Research methodology
The Small Arms Survey commissioned Afghan Peace Watch (APW) to conduct the field research described in this Situation Update. APW maintains an extensive network of journalists and civil society activists on the ground in Afghanistan, including professional journalists and reporters. For this study researchers were provided with information about benchmark NATO- and Soviet-pattern small arms and light weapons, ammunition, and associated materiel (for example, scopes and night-vision equipment) that was used to identify weapons in illicit markets between October and December 2023. Weapons markets were investigated and data collection was undertaken in three of the province’s districts (Balkh, Chamtal, and Kaldar) and in Mazar-i-Sharif city. Researchers also provided digital documentation of recently issued weapons permits, which are on file with the Small Arms Survey, and pricing information for weapons and ammunition found in various markets and summarized in this document. As part of this research, more than a dozen interviews were conducted with Taliban officials, weapons dealers, and officials in the previous national government.
Weapons markets
Between October and December 2023 APW researchers documented weapons markets in Balkh, Chamtal, and Kaldar districts. Two weapons markets in Balkh district are concealed inside local homes. These markets operate out of sight, but are easy to access. All operate unofficially, but with the knowledge of local Taliban officials, who may also benefit financially from sales. Access to these markets is restricted mainly to those with ties to the Taliban.
The largest weapons market documented was in the Noshar area of Chamtal district. Districts such as Chamtal have historically been strongholds for factions like Hizb-e-Islami and, later, the Taliban, with major jihadi commanders aligning with Hizb-e-Islami leader Gulbadin Hekmatyar. Although Chamtal is a Pashtun-dominated district, the militant stronghold was fuelled by the external support given by Europe, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United States to anti-Soviet guerrillas during the Soviet–Afghan war. The radicalization among these guerrilla forces laid the groundwork for prolonged instability and conflict in districts such as this.
Over the past two decades leaders such as Atta Noor, representing Jamiat-e-Islami, have been implicated in the destabilization of the district, often with the aim of influencing national and provincial election outcomes. More recently, a tribal leader noted that he now sees young men who are not very important or highly ranked in the Taliban openly carrying weapons, whereas in general only Taliban fighters with proper permission are allowed to carry weapons in public.
Kaldar district has been less affected by armed conflict and is predominantly a desert. Communities live mainly along the river that divides the province from Uzbekistan, which has put strong border-protection systems in place. The construction of the Qosh Tepa canal has not had any noticeable impact on conflict dynamics or demand for weapons in Kaldar district, and this may be expected to remain the case as long as water is fairly distributed and the authorities deal with any cross-border clashes.
Weapons types and prices
Researchers gathered price data from weapons markets in Balkh, Chamtal, and Kaldar districts and obtained two sets of price data from self-described weapons smugglers in Mazar-i-Sharif city in October and December 2023. Price data was provided in Afghan afghanis and US dollars to account for currency fluctuations over the past two years. In late 2022, when previous fieldwork was conducted in other provinces, the afghani was valued at roughly 90 to one US dollar; by late 2023 the exchange rate was roughly 70 to one.
Russian AK-pattern assault rifles varied in price from AFN 60,000 (USD 857) in Chamtal in November 2023 to AFN 100,000 (USD 1,428) in Mazar-i-Sharif in December 2023. Comparable US-made rifles were three to five times as expensive. M4 rifles, for example, were on sale for between AFN 350,000 (USD 5,000) in Chamtal and AFN 380,000 (USD 5,429) in Mazar-i-Sharif in October and December 2023 (two data points). By comparison, Pakistani-made AK-pattern rifles were on offer for AFN 20,000–30,000 (USD 286–428), which was slightly lower than the prices for Chinese-made AK-pattern (Type 56-1) assault rifles.
Overall, these prices are slightly higher than those that researchers had previously documented in Nangarhar province in November 2022, even taking currency fluctuations into consideration. This may indicate tighter Taliban controls in Balkh, or lower supplies of US-manufactured weapons being available in Balkh markets, or a combination of these factors. In any case, US-made materiel did not appear to be in high demand in markets.
