Key findings

  • Following the outbreak of war between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, in April 2023, the Sudanese government has not officially relocated the capital to Port Sudan, despite some government departments, diplomatic agencies, and international organizations setting up administrative headquarters in the eastern port city.
  • Belligerents on both sides of the conflict are trying to gain legitimacy through the formation of de facto governments in their areas of military control. This sets a dangerous precedent of using the logic of governance to shape the direction of the conflict, particularly the dynamics of aid.
  • The intention of SAF to form a new government in Port Sudan has contributed to political fragmentation among an already fragile coalition weakened by the October 2021 coup.
  • Unresolved issues related to political settlements are exacerbating political tensions in Port Sudan. The Juba Peace Agreement (JPA), championed by the military government, is not embraced by the High Council of Beja Nazirs and Independent Chieftains (referred to hereafter as Beja Nazirs Council) in the east. Land disputes and the future of Port Sudan’s political economy remain contentious issues.
  • A strategy of excessive securitization by SAF, including curfews, has been imposed to control all aspects of daily activities in Port Sudan.
  • Restrictions on aid distribution, the government’s decision to ban all community-based committees and initiatives, and weak state infrastructure continue to exacerbate humanitarian needs in the city.

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