Darfur’s fade-out from international headlines and Western interests over the past several years has fostered a false narrative that the conflict there is over, despite stark evidence to the contrary. Linked to this narrative, the paralysis of internal and international engagement on Darfur  has compelled Darfurians—civilians and combatants alike—to increase their outward mobility in search of safety and livelihood opportunities in neighbouring African countries or further afield into Europe.

The tri-border area between Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, and Mali has long been an important zone of commerce for West Africa, and a key transit route for the trade flowing between the Gulf of Guinea, the Sahara, Sahel, and Mediterranean.

Les institutions forensiques ont un rôle important à jouer dans les enquêtes criminelles, mais aussi, plus généralement, dans la lutte contre la prolifération des armes illicites. Mais elles ne peuvent le jouer que quand elles en ont les moyens. Cette réalité n’est pas toujours bien comprise, mais elle est prise en considération dans une note d’information portant sur les institutions forensiques guinéennes.

Southern Libya after the fall of Qaddafi has become synonymous with lawlessness. For centuries, the area has been home to a shifting sea of ethnic groups who see the border as an imposition but not a barrier. The Tubu (or Teda) are one such group, whose presence stretches across southern Libya, Chad, and Niger. 

The conflict that toppled former Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi in 2011 has affected Algeria in various ways. As a neighbour and a regional power, Algeria has largely looked to dialogue and engagement, playing a key role in international efforts to stabilize Libya. But the chaos that often characterizes its neighbour has moved Algiers to modify some of its long-held principles to ensure its interests are protected.

The Briefing Paper from the Security Assessment in North Africa (SANA) project examines the capacities of different actors to monitor illicit arms flows in the Sahel region. Monitoring illicit arms flows is critical to measuring states’ progress towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)—especially Target 16.4, which calls for a significant reduction of illicit arms flows by 2030.

Although Libya's estimated rate of violent deaths is still far below those of Syria and several Central American nations, it remains significant, ranking eighth globally for 2016. This unenviable situation is symptomatic of the ongoing turmoil and instability facing the country since 2011.

This Report from the Small Arms Survey’s Security Assessment in North Africa (SANA) project examines insecurity, terrorism, and trafficking in Niger.The Sahel hosts multiple conflicts with myriad armed actors destabilizing the entire region. Positioned at the heart of this region, Niger sits at the crossroads of terrorism, trafficking, and conflict.  

An unprecedented and complex Islamist insurgency has raged in Egypt since the 2013 military coup that overthrew the government formed by the Muslim Brotherhood. The Salafi-Jihadi attacks of Islamic State – Sinai Province (IS-SP) are well known. But another strain of pro-violence Islamist armed action aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) has recently evolved in the Nile Valley, home of 97 per-cent of the country’s population. This new strand of Jihadi belief represents what can perhaps best be described as a type of MB-Jihadism, or Ikhwani-Jihadism.

In April 2014, someone discovered a ‘gift from God’ in northern Niger: large quantities of gold, easily accessible using basic equipment. The gold rush began, and with it came a transformation of the security, political, and socio-economic dynamics in this vast and sensitive region. The population suddenly increased fifty-fold, and the number of vehicles circulating in the region grew even more than that.