Ammunition prices also varied significantly according to the weapon system, whether Soviet- or NATO-pattern. At AFN 12–15 (USD 0.17–0.21) per round, the price for AK-pattern 7.62 × 39 mm rounds in Balkh was generally consistent with data previously gathered in Nangarhar in November 2022; however, at AFN 20–50 (USD 0.29–0.71) for NATO-calibre 5.56 × 45 mm ammunition, prices were nearly double those previously recorded.
Importantly, the price data obtained offers single data points for individual weapons offered for sale.
Prices may fluctuate for a variety of reasons, including negotiations between buyer and seller, as well as the condition and quality of the item. Some weapons—especially US-made ones—have also been sold for much lower prices by those fearing house-to-house searches and Taliban reprisals against those caught in possession of such weapons.
Night vision and other high-value types of equipment were noticeably hard to find in the markets, suggesting tighter Taliban restrictions on the circulation of these items. Some price data for rifle scopes and night vision was obtained, but the make, model, and manufacturer of these items were not specified.
Taliban permits and weapons seizures
Prior to the collapse of the Western-supported government, weapons markets were present in areas under Taliban control and the Taliban had issued weapons permits in these areas. These included handwritten notes permitting individuals to hold and transport weapons. Since coming to power, the Taliban’s management practices have continued to evolve to deal with areas experiencing armed opposition and diverse ethnic communities.
Researchers noted three kinds of weapons permits being issued under the Taliban: official weapons permits to Taliban members, including the army and police; official weapons permits issued under the Chamber of Commerce and MoI to businesspeople; and unofficial weapons permits issued to those with direct ties to the Taliban. Unofficial permits are usually only valid in the province where they are issued and are only given to individuals with direct or indirect connections to the Taliban.
In April 2023 the Taliban’s MoI issued a statement requiring all mujahideen and civil service employees to obtain weapons permits from the relevant MoI authorities. This statement set a one-month deadline for compliance.
Researchers noted that the process for issuing weapons permits to businesspeople has been formalized under the Chamber of Commerce and MoI. The process can take between two and three months, and individual Taliban commanders can no longer issue official weapons permits under their personal authority. As of December 2023 the Taliban claimed to have issued some 163 weapons permits to businesses, factories, commercial markets, and hospitals in Balkh.[1] Despite the official ban on informal permits, the Taliban continue in practice to issue handwritten weapons permits to individuals having connections with them, which remain valid only in the province. In terms of format, only the MoI in Kabul can print official permit cards, which are recorded in a database, while other weapons permits issued at the provincial level may be typed. APW researchers obtained examples of both official permit cards and typed permissions, which are on file with the Small Arms Survey.
These regulatory efforts have not prevented the activities of weapons markets. Weapons seized by Taliban commanders and fighters during the collapse of the previous government likely account for a significant source of supply to these markets. These items were initially considered as ‘war booty’ and became the personal property of the individuals who had seized them. It may be that, as economic conditions have worsened, owners of seized materiel have sought to convert their stocks into cash.
In one instance that occurred during the government collapse a Taliban fighter described seizing a vehicle with 48 ‘Kalashnikov’ rifles on board. The fighter kept one for himself and sold it in Balkh two months later for AFN 65,000 (USD 720). As a field researcher reported, ‘this pattern of seizing and selling weapons became a means for Taliban fighters to address economic challenges within their families. Thus, they were motivated to capture more weapons.’ Similarly, during house-to-house searches immediately following the collapse, individual Taliban fighters kept some of the weapons they had seized and later sold them, while the remainder were turned over to Taliban commanders. One Talib noted that everyone in his group tasked with house-to-house searches was entitled to commandeer the same number of weapons as the number of houses that had been searched.
