

SITUATION UPDATE

October 2023



Jemma's War: Political Strife in Western Equatoria

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KEY FINDINGS

- The Azande Avongara elite around Jemma Nunu Kumba, the speaker of South Sudan's Transitional National Legislative Assembly (TNLA), are making a concerted effort to remove the opposition governor of Western Equatoria state, Alfred Futuyo Karaba. The governor is likewise moving against Jemma Nunu. This political strife has inflamed tensions on the ground, and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army-in-Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) and government forces have been patrolling independently in the state capital, Yambio.
- Futuyo, who is of Balanda and Zande heritage, has refashioned himself as a Balanda ethno-nationalist. Since the 2021 violence in Tambura county, politics in Western Equatoria has become increasingly ethnicized, with the Avongara successfully transposing political tension between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and SPLM/A-IO onto ethnic tension between the Azande and Balanda.
- The state government is divided between the two political parties, with both sides building up war chests in preparation for future conflict. Such violence could easily spill over South Sudan's borders. In 2021, Futuyo called on support from forces in the Central African Republic (CAR), and continuing violence in the CAR between Azande militias and the Peuhl-dominated Union for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC) could spark clashes in Western Equatoria.

Context

Western Equatoria has long had an ambiguous relationship with the SPLM/A. In 2005, after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that brought an end to Sudan's second civil war (1983–2005), the SPLM appointed Patrick Zamoi as state governor. Zamoi was an SPLA commander and an influential member of the Avongara elite, the royal clan of the Azande, which is the largest minority in Western Equatoria.¹ He proved to be extremely unpopular, however, and was replaced after six months, albeit by another Zande politician. The Avongara struggle to control Western Equatoria constitutes one of the main fault lines of politics in the state.

Following the signing of the CPA, the 'Arrow Boys' emerged, which largely comprised Azande community self-defence groups formed in response to Lord's Resistance Army raids.² Zamoi initially supported these groups, including forces under Futuyo's command, but the SPLM, which feared losing control of the state, viewed them with suspicion. From 2005 to 2011 there was widespread discontent with the national government among the people of Western Equatoria, who felt marginalized by the Bahr el Ghazal Dinka, whom they believed dominated state institutions.³ This discontent propelled Joseph Bakosoro's 2010 gubernatorial victory, which he won as an independent candidate, after he was blocked from the SPLM nomination by the then-incumbent governor, Jemma Nunu. Like Zamoi, Jemma Nunu is part of the Avongara, while Bakosoro is not from the Azande royal clan, and was considered a threat.

During the first phase of South Sudan's civil war (2013–15), prior to the signing of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS), Bakosoro backed the Arrow Boys, while flirting with joining the opposition. The Avongara elite pushed South Sudan's president, Salva Kiir, to remove him. After the signing of the

ARCSS, Bakosoro was finally removed and Western Equatoria was plunged into conflict.

Among other commanders, both Futuyo and Wesley Welebe, a Moro from the east of the state, joined the SPLM/A-IO, while Bakosoro was imprisoned for eight months.⁴ With the signing of the 2018 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, and faced with a loss of SPLM-IO power elsewhere in the Equatorias, the opposition leader, Riek Machar, chose Futuyo, a populist figure, to be the governor of Western Equatoria. This horrified the Avongara elite, who conspired to remove him. While Futuyo's mother is a Zande (although not part of the Avongara), his father is a Balanda from Western Bahr el Ghazal state. Zamoi and Jemma Nunu successfully cast Futuyo as an outsider, which increased ethnic tensions in Western Equatoria, setting the Azande against the Balanda.

After one of Futuyo's principal commanders, James Nando Mark, defected to the South Sudan People's Defence Forces (SSPDF) in March 2020, tension turned into violence in Tambura county, the precolonial seat of the Azande Tambura Kingdom. A Balanda force under the command of Angelo Davido and backed by Futuyo clashed with Nando's Azande forces from June to September 2021, leaving hundreds dead and tens of thousands displaced (UNMISS and OHCHR, 2022). This worried Juba, which stepped in, arresting Nando. The clashes failed to remove Futuyo from the governorship, but transformed the political landscape of Western Equatoria. Political divisions are now absolutely ethnicized, and the potential for serious violence is extremely high.

