The growing army

The continuing collapse of the South Sudanese economy, coupled with the growing number of people who have fled the war in Sudan, has deepened the labour crisis in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, creating a surplus class of young women and men that cannot be absorbed by the state’s economy. With labour migration to Sudan curtailed by the war, conscription has once again become one of the few ways to sustain a livelihood in an increasingly monetized, market-based economy. Under the terms of the R-ARCSS, the South Sudanese government committed to refrain from conscripting new soldiers. It has repeatedly violated these terms, including during NSS recruitment campaigns in Warrap in 2021, and in the creation of an entirely new division (Division 11), commanded by Santino Deng Wol and mono-ethnically Dinka (Craze, 2022).

Further recruitment has occurred in Northern Bahr el Ghazal. As first reported in November 2023, the SSPDF trained 3,018 recruits in September–December 2023, at the Mathiang military garrison in Aweil and at Division Three’s base in Wunyiik (Sudans Post, 2023). An estimated 573 recruits were also trained at the Mathiang facility in 2024—these recruits are said to be joining the state police force, which the South Sudanese government is building up as an alternative security force to the NSS. The Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism confirmed this recruitment in May 2024 (Sudans Post, 2024). Those initially trained in Mathiang were then transported to Mapel, Western Bahr el Ghazal, for future deployment. Just as during the recruitment of the Mathiang Anyoor, the SSPDF has claimed that this recruitment is merely a series of refresher courses for extant officers, a claim belied by the facts. At a funeral service in Aweil in January 2024, Tong Akeen called on the young people of the state to join the army and the police force.[1] These forces will constitute a mono-ethnic Dinka force, recruited entirely outside the bounds of the peace agreement.


[1] Interviews with informants in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, February–March 2024.


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