Port Sudan, in Sudan’s north-east, is geostrategically important due to its position on the Red Sea. It is the country’s main seaport through which 90 per cent of Sudan’s international trade transits (Eltahir, Abdelaziz, and Saul, 2021). Former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdouk’s plans for Sudan’s economic recovery had included developing Port Sudan as a regional logistics hub for neighbouring landlocked countries, including Ethiopia and South Sudan, prior to his removal in the October 2021 military coup. Before the current conflict, the Red Sea state was second only to Khartoum in terms of subnational resource revenues (Logan et al., 2021, p. 39).
Shortly after the government stated that it had no intention of making the city its new headquarters, it formed what appeared to be an emergency government in Port Sudan (Al Arabi, 2023). The Council of Ministers held its first meeting in Port Sudan on 9 July, headed by Osman Hussein, the minister of cabinet affairs and prime ministerdesignate (Noor News, 2023). The meeting was also attended by a member of the Sovereignty Council, Assistant Commander-in-Chief Lt. Gen. Ibrahim Jaber, signalling continuity with pre-war governance structures (Sudan Akhbar, 2023). These meetings resulted in decisions to prioritize salary payments to civil servants and increase cash flows by printing banknotes outside of Sudan (Halfawi, 2023). Banks in areas not affected by the war were called upon to resume financial activities and report problems to the Central Bank branch in Port Sudan (SUNA, 2023b). Parts of the executive apparatus were also replaced, both before and after al-Burhan’s arrival in Port Sudan (Ahmed, 2023).
As part of these undeclared efforts to re-establish the seat of governance away from war-torn Khartoum, the Red Sea state government granted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs land in Port Sudan to build a permanent headquarters, a conference centre, and presidential villas (Sudan Tribune, 2023a). From Port Sudan, the government launched a campaign to emphasize its legitimacy by issuing several directives. For instance, in July, the Sudan Railways Company resumed the Atbara–Port Sudan line (SUNA, 2023a), and the Civil Aviation Authority reopened commercial air flights in coordination with the International Civil Aviation Organization (Abdulrahim, 2023). Badr and Tarco, both national carriers, and international carriers such as EgyptAir resumed flights (Kush News, 2023). Furthermore, the Ministry of Interior opened an electronic passport facility in Port Sudan, restoring this service following its earlier suspension in Khartoum. Meanwhile, diplomatic activity is abuzz in Port Sudan as SAF seeks a political solution to the conflict through external interventions, underscoring the importance of having a functioning government in place.
Formally naming Port Sudan as the capital poses risks for al-Burhan since Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (known as ‘Hemeti’) could feel compelled to name an RSF-controlled capital elsewhere. Coexistent capitals could deepen the SAF–RSF political struggle and overrule legitimacy, which in turn would, among other things, likely complicate the management of humanitarian aid. Hemeti has threatened to form a parallel government in Khartoum, or perhaps in Geneina, West Darfur (Daglo, 2023; Reuters, 2023). Furthermore, if al-Burhan were to declare Port Sudan the capital, it could send a message to SAF officers in Khartoum that their commands will be abandoned, potentially destabilizing the already fragile SAF internal cohesion (Younes, 2024); the largest SAF forces are still located in Khartoum.
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