SAF’s vastly weakened and distracted position in the state has provided the SPLA-N with the opportunity to undertake a low-risk set of military operations with several intertwined strategic purposes: to protect the Nuba from attacks by Arab militias affiliated with the RSF; to reclaim territory taken by SAF and associated Hawazma and Misseriya militias, particularly during conflict in the state between 2011 and 2016; to ensure the geographic consolidation of this territory and thus facilitate the defence and cultivation of lowland areas to increase self-sufficiency; and to strengthen the movement’s hand in any future peace talks.[17]
Despite these rationales, there remains considerable consternation and confusion within the Nuba Mountains Liberation Council and the rank and file of the SPLA-N as to the purpose of these offensives.[18] Even where it has ejected SAF, the SPLA-N does not have the weaponry or armour to hold large swathes of territory beyond its own core areas of existing control. Furthermore, many of the attacks carried out on towns in August and September—particularly in and around the state capital, Kadugli—saw an increase in deaths, injuries, and hardship within the city (and among SPLA-N personnel) due to fighting and its impact on food and medical supplies—even prompting some SPLA-N fighters to refuse to participate in these offensives.[19]
In areas where Nuba have traditionally maintained a strategically diverse set of means of food production and livelihoods, the loss of farmland and forested areas during the 2011–16 conflict with the government has been particularly galling for Nuba identities and put new, extreme pressures on Nuba communities’ economies, livelihoods, and food security.[20] The SPLM-N has chafed at the loss, over decades, of key agricultural land in lowland areas to government-backed Arab militias. An emerging sense of the need to assure self-sufficiency—particularly given the state’s new level of isolation—has boosted the importance of recapturing that land to provide food security. Moreover, the capture of this land enables the SPLM-N to militarily link its existing patchwork of enclaves in a cohesive zone of control, dramatically improving its ability to defend its territory.
Despite the RSF’s significant presence in areas of West Kordofan since October and November 2023, South Kordofan has not constituted a priority for the RSF to date, both due to ongoing battles with SAF elsewhere and because of previous unsuccessful forays into the state. In October and November 2013, in the RSF’s first operations outside of Darfur, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo—known as ‘Hemeti’—was pressed to fight the SPLA-N in South Kordofan by Bashir and then governor Ahmed Haroun. The RSF found the South Kordofan terrain challenging to fight in, losing significant numbers of troops before retreating two months later.[21] Hawazma (and perhaps Misseriya) fighters have, however, already returned from fighting with the RSF in Obeid, constituting a more localized—but no less combustible—concern. Additionally, new weaponry acquired by the RSF from the UAE may tilt the military balance in any future conflict in the Nuba Mountains (Walsh, Koettl, and Schmitt, 2023).[22]
[17] Confidential UN report seen by the author, 21 June 2023.
[18] Author telephone interviews with a civil society figure, 13 September 2023; a South Kordofan-based NGO worker, 13 September 2023; and a researcher, 18 September 2023.
[19] Around 300–400 SPLA-N fighters were reportedly killed in recent attacks on Kadugli. Author telephone interview with a researcher, 18 September 2023.
[20] Author telephone interview with an SPLM-N official, 4 April 2023.
[21] Author telephone interview with a civil society figure, 16 November 2023.
[22] Author interview with a Western intelligence source, location withheld, 20 July 2023.
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