A divided cabinet

Futuyo is a popular governor across much of Western Equatoria, but he has little control of the state. SPLM county commissioners in Tambura and

1 The Azande are referred to as Azande in the plural and Zande in the singular; they speak Pazande.

2 See Small Arms Survey (2016).

3 For background on Equatorian suspicions of the SPLM, see Boswell (2017; 2021).

4 Futuyo was one of several Arrow Boy commanders to join the SPLM-IO; Welebe's 'Nyarango Boys', formed in the east of the state to deal with the threat from Dinka pastoralists, was a distinct entity, but also received funding and support from Bakosoro.

Ezo are part of an Avongara elite (the Tambura commissioner is a relative of Jemma Nunu) that have effectively carved out a separate territory in the state, while Futuyo controls Yambio, Nzara, and Nagero counties. Kiir's regime has also starved Western Equatoria of funds, as a means of disempowering the governor.⁵

A lack of funding has created a crisis in the state: in 2022, its employees went unpaid for five months. The SPLM attempted to exploit this situation in October of that year by walking out of state government in protest, together with other political parties. While the SPLM subsequently returned, it remains at loggerheads with the governor. When Futuyo dismissed the SPLM deputy mayor of Yambio, Patrick Mukanga, in June 2023, he refused to leave his position, and had the backing of the SPLM deputy governor, Kennedy Gaaniko.⁶

Both the SPLM and the opposition are building up financial war chests in anticipation of future conflict. With Juba unwilling to support the state administration, Futuyo is maximizing the revenue sources he can control. Traders in Yambio market complain about high levels of taxation, while some civilians report that they have moved out of SPLM/A-IO-controlled areas because of the tax burden.⁷ The SPLM behaves similarly in areas under its control.

The SPLM is also trying to weaken Futuyo militarily. In August 2023, Gaaniko organized the defection of SPLA-IO Brigade 2 from Maridi; this defection could be as explosive as that of Nando in 2021, even if the brigade's commanding officer, Christopher Gume, does not have Nando's stature.

Tensions between the two parties have intensified in recent months. At the end of August 2023, the popular TNLA member from Mundri, Richard Mullah, tabled a motion at the assembly calling for Futuyo's removal, accusing him of failing to pay wage arrears

to the civil servants of the dissolved states of Amadi, Maridi, and Tambura.⁸ Futuyo initially refused a summons from Jemma Nunu to appear before the TNLA in mid-September. He instead wrote a letter to Kiir on 31 August, asking him to remove Jemma Nunu, and accusing her of instigating an ethnic war in Western Equatoria. On 19 September, Futuyo finally travelled to Juba and appeared before the TNLA to refute allegations he had misappropriated funds intended for state officials, and to demand salary arrears from the national government.

On 21 September, Futuyo returned to Yambio, but tensions in the state have not abated. In his absence, conflict arose over who should be the acting governor: Futuyo had nominated the SPLM-IO minister of cabinet affairs, but Gaaniko insisted he was in charge. Both government forces and the SPLA-IO have since patrolled separately in Yambio, while Juba has ordered Futuyo's troops to go back to their barracks in Maridi and leave the state capital.

Tensions in Western Equatoria state are reaching similar levels to the period that immediately preceded the 2021 violence in Tambura. Since August 2023, there has been a series of mysterious killings, including that of Richard Sereberani (9 September), the Zande education director in Nagero county, and of Justin Agbiamamu (30 August), the Zande chief and Bakosoro loyalist.⁹ A further attempt to force Futuyo out of the governorship would likely leave Western Equatoria convulsed by violence.

Futuyo's fortunes

Eighteen years ago, Futuyo was an Arrow Boy commander who answered to Azande traditional authorities and was backed by Patrick Zamoi—a man whom he now regards with implacable dislike. After he was appointed governor, Futuyo presented

5 Author interview with Alfred Futuyo Karaba, Yambio, August 2023.

6 Author interview with Patrick Mukanga, Yambio, August 2023.

7 Author interviews with civilians in Yambio and Nzara, August 2023.

8 When South Sudan was divided into 32 states (2017–20), Western Equatoria was split into Amadi, Maridi, Gbudwe, and Tambura states, which became Western Equatoria once again in 2020. See Pritchard and Verjee (2021).

