On 15 April 2023, war broke out between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Since the fall of Omar al-Bashir in 2019, SAF and the RSF co-governed through an intricate power-sharing deal that included other armed groups and, importantly, civilians representing the pro-democracy movement in Sudan. The confrontation between SAF and the RSF unravelled the wins of the 2018 revolution and the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement, which was meant to usher in a period of tranquillity and address economic and political marginalization.
Investigations into the post-war landscape in Sudan showcase an evolution of political paradigms that have emerged to decisively shape developments in the country. This portfolio provides a snapshot of otherwise obscure local players, institutions, and the processes that inform everyday war politics in Sudan.
HSBA’s Sudan portfolio aims to introduce readers to the multiplicity of actors and networks that influence the situation on the ground. In the coming months, the portfolio will include additional actors, groups, and key events in the country’s various regions.
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Actors |
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Ibrahim Adroub
Head of the High Council of Beja Nazirs and Independent Chieftains splinter group
Adroub belongs to the Amarar tribe in eastern Sudan. It is one of the largest groups residing in the Red Sea state. Its homes include most of the seaports, including the proposed investment site of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Ammara. Adroub is not the al-Nazir of Amarar; however, as an Omda’a (leader in his tribe), he became the vice president of the High Council of Beja Nazirs and Independent Chieftains, before heading the dissident wing after internal differences emerged in June 2022.
Ahmed Adam Bakhit
Minister of social development and deputy head of Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)
A veteran of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), Bakhit has served as JEM’s vice president and secretary of the Darfur region since the previous JEM leader, Khalil Ibrahim’s, time. He was appointed minister of social development in February 2020 as part of JEM’s quota following the inauguration of the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA), replacing a civilian member of the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) group.
Shaybah Dirar
Alliance of Eastern Sudan Parties and Movements
Deputy head of the Beja Congress, Dirar, a staunch adversary of central politics, opposed the 2006 Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement in Asmara. In 2010, he ran as an independent candidate for the Red Sea state governorship. Dirar later relinquished this pursuit to the favoured candidate of the National Congress Party, then-incumbent governor Mohamed Taher Ayla, who was the last prime minister before the December Revolution. After 2019, Dirar emerged as a central figure in eastern Sudanese politics, anointing himself Lt. Gen. of the Alliance of Eastern Sudan Parties and Movements, the armed wing of the Beja Congress. On numerous occasions, he addressed the public in military uniform, sometimes supporting the High Council of Beja Nazirs and Independent Chieftains and other times standing against it. After the outbreak of conflict in April 2023, Dirar publicly backed Sudan’s army chief, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, by stating that he prepared 25,000 fighters to support SAF. In September 2023, Dirar’s forces clashed with SAF in Port Sudan, but these skirmishes were quickly contained.
Osman Hussein
Acting prime minister
Osman joined the Council of Ministers in 1981 as a public servant without any declared political affiliations. He was the director of financial and administrative affairs and the director-general of political affairs and media. Weeks before al-Bashir was removed, Hussein was appointed Secretary-General of the Council of Ministers for the deposed Islamist government, which was the same position the former prime minister, Abdalla Hamdok, later appointed him. Three months after the October 2021 coup, and following the international community’s suspension of economic aid and technical support, al-Burhan nominated 15 ministers—including Hussein—to the position of minister of cabinet affairs. Following the 15 April war, Hussein was named the acting prime minister.
Ibrahim Jaber
Assistant to the Commander-in-Chief of the Sudan Armed Forces
With a bachelor’s degree in engineering, Jaber was the director of Sudan’s Complex for Heavy Industries[1] and the director of its commercial office in Malaysia. A member of the Transitional Military Council after the ousting of al-Bashir in April 2019, he served as chairman of the economic committee and as a member of the Transitional Sovereignty Council since its establishment in August 2019. Jaber was appointed assistant to the commander-in-chief of SAF in May 2023 and was the first high-ranking officer to relocate to Port Sudan after 15 April 2023. He oversees several ministries in Port Sudan, including agriculture, communications, development, industry, investment, livestock, trade, and transport. He also heads the Supreme National Committee assigned with interfacing with the United Nations.
Sayed Mohamed al-Amin Tirik
Nazir of the Hadandowa tribe and head of the High Council of Beja Nazirs and Independent Chieftains
Tirik was the National Congress Party's candidate for the Kassala State Legislative Council in the 2015 elections. He is one of the most important figures in eastern Sudan since 2019, and heads the High Council of Beja Nazirs and Independent Chieftains. He was a decisive figure in overthrowing the transitional government through his support for the military.
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Al Attawa
Al Attawa is an umbrella term for Arab groups, mainly Baggara tribes of the Kenana tribe. These include the Hawazma, Misseriya, and Reizegat tribes, who believe they share a common ancestor, Atta. The key to the Al Attawa historical narrative is control over the Zurga area, with fertile land spanning East Darfur, West and South Kordofan, and White and Blue Nile states. Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, or Hemeti, and the rest of the RSF leadership are of the Mahariya clan of the Reizegat. Al Attawa is an enlargement of the Tajammu al Arabi (Arab Gathering) project initiated in Darfur by Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, who reportedly supported rebel groups in Sudan. Gérard Prunier has described the Tajammu al Arabi project as "a militantly racist and pan-Arabist organization which stressed the 'Arab' character of the province”.