The Taliban’s High Commission for Security and Clearance Affairs, led by Deputy Defence Minister Fazil Mazloom, has taken primary responsibility for house-to-house searches for weapons across the country (ICG, 2022, p. 22). The Taliban routinely conduct search and seizure operations in Balkh province. For instance, the Taliban captured 33 rifles and seven pistols during a raid on the Tajik village of Samar Qandian in Balkh district in early December 2023.[2] The raid may have been prompted by specific intelligence regarding the presence of weapons in this Tajik (non-Pashtun) area. Yet these operations have not been as intensive in Balkh province as in other areas, which is perhaps a reflection of lower armed group activity in the province.
According to data collected from Taliban sources for this Situation Update, the authorities seized some 17,000 weapons in Balkh province over the past two years, but this figure has not been independently corroborated.[3] US-manufactured weapons reportedly account for less than 10 per cent of the weapons seized. The majority are said to be AK-pattern assault rifles and pistols of the types that have been widely in circulation in Afghanistan for decades. Some of these weapons were likely also seized from the supporters of former elite government officials, including the houses and offices of business associates, relatives, and affiliated militias.
Under the previous government, predominantly non-Pashtun power brokers and political elites were able to establish their own militias and weapons stockpiles. Taliban sources interviewed by researchers noted that the Taliban feel they have not been successful in locating and seizing all these weapons stockpiles, and some likely remain hidden.
Evidence of cross-border trafficking and armed group activity
There is currently no evidence of significant cross-border weapons flows between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan using the border crossing at Hairatan. This does not preclude the possibility of some small-scale weapons trafficking, but none of the Afghan stakeholders engaged considered it to be a significant issue. Recent Small Arms Survey engagement with Uzbek customs and border authorities confirms these reports. Researchers did note the trafficking of parts for armoured vehicles to Tajikistan as scrap metal at the Sher Khan border crossing in Afghanistan’s Kunduz province. Because of this and other issues, the Tajik authorities have security concerns and have requested international assistance to strengthen the country’s border controls.
The risk of armed violence by resistance groups appears muted in Balkh province. While the NRF is one of the main armed resistance groups operating in north-eastern Afghanistan and has strong support among Tajik and specifically Tajik Panjshiri communities,[4] it has failed to establish a strong support base or undertake operations against the Taliban in Balkh. This is in part due to longstanding political differences in the Tajik-dominated Jamiat-e-Islami (Jamiat) political party. Atta Noor, previously dubbed ‘Emperor of Balkh’ by Afghan media, is the main power broker and a former governor of Balkh. Jamiat is the main political party of Tajiks in Afghanistan and was founded by Islamist students at Kabul University in the 1970s. Jamiat later became a Tajik-dominated Islamist party under the leadership of Burhanuddin Rabbani, a Tajik from Badakhshan. The Pashtun-dominated Hizb-e-Islami was founded at the same time under the leadership of Gulbadin Hekmatyar.
In 2021 a split occurred in Jamiat that led to two factions being formed, both under the same name. Atta Noor leads one faction of Jamiat, while the other is led by the son of Burhanuddin Rabbani, Salahuddin Rabbani. Panjshiris are represented in both factions, but primarily in the faction that Rabbani leads. To an extent, the NRF has now overshadowed Jamiat as a political party, and currently leads armed opposition against the Taliban. These political differences among Tajik leaders have never been fully resolved and will likely continue to undermine Tajik unity under the NRF or any other armed opposition group.
Interviews and press monitoring do not suggest significant evidence of armed groups being active in Balkh compared to other provinces in the country. Apart from the successful ISKP suicide attack against the Taliban governor in April 2023 (in response to which the Taliban raided the city of Mazar-i-Sharif, allegedly killing members of ISKP), there have been no major ISKP attacks. Other parts of the country may be more prone to terrorist group activity, including ISKP and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) cross-border activity in eastern Afghanistan and the border region with Pakistan.
[1] Taliban figures collected by APW, December 2023.
[2] Author interview, Balkh province, December 2023.
[3] The figure provided by the Taliban was 16,858 (data collected by APW, December 2023).
[4] The Afghanistan Freedom Front has also been active in northern Afghanistan, but researchers recorded no major incidents in Balkh associated with it.
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