9 Sereberani was reportedly assassinated in revenge for the death of a Balanda trader earlier killed in Ezo. Futuyo accused Jemma Nunu of orchestrating Agbiamamu's assassination.

himself as someone—given he was of mixed heritage—who could unite the Azande with the other ethnic groups of Western Equatoria. After the Avongara campaign to characterize him as a Balanda, Futuyo refashioned himself as a Balanda ethno-nationalist, in a strategic affirmation of the outsider status with which Jemma Nunu sought to tar him. This refashioning has involved a rewriting of his own history. Futuyo now claims that he became a commander in the Arrow Boys as the first step in an ethno-nationalist Balanda project, and joined the SPLM/A-IO opportunistically as a means of taking power in Western Equatoria.¹⁰

At present, Futuyo's political strategy is composed of two somewhat contradictory rhetorical ploys. He is trying to rally the non-Azande ethnic groups of Western Equatoria under the banner of a 'majority of minorities', while simultaneously claiming that what he desires is a Balanda administrative area, along the lines of the Greater Pibor and Ruweng administrative areas. This claim echoes earlier Avongara demands for an Azande administrative area. At present, Futuyo is at an impasse: it is impossible for the Avongara elite to tolerate him as governor and he lacks the means to actually rule the state; however, he is adamant that he will not leave power under any circumstances.¹¹

Avongara anxieties

After the 2021 Tambura violence, the SPLM/A-IO—at least in the west of the state—became so associated with the Balanda that in Yambio, Azande feel they cannot espouse any support for Futuyo without being considered traitors.¹² Both sides have made autochthonous claims to Western Equatoria: Azande politicians assert that the Balanda are foreigners; Futuyo claims that the Azande are actually from Mali. Neither of these claims is about the historical record—they are both contemporary means of asserting legitimacy in Western Equatoria.

While Zamoi and Jemma Nunu managed to sow ethnic divisions in Western Equatoria, they have not necessarily profited from their own strategy. The Azande of Yambio resent the dominance of the Avongara elite from Tambura county and are more open to making deals with other ethnic groups. Part of Futuyo's strategy is precisely to appeal to Azande who are unhappy with Jemma Nunu, who is partly blamed for the 2021 violence in Tambura, and with Zamoi, whose unpopularity stems from the arrest of the Yambio county paramount chief, Atoroba Peni Rikito (now the Azande king), which occurred during Zamoi's time as governor.

Joseph Bakosoro, Jemma Nunu's erstwhile Zande political rival, retains a strong following. Bakosoro has always had national ambitions—which was one of the reasons he clashed with Riek Machar and never joined the SPLM-IO—and used his National Movement for Change party as a vehicle to first join the South Sudan Opposition Alliance and then take up a ministerial position in March 2020. In August 2021, however, he joined the SPLM, while retaining his ministerial position. Kiir's absorption of a problematic rival into the SPLM was a cunning move: Bakosoro joined the party with the expectation of becoming the speaker of the TNLA (Jemma Nunu's position), and—perhaps—being given the vice-presidential ticket for the forthcoming elections. He now finds himself becalmed. He is in a ministry without power and is unlikely to receive the vice-presidential nomination, which is expected to go to a Nuer candidate.

Despite Bakosoro's neutralization, Avongara weakness at the state level may yet prove problematic for Kiir. When Futuyo was appointed governor in 2020, the assumption was that the deputy governorship would go to someone from the east of the state, thanks to a long-standing agreement about the geographical balance of power in Western Equatoria. Africano Mande, a popular Baka politician from Maridi county, was considered the favourite for the position. With Futuyo appointed as the governor,

¹⁰ Author interview with Alfred Futuyo Karaba, Yambio, August 2023.

¹¹ Author interview with Alfred Futuyo Karaba, Yambio, August 2023.

¹² The ethnic politics of opposition in the east of the state, where substantial numbers of the Baka and Moro, among others, are loyal to the SPLM-IO, is considerably more complicated.

however, the Avongara feared marginalization, and pressured Kiir to appoint Kennedy Gaaniko, who is Jemma Nunu's protégé, but lacks popularity in Western Equatoria.¹³ He will struggle in an open gubernatorial election. Avongara unpopularity poses a problem for Kiir: he wants to win Western Equatoria in the 2024 elections, but cannot choose a non-Avongara candidate, given their centrality to his political coalition in the Equatorias.

