Prior to the war, the political economy of the east shaped political developments in Sudan. In the months leading up to the outbreak of conflict, Gebreil stirred resentment in the east against Khartoum and the JPA when he signed a tripartite agreement between the Government of Sudan, the Sudanese private capital firm Invictus Investment, owned by Sudanese tycoon Osama Daoud, and the Emirati AD Ports Group—the latter two constituting a long-term Emirati alliance. The contract stipulated a USD six billion investment to the Sudanese government for the development of the new Abu Amama port. The deal included a free industrial zone, commercial and residential cities, and resorts to promote tourism (Othman, 2022). The terms of the contract were shielded from the public, despite promises to the contrary. Port Sudan residents feared that the project would negatively affect the city’s economic prospects, which are dependent on the existing port. There were also concerns that the UAE would require concessions that would not be welcomed by civic associations and workers’ unions (Sudan Tribune, 2022b).
With these developments in mind, Adroub’s Beja Nazirs Council wing called for the dismissal of Gebreil as minister of finance, alleging corruption and mismanagement of Port Sudan (Obshar, 2022). In June 2023, the Joint High Committee in Red Sea State to Demand Workers’ Rights and the Teachers’ Committee held a protest at Gebreil’s Port Sudan residence to demand a solution to electricity outages and the payment of delayed salaries to workers and civil servants. Similarly, maritime workers denounced the Ministry of Finance’s failure to pay their dues, and declared a strike. The Sudanese Teachers’ Committee in the Red Sea also called for a strike, demanding backdated payment of salaries from April. The strikers have since entered into direct negotiations with the director general of finance in the state, who has committed to paying 50 per cent of the amount due while negotiations are still underway to settle the rest.[1]
At the end of November, workers in the Red Sea state ended their strike after the government promised to pay August and September salaries, and to make the necessary arrangements for the payment of October salaries. In early January, the Red Sea State Government’s Council of Ministers approved the budget for the year 2024, amounting to more than SDG 100 billion (about USD 168 million), with payrolls as a priority.[2]
The FFC-DB’s politicking in the east, however, represents a dangerous path in a state that has been plagued by ethnic violence dating back decades (Fadl, 2020). Tensions worsened after the popular revolution succeeded in overthrowing al-Bashir in 2019, exposing in the process cleavages in the failed settlement process with the Beja Nazirs Council. Despite expanded urbanization and the increased waves of immigration to the east, the inner city’s neighbourhoods remain divided along ethnic and class lines—a product of 20th century colonial urban planning (Abdel Ati et al., 2011). The most recent violence occurred in August 2019 between the Beni Amer and the Nuba groups, and in November 2019 between the Beni Amer and the Hadendaowa (Al Arabiya, 2019; Alhurra.com, 2019). Further violence took place in August 2020 in neighbouring Kassala state (OCHA, 2020). Disputes over land ownership are a major driver of ethnic grievances, including the violation of compensation rights for any major development projects (such as the development of ports) (Abdel Ati et al., 2011, p. 15).
Lingering disputes within the Beja Nazirs Council may similarly be attributed to contestation over land in relation to development planning. The proposed building site for the Abu Amama port, whose construction is pushed by the Gebreil–Tirik alliance within the Beja Nazirs Council, falls within the oversight boundaries of the Bishari people (Radio Dabanga, 2023a). Meanwhile, the dissenting faction of the Beja Nazirs Council, the Amarar, are the historic claimants of Port Sudan’s land. Despite conflicting political positions, the economic interests of eastern elites—particularly developments concerning the ports—remain the key area where all groups are prepared to compromise. Tirik, a staunch SAF ally, did not re-evaluate his administration’s position on the port of Abu Amama, nor did he review the UAE’s future investment in the region despite its backing of the RSF. Following the outbreak of war, political fragmentation continues to occur along personal and ideological lines, thus conforming to the post-colonial ideal in the context of Sudan.
Early in the war, SAF consolidated control over the Red Sea state through excessive securitization, such as appointing a military governor who prohibited any criticism of SAF, banned all community-based initiatives—including emergency response rooms—and formed alternative committees mandated by district directors; these committees do not include former members of resistance committees or the FFC (Altaghyeer, 2023; Radio Dabanga, 2024a). The local government in Port Sudan imposed a curfew in May and again in December 2023, which is ongoing (Sudan Tribune, 2023b). In February 2024, despite a total outage of communications and internet networks for more than a week, the eastern government banned Starlink devices, which exacerbated the suffering of people who use banking apps in their daily transactions (Radio Dabanga, 2024b).
Securitization remains the most viable governance strategy in Port Sudan in the face of possible infiltration by the RSF and their alliances, as well as a means of quelling any fears arising from a possible fallout of further political fragmentation with the eastern peace bloc, as was the case in Khartoum. The first three months of the war saw continuous SAF allegations of raids on RSF sleeper cells, claiming to have arrested infiltrating enemies within the Red Sea state or aborted attempts to smuggle weapons across the Red Sea coasts into Port Sudan and Suakin (France 24, 2023; Othman, 2023). The Red Sea state later banned the building of shops in public facilities, and arrested young people from the regions of Darfur and Kordofan, most of whom have marginal daily jobs, such as wheelbarrow porters, over allegations of their affiliation with or support to the RSF.
The city, however, has not witnessed any security incidents since the arrival of al-Burhan, except for a small clash between SAF and its once-aligned eastern militia under the command of self-promoted Lt. Gen. Shaybah Dirar (Nashed, 2023b).
[1] Author interview with Hassan Kunah, member of the Sudanese Professionals Association of Red Sea State, Port Sudan, Sudan, 16 July 2023.
[2] Author interview with Hassan Kunah, member of the Sudanese Professionals Association of Red Sea State, Port Sudan, Sudan, 16 July 2023.
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