In late 2023, Kiir informed the Community of Sant’Egidio, which had been hosting talks in Rome between the South Sudanese government and rebel groups not party to the R-ARCSS, that negotiations would move to Nairobi, and take place under the auspices of Kenyan President William Ruto. On 17 May 2024, the talks led to a nebulous ‘commitment declaration’ for peace (Memo, 2024). Among the many unanswered questions left by this declaration is whether Malong and his SSUF/A would return to South Sudan.
Malong’s strength on the ground is not what it was. Following his rebellion in 2017, many of the supporters of the man popularly known as ‘King Paul’ were arrested. Some of his closest supporters—including Kuol Athuai (the former commissioner for Aweil North county) and Manut Yel (Malong’s manager of the Warawa/Majok Yithau border point)—fled to Meiram in East Darfur, and established an operations post. In June 2019, Kiir visited Khartoum to obtain northern approval for an operation against Malong’s men. By August 2019, Sudanese government forces had flushed the SSUF/A out of Meiram and into South Sudan. The SSUF/A attempted to reach a cantonment site at Pantit, but Manut Yel was killed and Athuai injured during clashes with the SSPDF (RVI, 2019). Malong now has almost no military forces under his command.
Politically, Malong’s supporters have largely been absorbed into the government coalition. His closest lieutenants, Santino Deng Wol and Madut Yel, are now the chief of defence forces and the ambassador to Egypt, respectively. Lesser figures have also been given choice sinecures. Joseph Akok, Tong Akeen’s security adviser, for example, once swore fealty to Malong. Other supporters were arrested.[1] Such is the rigour with which Malong’s supporters have been suppressed or bought off that it is hard to gauge the popularity of the rebel general in the state. What is clear is that Malong retains far more local legitimacy than the former NCP politicians currently dominating the state.
Northern Bahr el Ghazal’s elite is unified against the prospect of Malong’s return. The principal opposition comes from three of the major families in Northern Bahr el Ghazal. In Aweil East county, opposition is led by the family of Abdel Bagi and that of Akuei Ajou. The latter includes the veteran politician Aldo Ajou, along with Deng Deng Akuei, the former governor of then Aweil East state (2015–20). In Aweil West county, Malong’s return is opposed by Riiny Lual’s family. Unlike in Warrap state (Craze, 2022), where political conflict often emerges between communities, the politics of Northern Bahr el Ghazal is contested between the elite families that emerged as a ‘military aristocracy’ during the second civil war (Pinaud, 2014). All these families fear that Malong’s return would threaten their domination of the state.
State-level concerns are less important to Kiir than national priorities. The more decisive opposition to Malong’s return is likely to be from Akol Koor Kuc, the director-general of the NSS, who was instrumental in the rebel general’s ousting in 2017. The director-general would resist the return of Malong, who harbours a deep enmity against him. Malong’s return, if it is indeed negotiated in Nairobi, would send shockwaves through Juba, and represent an attempt by Kiir to rebalance his coalition—with an empowered Malong intended to block Akol Koor, Hussein Abdel Bagi, and the other former NCP security figures that have, until now, proved critical to Kiir’s political calculus.
[1] Interviews with informants in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, February–March 2024.
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