If elections do occur in Western Equatoria, they will almost certainly be marred by violence. In preparation, the Avongara elite have recruited in Tambura and Ezo, where the rump of James Nando Mark's forces are based, even if the notoriously impetuous commander remains in Juba. In addition, the SSPDF battalion that was supposed to deploy on a peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) never arrived, and instead installed itself on the DRC–South Sudan border, effectively acting as a back-up force in case tensions between the Avongara and Futuyo become violent.

Thy kingdom come

The Azande Kingdom traditionally included both parts of Western Equatoria and Azande groups now resident in the CAR and DRC. The last Azande monarch was King Gbudwe, who in the 19th century led resistance against encroaching slave traders, before his capture and death in 1905 at the hands of British colonialists.¹⁴ While Gbudwe was revered among the Azande for his military prowess, this very talent inspired fear in surrounding communities—fears that would subsequently resurface in the 21st century. After Gbudwe's death, the kingdom remained without a king for over a century, despite intermittent attempts to restore the monarchy.

All that changed on 9 February 2022, when the paramount chief of Yambio county, Atoroba Peni Rikito, was crowned the new Azande king, albeit one whose kingdom would be restricted to South Sudan. It is politics in Juba that explicates the king's coronation. Following Futuyo's ascension to the governorship in 2020, Azande faith in the SPLM was failing, and Kiir calculated that by granting the re-establishment of the kingdom, he would keep them within his political coalition.

Peni's coronation came after a great deal of lobbying. Most recently, the Azande Supreme Welfare Organization had been pushing Kiir to re-establish the kingdom. Complicating these efforts was a disagreement over who the king should be.¹⁵ Peni was the popular choice and claimed the most legitimate hereditary right to the title. Jemma Nunu (Gbudwe's grand-daughter) thought he was a threat, however, and instead proposed the paramount chief of Tambura county as the Azande king. After this suggestion was blocked, Jemma Nunu put forward Paulino Zizzi as a compromise candidate.¹⁶ Kiir, however, was always going to pick Peni, who had long been a popular leader among the Azande. To have appointed an unpopular king would have ruined Kiir's political strategy. Furthermore, after a period of critique of the SPLM—which resulted in Peni's imprisonment in Juba in 2016—Peni had come to an accommodation with Kiir's regime.

Despite Peni's popularity, much remains uncertain about the fate of the Azande Kingdom. South Sudan's other great monarchy, the Shilluk, has seen their king politically captured by the SPLM (Craze, 2022). It is not clear what it means for a monarchy that once had spiritual and military sovereignty over its territory to exist within the context of a nation state in which, at least in theory, Kiir's regime exercises a monopoly on violence and the use of political power. Tensions have already emerged. Peni intended to appoint ambassadors from the Azande communities in the

¹³ Gaaniko has previously competed for national positions—including the chairmanship of the National Youth Union—and worked in Juba; he does not have a strong local base, although he seems to be intent on trying to become the SPLM gubernatorial candidate in Western Equatoria.

¹⁴ For a more detailed history of the Azande Kingdom, see Waanzi (forthcoming).

¹⁵ Author interview with Azande elders, Yambio, August 2023.

¹⁶ Paulino Zizzi, who comes from a disgraced lineage of the royal family, is thought of as cursed; this malediction extends to his son, Richard Zizzi, who was the SPLM-IO commissioner of Nzara county before trying to unseat Futuyo as governor, leading to his dismissal and effective house arrest in Juba.

CAR and DRC, only to be told by Jemma Nunu that only the government in Juba can make such appointments.

Meanwhile, the re-establishment of the kingdom has been a political lightning rod. Jemma Nunu and Patrick Zamoi fear a loss of influence. In 2022, this was exacerbated by Peni's decision on Gbudwe Day (which celebrates the former king), to visit Kiir directly at J1 (State House) in Juba, bypassing Jemma Nunu, who has long positioned herself as *the* Azande power broker.¹⁷ Peni's decision in September 2023 to relocate the royal palace to Bazunga payam, Yambio county, further underlines the way the establishment of the kingdom has shifted power away from the Tambura elite.¹⁸

The re-established kingdom has also kindled fears of Azande dominance among other ethnic groups in Western Equatoria. Futuyo has accused Jemma Nunu—entirely without basis—of wishing to create a pan-national Azande kingdom, including the Azande populations of the CAR and DRC. Futuyo's allegations must have been bitterly received, because the establishment of the kingdom has lessened, not augmented, Jemma Nunu's power.

