Troubled Waters

SOMALI PIRACY



They kept us in a state of terror. Even when I could not see the torturing, I could hear the screams.

> Dipendra Rathore, crewmember of a hijacked ship (Guardian, 2011)



n May 2010, 21-year-old Dipendra Rathore was training to become a naval officer onboard a Mumbai-owned chemical carrier when pirates hijacked the ship, 120 miles south of Oman. All 22 members of the crew were taken hostage. Eight months later, after mental and physical torture at the hands of their captors, they were released following the payment of a hefty ransom.

Experiences such as Dipendra Rathore's shed light on the harsh reality of hostage conditions. As discussed in the chapter on Somali

piracy in this volume, these conditions appear to be deteriorating despite a decrease in overall hostage-taking at sea. Interviewed Somali pirates acknowledge their growing frustration—and increasing tendency to take that frustration out on hostages—as deployments of naval forces and private security companies on ships intensify and ransom negotiations are prolonged. As state and private actors continue to seek effective responses to stem pirate activity, however, the fate of the 199 hostages being held as of March 2012 remains uncertain (ICC CCS, n.d.).

I his photo essay begins by considering the root causes of Somali piracy: strong criminal networks, profitability, and a lack of alternative economic opportunities. It then turns to the measures undertaken to respond to pirate activities—including local resistance, deployments of NATO vessels and private security companies, and incarceration.

Somali pirates have a significant presence at sea and on land, with team members fulfilling various roles, whether as part of an attack team on the water or as armed guards onshore (Photos 1, 3). Ransom proceeds extend inland, benefitting not only pirate group members, but also local businesses and communities as well as armed groups that provide security (Photo 5). Pirates report that 30 per cent of their profits are regularly paid to government officials (Photo 2). Given the lack of economic and development prospects onshore, pirate groups can easily hire new recruits who are ready to risk their lives for a sum of money unobtainable elsewhere. Communities are left with few means with which to provide alternative livelihoods (Photos 4, 6).

At sea, the area of pirate operations continues to expand, stretching from Somalia's coastline to the Gulf of Aden and large parts of the Indian Ocean. In 2008, a series of high-profile hijackings, including that of the Ukrainian cargo ship MV Faina, attracted international attention (**Photos 8, 9**; Leff, 2012; Lewis, 2009). Since then, many pirates have become increasingly violent during attacks and ransom negotiation periods. Although pirates have a financial interest in keeping their hostages alive, reports of torture and intimidation, and of the destruction of ships they are unable to capture, point to an escalation in the use of force at sea (**Photos 7, 12**).

The international community has stepped up efforts to patrol waters under pirate threat and has been deploying three naval coalitions to the 'high-risk area' since 2008 (Photos 10, 11). In Somaliland, an autonomous and stable region of Somalia, coast guards work to secure local waters (Photo 13). The high number of attempted pirate attacks has also prompted states and shipping companies to rely more and more on private armed guards to secure their vessels (Photo 15). Yet, while private security companies seem to have contributed to the recent reduction in successful hijackings, their use is also costly, poses complex legal challenges, and raises concerns over further escalations at sea.

The increasingly real possibility of capture and longer prison terms for pirates also contribute to this cycle of violence, with pirates claiming that higher risks prompt them to use greater force (Photos 14, 16–17). Meanwhile, Somali prisons struggle to find space for growing numbers of captured pirates (Photo 18). The economic incentives for piracy are clear, but the stakes for Somali pirates are high, and getting higher. Meanwhile, for those sailing within sight of the pirates, the risks have never been greater.

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