EU’s engagement on migration

The EU’s engagement with Tunisia on migration is multifaceted. Italy has been a leader in pushing for EU engagement, given its location, as most migrants have been arriving by sea from North Africa. Italy became more vocal in 2020. That year, nearly 80 per cent of all migrants who reached Europe departed from either Tunisia or Libya; of the migrants landing on Italian shores, about 6,500 were Tunisians (Arab Weekly, 2020). As a consequence, Italian authorities began to put increasing pressure on Tunisia to adopt a stricter security approach, including seizing boats before departure (Arab Weekly, 2020).

Italy’s push to curb migration in 2020 came well after the EU began engaging with Tunisia on migration issues. In 2015, Brussels implemented programmes to train and enhance the capacities of the Tunisian Coast Guard (Garde Nationale Maritime, GNM), particularly in collecting personal data of migrants. One such example was the ‘Maghreb Border Management’ programme, launched in July 2018, with a budget of EUR 24.5 million—most of which went to the GNM (FTDES, 2021).

In 2018, the European Commission designated Tunisia as a strategic partner for establishing ‘disembarkation platforms’ (FTDES, 2021). These platforms served as outsourced sorting camps intended to accommodate—outside of Europe—migrants either rescued or intercepted at sea. Additionally, the European agency Frontex monitors Tunisian waters using satellite images, radar, and drones, and shares this information with the GNM—a cooperation agreement similar to the one the EU has with the Libyan coast guard. The efforts are primarily focused on early detection of vessels carrying migrants that are departing from Tunisian waters, giving the GNM time to effect a maritime interception (FTDES, 2021).

The focus on interdiction (rather than on addressing the root causes of migration) has not led to reduced numbers of migrants transiting Tunisia on their way to Europe. In fact, regional conflicts, as well as political and economic crises in Tunisia, have resulted in increased numbers of attempted sea crossings towards Europe from Tunisia or by Tunisians (Refugees International, 2023, p. 13). According to Refugees International, between January and September 2023, the number of migrants crossing to Italy from Tunisia was four times higher than in 2022, reaching 90,601 (p. 13). This could be explained by the security-focused agreement between Italy and Libya in 2017, since Tunisia became the main exit point for sub-Saharan migrants towards the EU from this point onwards. In 2023, 62 per cent of arrivals to Italy originated from Tunisia, while only 33 per cent originated from Libya—compared with 91 per cent in 2017 (Meddeb and Louati, 2024, p. 7; UNHCR, 2023). According to UNHCR, ‘[n]early 100,000 migrants and refugees, primarily from West Africa, reached Italy via the sea route from Tunisia in 2023. More than half (62% of all sea arrivals) arrived during the July-September quarter’ (UNHCR, 2023, p. 3).


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