Much about Peni's nascent kingdom has yet to be determined. In August 2023, Peni went on a fundraising drive in the United States among the Azande diaspora in order to obtain funds for the kingdom's administration. Customarily, the kingdom was decentralized, with positions such as paramount chiefs determined from the ground up, via a process of popular sovereignty. Peni's confirmation of Simon Atoroba as the paramount chief of Yambio county has been controversial, partly because it upsets this tradition of popular sovereignty, and has led many chiefs not to recognize Atoroba. 'The kingship', one customary chief said, 'should not be a dictatorship'.¹⁹ In order to keep a lid on budding Azande nationalism, however, there is pressure from Juba to turn the kingship into exactly that, especially given the international dimensions of the affair.

Border dilemmas

In the far south-east of the CAR, in Haut-Mbomou prefecture, there have long been simmering tensions between political authorities, with feuding officials engaged in tit-for-tat accusations about their backing for the UPC, a rebel group responsible for multiple atrocities, and the Ani Kpi Gbe (AKG), an Azande ethnic militia in the border region, formed in March 2023 to protect the Azande community against the UPC presence. At the root of this tension is latent conflict between the Peuhl ethnic group (which comprises the majority of the UPC and is largely pastoralist) and the agricultural Azande. Clashes in April 2023 displaced thousands towards the South Sudanese border and continued into May and June.

The AKG clashed with the SSPDF on 23 April at Bambouti on the South Sudanese border.²⁰ It is not clear what provoked the clash, but it points to the possibility of the AKG's becoming involved in conflict in Western Equatoria. For some, this is an opportunity. In 2023, Emmanuel Charles Riko formed the Community Patriotic Front (CPF) and announced that it was the military wing of the Azande Kingdom, making explicit the pan-national promise of Peni's coronation. The king was quick to denounce the project, and Nando's forces subsequently arrested Riko en route to Tambura. For the Avongara elite, as for the king, a pan-national Azande military project risks alienating Kiir, undermining their own position in South Sudan, and providing rhetorical fuel for Futuyo's fire: the governor is constantly warning that the Azande Kingdom poses a threat to other ethnic groups in Western Equatoria.

At present, the Azande of Western Equatoria have little interest in a pan-national project, even if many of them have family ties that cross national borders. Despite the Avongara elite's intent to put a dampener on South Sudan's involvement in the CAR conflict, the potential for cross-border spillover remains

¹⁷ Gbudwe Day was held on 4 February 2022.

¹⁸ The payam is South Sudan's third administrative level, under state and county; payams are divided up into bomas.

¹⁹ Author interview with customary chief, name withheld, Yambio, August 2023.

²⁰ Author interviews with Azande commanders, UN officials, and international experts, August 2023.

acute. During the violence in Tambura in 2021, Futuyo not only made common cause with Balanda Fertit members of the SPLA-IO in Western Bahr el Ghazal state, who provided supplies for his forces, but also connected with ex-Séléka forces on the CAR border. In the same year Nando attacked ex-Séléka in Bambuti, having earlier—in 2016—recruited in the Azande areas of the DRC. Nando's forces also clashed with the UPC in November 2020. In such a context, the AKG could easily be drawn into a conflict that extends beyond South Sudan's borders, potentially pitting the Azande against an unstable coalition of Balanda, Peuhl, and ex-Séléka forces.

