On 25 July 2021, Tunisia took an unexpected turn as President Saïed—first elected in 2019—declared a state of emergency. This was the first step in what became an autocratic centralization of power, culminating in the dissolution of parliament and the dismissal of the government on 30 March 2022. Though his stated aim was to end political deadlock and fight corruption (Speakman Cordall, 2022), he has instead presided over an escalating economic and political crisis (Carbonaro, 2023). And while the poor economy and political repression pose significant challenges for many Tunisians, President Saïed’s shift towards autocracy has had an even more profound impact on migrants in Tunisia.
Tunisia’s economy is in shambles. While the country experienced a modest gross domestic product (GDP) growth of 0.6 per cent in 2023, high external debt and a 7.10 per cent budget deficit remain critical issues (INS, 2023; Trading Economics, 2023). In comparison, in July 2024, Tunisia reported a GDP growth of 1 per cent, but the economy is still troubled by an inflation rate of 7 per cent and an unemployment rate of 16 per cent (INS, n.d.). The potential lifeline offered by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has thus far not materialized in the face of potential political backlash to the implementation of reforms required for funding. In addition, external factors such as the war in Ukraine have caused food shortages and spikes in energy prices (Saleh, 2022).
Against this dire economic background, President Saïed has turned to demonizing migrants within and transiting through the country in an attempt to shift the focus from the economy and cast himself as a populist hero. This was evidenced most clearly in February 2023, when he accused irregular migrants, particularly sub-Saharan Africans, of causing ‘violence, crime, and unacceptable acts’ (Middle East Eye, 2023). The president stressed the need to enforce strict laws on foreign nationals and border control, and framed migrants as a threat to Tunisia’s Arab–Muslim identity (Middle East Eye, 2023). Subsequent police actions led to a surge in racist attacks and xenophobic behaviour.
Migrants have been a regular presence in Tunisia since around 2011, when they arrived in the country after fleeing instability in Libya. It is only in recent years, however, that they have become a political issue. President Saïed has used Tunisia’s position as the second largest transit point for migrants en route to Europe as a negotiation point with the EU. He successfully secured financial aid to support his administration’s strained finances as part of a package that also included capacity building and border control.
The aim of these packages from the EU is to help stem the flow of migrants. Though cooperation between the EU and Tunisia began in 2015, the current relationship is built on the ‘strategic partnership’ agreement signed in July 2023 (Amara, 2023a). In a visit to Tunisia in April 2024—a few months before European elections, in which migration was a crucial issue—Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni focused on the necessity of reinforcing this cooperation, repatriating migrants, and regulating migratory flows (France 24, 2024).[1]
Even as the EU increases its commitment to preventing sub-Saharan migrants from taking to boats, however, there is increasing evidence that its actions are not without risk to the migrants themselves. Civil society organizations have noted that the increased resources deployed by the EU are contributing to pushbacks and mistreatment of migrants. For example, one recent investigation revealed that Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia have pushed migrants into desert areas, despite having received more than EUR 400 million from the EU for the management of their borders through the Emergency Trust Fund (Le Monde, 2024).
The situation is potentially even more worrisome after EU heads of states validated the migration and asylum pact in May 2024. This agreement introduced ‘filtering’ procedures at EU borders, intended to distinguish those migrants eligible for asylum claims from those deemed ineligible who may be repatriated (L’Express, 2024). This effort requires agreements with countries of origin and transit, part of a long line of attempts to further externalize the EU borders into third countries. Civil society organizations have raised the alarm over the potential detention of families and the ‘criminalization’ of migrants (L’Express, 2024).
[1] It is worth noting that Meloni’s focus on migration worked politically: her party received the most votes in Italy’s EU parliamentary elections. As a result, she is widely considered to be a new kingmaker in the European Parliament (Preve, 2024).
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