The EU MoU

In 2023, amid his consolidation of power, President Saïed used the migration crisis both domestically—as a populist way to increase support for his government—and internationally—as a currency to negotiate with the EU (Ben Hamadi, 2024).[1] While the former tactic won some adherents, the latter proved less effective, as the EU stipulated that agreements must first be reached with the IMF.[2] That is not to say that the EU is unconcerned with Tunisia: there are fears in Brussels and other European capitals that, should the Tunisian economy collapse entirely, amplifying internal instability, this could trigger an exodus of people crossing the Mediterranean towards Europe (Liboreiro and Genovese, 2023).

Despite the democratic regression of the past three years, the EU has continued to provide support to Tunisia, including financial assistance. In July 2023, the bloc signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the country (EC, 2023). Under the MoU, the EU agreed to provide EUR 150 million in funding to Tunisia (De La Feld, 2024). The objective of the MoU was to avoid the worst-case scenario and ensure that the Tunisian government has enough liquidity to fund basic services.[3]

The text of the MoU outlines non-binding action plans across five thematic pillars: 1) macro-economic stability; 2) economy and trade; 3) the green energy transition; 4) people-to-people contacts; and 5) migration (EC, 2023). Migration is a pivotal focal point of the MoU, with an initial financial commitment of EUR 105 million earmarked to combat anti-smuggling operations, fortify border management capabilities, and streamline the repatriation process for asylum seekers (HRW, 2024). Officially, these funds are intended to bolster Tunisia’s capacity to effectively manage irregular migration flows, and include investments in essential equipment as well as logistical support for international organizations such as UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) (Liboreiro and Genovese, 2023).

The MoU ‘only includes very general language on human rights’ (CHR, 2023). This is notable given the evidence of Tunisian pushbacks at the country’s borders and of acts of violence against sub-Saharan migrants (OHCHR, 2023).[4] The lack of clear references to human rights safeguards, coupled with the EU’s silence in the face of reports about Tunisian expulsions and pushbacks at the country’s borders, would suggest that the bloc has chosen to adopt a securitized approach to migration. The EU sees migration as a security rather than a humanitarian issue and, in doing so, seeks to treat the symptoms rather than the root causes of migration or its impact on migrants travelling towards Europe.

The practical impact of this decision to seemingly turn a blind eye is clear. The EU has allocated EUR 4.5 million in 2024 and a further EUR 4.5 million for 2025 to support the efforts of Tunisian naval units in countering irregular migration. In addition, the EU is providing Tunisia with EUR 4.8 million to refurbish six vessels for the GNM, to be used in interdiction operations (Kapitalis, 2024). This increased support is proving effective: in the first quarter of 2024, the GNM interdicted 14,562 migrants at sea, returning them to Tunisian territory (Kapitalis, 2024).


[1] He is not the first to do so; indeed, migration has been leveraged to apply pressure on the EU to release funds (Martini and Megerisi, 2023).

[2] Online interview with Hanène Zbiss, journalist and president of the Tunisia section of UPF, April 2024.

[3] This significant agreement involving Tunisian president Saïed, European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen, Italian prime minister Meloni, and Dutch prime minister Mark Rutte underscores the critical imperative of grappling with migration challenges amid prevailing geopolitical uncertainties (Saleh and Dubois, 2023).

[4] The MoU emphasizes that Tunisia will only be expected to accept the return of its nationals, not migrants transiting through the country. Returns will be voluntary and facilitated by the IOM and UNHCR (Liboreiro and Genovese, 2023).


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