Post-war security: a slippery slope

In the aftermath of a conflict, societies are likely to experience a surge in criminal violence, which encompasses both interpersonal violence (Bradley, 2018) and organized criminal activities where former combatants and military leaders seek to turn the skills they learned in their former roles into ways of exercising economic or political power, often resorting to illegal and violent methods to do so (Stepanova, 2010). This vulnerability is exacerbated by the increased availability of military-grade weaponry that finds its way into civilian circulation as these weapons ‘leak’ from the battlefield. 

The previous intensive phase of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict (2014–15), which involved the Russian Federation’s annexation of Crimea and its support for separatists in the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, triggered a short-lived but discernible upswing in violent criminal incidents in Ukraine. While data for several years is missing, the homicide levels between 2014 and 2017 appear to represent a significant setback in the otherwise improving security trend in Ukraine (see Figure 1). Currently, 30 per cent of respondents in the most recent survey agree that life in Ukraine will be less safe after the war because of people with weapons coming back from the contact lines, and only 16 per cent think this outcome is very unlikely, while the rest fall somewhere between these extremes (Small Arms Survey, 2023b).

 
This war has already had ripple effects after its initial stage, so it is reasonable to expect a comparable pattern in the coming years. The ongoing phase of conflict starting after the February 2022 full-scale invasion brought the armed conflict to an entirely different level, with many more Ukrainians being directly affected and many more serving on the front lines. The risk that the post-conflict security situation will get much worse once hostilities eventually subside is significant on multiple levels. As seen from previous research,[1] traumas afflicting former combatants correlate with mental problems, including substance abuse, which in turn increases the likelihood and severity of partner violence against women. Similarly, there is a risk—as the post-2014 homicide trends suggest—of increased criminal violence among rival gangs or targeting peaceful citizens.
 
The rally-round-the-flag effect is clearly noticeable when examining the levels of Ukrainians’ confidence in law enforcement—or any other state agency, for that matter. Trust in the police has recently seen a remarkable surge, especially when compared to pre-invasion statistics. In 2016 only 38 per cent of the population had favourable views of the police (Schroeder et al., 2019), a number that increased to 45 per cent by 2019 and reached 84 per cent in January 2023 (see Figure 2). This surge in confidence may have already passed its peak, however, because it decreased to 73 per cent in the September 2023 survey.
 
Crime victimization among the general population is indeed on the rise. The annual household victimization rate has climbed from 6.8 per cent in 2019 and 6.7 per cent in January 2023 to 8.2 per cent by September 2023. Notably, however, victims report that firearms play a decreasing role in the crimes that survey respondents fell victim to. In both 2022 and 2023 firearms were involved in just under 6 per cent of crime incidents that members of the surveyed households suffered, which is a marked decrease from the pre-invasion period, when they were involved in 14 per cent of cases (Schroeder et al., 2019).

A noteworthy development lies in how Ukrainians are adapting to the surge in criminal activity. While the proportion of those who prefer not to go out alone at night[2] and those who limit how much cash they carry for security reasons has remained relatively stable, there has been a significant shift in the number of people who now carry some form of self-defence weapon to protect themselves from potential victimization (see Figure 3). This figure has more than tripled between 2011 (3.9 per cent) and the summer of 2023 (13.5 per cent). Currently, 16.6 per cent of adult males residing in the parts of Ukraine not controlled by Russian forces indicate that they carry some form of weapon for security purposes (Small Arms Survey, 2023b). These typically are not live-firing firearms (3.6 per cent of men carry such weapons, compared to 0.5 per cent of women). Instead, they consist of traumatic weapons[3] (total: 2.7 per cent; men: 4.2 per cent; women: 1.5 per cent) or other weapons (such as knives, pepper spray, etc.; total: 11.3 per cent; men: 12.7 per cent; women: 10.1 per cent).

 

[1] For example, OSCE (2020, pp. 59–62).

[2] Referring to periods when no curfew was in place.

[3] ‘Traumatic’ weapons are non-lethal handguns that fire rubber projectiles.

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