Musical cows

Despite the value the Dinka people place on cattle, some of their livestock are causing a headache for Kiir. In 2022, large herds from Jonglei state moved into Eastern Equatoria state, accompanied by heavily armed pastoralists. These herds destroyed farmland, with the pastoralists clashing with agriculturalists in Magwi, leading to thousands of people being displaced. Equatorian complaints about the encroachment of Dinka herds are long-standing and increased after the signing of the CPA. These herds have also proved problematic for Kiir, who seeks Equatorian support in the elections postulated for 2024. The situation is especially unwelcome for Kiir's regime because the herds largely belong to high-ranking Bor Dinka politicians and SSPDF commanders—the principal rivals of the Bahr el Ghazal Dinka. Erroneous claims have been made that climate change explains the migration of these large herds (Eberle and Boswell, 2023). The herds are effectively safe-deposit boxes for wealth accumulated by the Bor Dinka elite. They are guarded by young cattle guards who receive regular resupplies of materiel from military sources.²¹ 'What sort of cattle guards', one disgruntled Baka community elder asked, 'come with machine guns?'²² The clashes that ensue when these herds move cannot be explained by climate change, but rather by the politics of

capital accumulation by the elite, and its ability to use violence with relative impunity.

In Eastern Equatoria state, the political problem of the cattle herders received a political solution. The populist SPLM governor of the state, Louis Lobong Lojore, used his security forces to remove the herders in November 2022. Some returned to Jonglei, but many went into Central Equatoria state, where the same scenario of violence and displacement played out in February 2023, leaving dozens dead and tens of thousands displaced. The SPLM governor of Central Equatoria state, Emmanuel Adil Anthony, then forced the herders out of the state and into Western Equatoria state, the only one of the three Equatorian states with an SPLM-IO governor.

While herders in Central and Eastern Equatoria states disrupt both agriculturalists and Kiir's electoral chances, in Western Equatoria state they damage Futuyo's credibility. Although Futuyo ordered the cattle herders to leave Mundri West county in June 2023, they remained there throughout the height of the rainy season. Moro elders complained that the cattle destroyed crops and that the pastoralists bought up all the food in the market, raising prices.²³ Herders have also destroyed bee hives and attacked the local population. The fear consistently raised by communities in Greater Mundri is that the Dinka pastoralists intend to stay, creating a 'greater Bor'.

These fears, combined with the pastoralists' presence in Western Equatoria, could result in serious violence. In 2005, Dinka pastoralist encroachment in the state led to reprisal attacks against Dinka residents in Yambio that left hundreds dead. The 'Nyarango Boys', which were a Moro equivalent of the Arrow Boys, had the explicit intention of resisting Dinka encroachment, and clashed with pastoralists during the CPA period in Mvolo county. The east of Western Equatoria state has long been supportive of the SPLM-IO, and clashes between the people of Greater Mundri and Dinka pastoralists could quickly take on political dimensions given that the herders

21 Author telephone and in-person interviews with Bor Dinka politicians and cattle guards, February–September 2023.

22 Author interview with Baka community elders, Yambio town, August 2023.

23 Author interviews with Moro elders, Yambio town, August 2023.

are backed by the SSPDF, and the herds are in some cases owned by high-ranking generals. If SSPDF Division 6, stationed in Maridi, became involved in the fighting, it could be the touch paper for a more general conflagration in Western Equatoria, especially if the Avongara elite used it as an excuse to move against the SPLM/A-IO.

Conclusion

Since 2011 political positions in South Sudan have increasingly been seen as a question of ethnic ‘possession’. Given that politics has become ethnic, it is hardly surprising that ethnicity itself has become political, with the Avongara elite moving against Futuyo by casting him as an outsider, and Futuyo, in response, refashioning himself as a Balanda ethnic nationalist—a recasting that he recounted to a Small Arms Survey interviewer in the Pazande language.

The ethnicization of politics has set family members against each other and closed civic and political space in the state. Proposed elections in 2024 threaten to be explosive, because both Futuyo and Jemma Nunu see the current situation as a zero-sum contest. At present, however, it seems unlikely that Western Equatoria state will get to the stage of actually holding elections before it is convulsed by violence. ●

Corrigendum

In a previous version of this Situation Update, the Small Arms Survey erroneously identified Emmanuel Charles Riko as the former director of the DDR Commission in Yambio. It has since been verified that this was not the case.

Abbreviations and acronyms

AKG	Ani Kpi Gbe
ARCSS	Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan
CAR	Central African Republic
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
SPLA	Sudan People’s Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudan People’s Liberation Movement
SPLM/A	Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army
SPLM/A-IO	Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-in-Opposition
SSPDF	South Sudan People’s Defence Forces
TNLA	Transitional National Legislative Assembly
UPC	Union for Peace in the Central African Republic

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