Ethnicization and reinvigoration of intercommunal tensions

South Kordofan state is characterized by significant ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity with Nuban groups and Arab tribes such as the Awlad Himaid, Hawazma, Kenana, and Misseriya living alongside groups such as the Bargo, Barno, and Fallata originating from western Africa. Hawazma from al-Fayd, Khor al-Delib, and Rahmania have taken up arms to fight alongside Mohammed Ibrahim Sheria, a Rawawga Hawazma and commander of an RSF unit.[48] Researchers in South Kordofan have found evidence that Misseriya youth have been mobilized, although clan divisions within the tribe illustrate the broader complexity of ethnicized mobilization in South Kordofan, with other Misseriya either supporting SAF or remaining neutral.[49] The ethnicization of the prolonged war reopened divisions between groups—because of mobilization along ethnic lines and new levels of economic duress—and weakened traditional mechanisms for peace and conflict resolution. Tribalization and ethnicization of the current conflict have been cultivated in particular by the RSF in its recruitment of Hawazma, Kenana, and Misseriya in South Kordofan, which stands to represent the most damaging long-term impact of the fighting in the state. This recruitment invoked Arab, pan-Sahelian tropes that appealed to members of the Al Attawa tribal umbrella, living in a region with ‘unprecedented security and humanitarian challenges’, according to a January 2023 briefing to the UN Security Council.[50] These tropes include a strong racial element and the capture of land in South Kordofan for Arab economic use is a core principle. Well before the outbreak of conflict, Hemeti himself had worked assiduously to cultivate the loyalty of tribal leaders from these Baggara communities.[51]


[48] Confidential situational update report on the Sudan conflict by S4GS, 3 May 2023.
[49] Confidential situational update report on the Sudan conflict by S4GS, 3 May 2023.
[50] Confidential United Nations Office for West Africa briefing, 10 January 2023. For more on Al Attawa, see Prunier (2011) and the Small Arms Survey’s ‘HSBA Reference Portfolio: Sudan Actors, Groups, and Events Post-April 2023’. Author telephone interview with a South Kordofan-based academic and civil society figure, 14 June 2023. In the last serious Nuba–Arab conflict, in Lagawa in October 2022, Misseriya violently expelled 36,500 Nuba from the city with the support of the RSF. This conflict featured strong language and narratives declaring Lagawa ‘Arab’ land in which Nuba were not welcome. See UNOCHA (2022).
[51] Key traditional leaders quickly sought to inure greater Kordofan to a widening of the SAF–RSF conflict. In West Kordofan, the Misseriya and Hamar Native Administration has stated that they do not wish to participate in fighting (confidential situational update reports on the Sudan conflict by S4GS, 26 April and 3 May 2023). Nuba and Hawazma from Dilling met early in the conflict to find ways to maintain peaceful relations (confidential situational update report on the Sudan conflict by S4GS, 3 May 2023).


< PREVIOUS NEXT >