The increasingly sophisticated arsenals of guided light weapons held by non-state actors pose an international security threat. Such systems—man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) and anti-tank guided weapons (ATGWs)— are operable by a single user or a small crew, and the weapons' missiles are either manually targeted or self-guided after launch. These weapons have been used by armed groups to attack commercial airlines, military aircraft, and governmental targets, as well as to degrade military and peacekeeping operations worldwide.

For decades, armed groups around the world have converted rockets intended for use with large, vehicle-mounted launchers into improvised light weapons. Indiscriminate and lethal, these weapons have killed and injured thousands of people in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere.

Yet, despite the demonstrated threat posed by artillery rockets, they have received significantly less attention from policy-makers than conventional small arms and light weapons do.

Although many armed groups possess guided weapons, such as man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) and anti-tank guided weapons (ATGWs), few of them possess sophisticated vehicle-mounted systems—like the SA-11—capable of targeting airliners at cruising altitudes.

Since 1998 at least 59 non-state armed groups from 37 countries are known to have possessed guided light weapons systems, posing a significant international security threat (2013).

Armed groups, whatever their objectives, tend to rely on similar mechanisms to control their fighters. These include a recruitment process that aims to provide the group with the appropriate quantity and quality of personnel; a socialization process for new recruits (such as through oaths and initiation rituals); and the elaboration of internal regulations—such as codes of conduct— and their dissemination among the rank and file.

This Security Assessment in North Africa (SANA) project paper on armed groups in Libya shows that the revolutionary brigades formed to topple Gaddafi are still a cohesive military force. The study highlights the emergence of the National Shield, which it calls an ‘army-in-waiting’, and suggests there is a power struggle over the rebuilding of the Libyan National Army as revolutionary commanders still distrust much of the leadership of the Libyan National Army and the Ministry of Defence who ran the war against them.

Armed groups—such as insurgent organizations—rely on internal regulations to exercise control over fighters; these rules also affect the groups’ respect for humanitarian law and human rights, and on levels of armed violence. Certain types of regulations can provide detailed guidance on the use of arms, their storage, and their management.

Since 2000, Guyana has seen a rise in violent crime associated with gangs and organized crime syndicates, which have created drug and weapon problems in the country. Cocaine, trafficked from neighbouring Venezuela, is transited through Guyana en route to Europe and the United States. Gangs also utilize the country’s porous borders with Brazil, a major weapons manufacturer, to smuggle arms into Guyana and ship them to other countries in the Caribbean.

Working Paper No. 8

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