Northern Bahr el Ghazal’s economy has capsized. Once a major importer of goods from Sudan, the state has seen its food supply from Darfur reduced to a trickle, while the influx of people fleeing south has pushed up commodity prices throughout the state (Majok, 2024). Some, though, have profited from the disarray. South Sudanese traders now bring commodities from Juba and sell them to Sudanese customers, in a reversal of customary trade flows. Fuel has become another lucrative market—the best customer being the RSF, installed at Raiq Mandalla, some ten kilometres north of Kiir Adem. While the state government formally banned the export of fuel to Sudan in November 2023, this has made little difference to its current trade: the RSF is desperate for petrol, and the traders for dollars. Flowing south, alongside the refugees, is war loot, including sheet metal, and a flourishing trade in stolen cars destined for Juba.
All these goods flow into a militarized border economy. Kiir Adem now marks a smuggling frontier, with the SSPDF on one side, and the RSF on the other. The trade in fuel and looted goods has proved profitable to the Northern Bahr el Ghazal state government, which taxes the proceeds. This enrichment consolidates already strong ties between the Abdel Bagi family and the RSF. In November 2020, Abdel Bagi personally delivered USD 690,000 to the leader of the RSF, Mohamed Hamdan Daglo (known as ‘Hemeti’), in payment for the deaths of Sudanese Misseriya killed during clashes in May and June of that year (RVI, 2020b). Tong Akeen has publicly remained neutral in the war, but both his security adviser, Joseph Akok, and his economic adviser, Nyuol Arop, have expressed support for the RSF.[1] These ties reflect a history of connection. between the RSF forces in East Darfur—which have long controlled the northern side of the border—and the political elite of Northern Bahr el Ghazal.
[1] Interviews with informants in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, February–March 2024.
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