High Council of Beja Nazirs and Independent Chieftains
The High Council of Beja Nazirs and Independent Chieftains was established by Eastern Sudan’s native administration system following disputes with the transitional government over representation in the JPA. The council consists of 13 components: 7 nazaras (a tribal-based governance system) and 6 independent chieftains. The nazaras include Ababda, Amrar, Bani Amer, Bashariyin, Habab, Hadandowa, and Halanga tribes. The chieftains are Artiga, Ashraf, Hasnab, Kumaylab, Nurab, and Shayayab tribes. Hadandowa Nazir, the largest tribe in the east, chairs the council, with other tribal leaders serving as deputies. In 2022, the council split after its president, Tirik, suspended its membership in preparation for the second Sinkat conference. The dissenting group emerging from within the High Council of Beja Nazirs and Independent Chieftains, led by Adroub, claimed that the goals and political positioning of the eastern track within the JPA motivated the split. They accused Hemedti, who was in charge of the eastern Sudan file at the time, of undermining the council by bribing the High Council of Beja Nazirs and Independent Chieftains leadership to manipulate the direction of the eastern track.
Forces of Freedom and Change – Democratic Bloc
The Forces of Freedom and Change – Democratic Bloc (FFC-DB) was established in November 2022 and is an alliance of armed groups that signed the JPA. These groups include JEM, led by Gebreil Ibrahim, the current minister of finance and economic planning; the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM-MM) led by Minni Minawi, the governor of Darfur; the Justice and Democracy Alliance, led by Mubarak Ardol, the former director of the Sudanese Company for Mineral Resources; the Democratic Unionist Party, led by Jaafar al-Sadiq al-Mirghani; and the High Council of Beja Nazirs and Independent Chieftains, led by Tirik. FFC-DB evolved from the Forces of Freedom and Change – National Charter, which split from the FFC alliance before the 2021 military coup that ended Hamdok's transitional government. FFC-DB leaders continued their constitutional positions in the transitional government after the coup and it continues to be a political base for the post-coup military government. Not all Darfur armed movements that signed the JPA joined the FFC-DB, including the factions of leaders al-Hadi Idris and al-Taher Hajar, whose groups remain within the original FFC alliance.
Justice and Equality Movement
JEM was established in August 2001 by a group of educated Darfuris, many of whom were former members of the Popular Congress Party. Most of the group’s leaders hail from the Kobi clan, a subgroup of the wealthy Zaghawa merchant tribes in North Darfur. JEM abstained from signing the Darfur peace agreements in Abuja in 2006 and Doha in 2011. Among its military exploits, one of their most notable events was an unsuccessful attack on Omdurman town in 2008. Finance Minister Ibrahim became the leader of the movement after his brother, Khalil Ibrahim, was killed in late 2011. As a member of the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), an opposition group alliance, JEM signed the JPA.
Sudanese Revolutionary Front
Established in November 2011, the SRF is comprised of four armed movements: the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), the Sudan Liberation Movement-Abdul Wahid (SLM/A), the Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi (SLA-MM), and JEM. This alliance initially aimed to fight and depose the National Congress Party’s central government through armed rebellion and political struggle. Later, smaller armed movements from northern, central, and eastern Sudan joined the alliance. The United Popular Front for Liberation and Justice, an alliance of 17 smaller movements from eastern Sudan, was one of these groups. Ideological differences and personal interests eroded the SRF alliance, particularly the disagreement over adopting secularism in Sudan. The leaders of JEM, which is a group with Islamist roots, opposed this. The SRF signed the New Dawn Charter in 2013 with several central political parties, later entering into the Sudan Call alliance. This alliance paved the way for the post-revolution joint transitional government, where SRF members became the JPA’s primary signatories.
Events |
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Sinkat conference
The first Sinkat conference was held on 27 September 2020 after the 2019 transitional government failed to reach a solution with the High Council of Beja Nazirs and Independent Chieftains on the eastern track of the JPA. The High Council had called for a conference in Sinkat, 100 km southwest of Port Sudan, to reclaim the Beja’s historical rights over their land, and their right to self-determination. The High Council’s demands called for an end to the eastern track of the JPA and the suspension of agricultural and industrial development plans and mining activity until the region’s interests were prioritized within the JPA framework. A second Sinkat conference was held in July 2022 following divisions within the High Council of Beja Nazirs and Independent Chieftains over tribal representation within the group.
Arkawit conference
The Arkawit Conference was held in Port Sudan—at the behest of the FFC-DB—after the outbreak of armed conflict in April 2023 between SAF and the RSF. It concluded with the formation of the Sudanese National Front, headed by the High Council of Beja Nazirs and Independent Chieftains’ Tirik, with the aim of providing support for SAF.
[1] Sudan’s Complex for Heavy Industries is not exclusively for military production; it extends to agricultural machinery and the manufacturing and rehabilitation of railway wagons and river transport equipment.