Arms Smuggling Dynamics under Taliban Rule

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KEY FINDINGS

• Fieldwork in Afghanistan under the Taliban confirms the presence of weapons markets in key border areas, significantly increasing the risks of arms proliferation in the region. Of particular concern is smuggling in border areas with Pakistan, where the state faces the growing threat posed by the Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, TTP).¹

• Weapon trafficking dynamics under the Taliban appear to be highly localized owing to internal Taliban dynamics; commercial, political, and security interests; and longstanding cross-border ties between armed groups, fighters, and for-profit smuggling networks.

• While weapon dynamics differ significantly by province, their prices initially fell immediately following the collapse of the Republic of Afghanistan due to the chaotic situation during the final phase of the war, which led to highly informal and unregulated small-scale bartering and trading for newly seized weapons among rank-and-file Taliban fighters. Weapon prices have since regained most of their value, as the Taliban have consolidated their control over former Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) stockpiles.

• The Taliban have taken steps to formalize the process of buying, selling, and transporting weapons internally. Taliban officials in each province issue weapon permits and licences for a tax or fee, which generates additional revenue for, and enhances the governance authority of, local officials.² The Taliban’s intelligence apparatus, the General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI), has also seized hundreds of weapons following door-to-door searches of civilian and former ANDSF homes, as well as from weapons smugglers operating without the authorization of the Taliban.

• Anecdotal reporting suggests that the Taliban have been particularly careful to assert control over remaining stockpiles of US-manufactured M4 and M16 assault rifles, night vision and thermal sights, and other high-value items not normally in circulation in the region. M4s and M16s are valued at roughly two to three times the price of an AK-pattern assault rifle. Nevertheless, groups allied with the Taliban, including the TTP, continue to gain access to US weaponry.³ These supply patterns indicate an inability or unwillingness to block these transfers, further complicating relations with Pakistan.

¹ See, for example, Mir (2022).
² Copies of weapon permits and licences on file with the Small Arms Survey.
³ See Siddique (2023).
Context

Afghanistan is a landlocked country that shares extensive borders with Pakistan; Iran; and the Central Asian countries of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—as well as the narrow Wakhan Corridor with China. In July 2020, the Republic of Afghanistan joined the Arms Trade Treaty. While the Afghan drug trade has been widely studied, little research has been done on weapons smuggling and the extent to which these proceeds may provide an additional source of revenue for armed groups and terrorist networks. Despite a dramatic decline in opium production under the Taliban, Afghanistan continues to dominate the global illicit supply of opium and also produces methamphetamine that reaches every corner of the globe through well-established overland and maritime smuggling routes.

Since the collapse of the Republic in August 2021, efforts to take stock of the total quantity of weapons and ammunition supplied by the United States and NATO over nearly 20 years have been hindered by weak transfer controls and logistics management systems. Former ANDSF commanders have confirmed reports of widespread ammunition shortages during the final phase of the war. Ammunition was never closely tracked or audited by the United States, however, and shortages and logistics failures plagued the ANDSF for years. For these reasons, even with a full accounting of the total quantity of equipment transferred to the ANDSF, it may still be difficult to specify the number of US- and NATO-supplied arms in the hands of the Taliban.

The former National Directorate of Security (NDS) previously carried out regular seizures of illicit weapons and explosive material at key border crossings with Pakistan. Items were reportedly concealed inside heavy trucks transporting goods from Pakistan to Kabul; in one well-documented case, commercially available night vision riflescopes were purchased on Amazon in the United States and smuggled across the border at Torkham. The scale of weapon smuggling from Afghanistan to Pakistan during the Republic era is difficult to quantify due to a lack of dedicated research and reporting.

The Taliban currently face a host of internal security challenges, including the threat posed by the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP)—that is, the Islamic State (IS) affiliate in South and Central Asia based in Afghanistan. The group first emerged in Nangarhar province in 2014 led by a group of former TTP militants from Pakistan and was officially formed in January 2015. In early June 2023, the leader of ISKP in Afghanistan, Sanaullah Ghafari, an Afghan national also known as Shahab al-Muhajir, was reportedly killed along the border with Pakistan.

Initial scepticism over links between ISKP and IS-affiliates elsewhere has since faded, replaced by growing evidence of at least some financial and operational ties. A July 2022 report by the UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team notes that, “IS views Afghanistan as a base for expansion in the wider region for the realization of its “great caliphate” project.” ISKP has also recruited fighters from the ranks of al-Qaeda, the TTP, the Afghan Taliban, and other groups, further complicating armed group dynamics and weapons proliferation risks in the region.

4 See UNGA (2020).
5 See Mansfield (2023).
6 See, for example, Stone (2022). The 14th report (June 2023) of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team notes that opium prices have increased, as has the production of methamphetamine (UNSC, 2023, pp. 3, 12–13).
7 See SIGAR (2023, p. 66) for the most comprehensive list of US military equipment supplied to the ANDSF between 2005 and 2021. See also CAR (2021).
8 See CAR (2022).
9 See Sayed and Hamming (2023, p. 4) and CSIS (2018).
10 See Gul (2023) and US (2023).
12 See UNSC (2022, p. 16).
13 See UNSC (2023, pp. 15–16).
The rise in TTP attacks in Pakistan since the Taliban came to power has also strained relations between the Afghan Taliban and Pakistan. In June 2022, the Afghan Taliban brokered a ceasefire between the Pakistani government and the TTP. By November 2022, the TTP had unilaterally ended the ceasefire and resumed its terror campaign against the Pakistani state. Since then, attacks have continued to threaten security in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan. The TTP is widely believed to operate from Afghan soil, with broad security implications for the Taliban and the region.

Arms smuggling under the Taliban

To explore the possible risk factors for arms proliferation under the Taliban, Afghan Peace Watch (APW) conducted field investigations in late 2022 in three provinces in Afghanistan: Helmand, Kandahar, and Nangarhar. It identified weapons markets or bazaars in border areas that operate with the consent of local Taliban officials, as evidenced by weapon permits and licences obtained by APW. Researchers visited six weapons markets in the three provinces, and obtained paperwork issued to civilians and local weapons dealers on file with the Small Arms Survey. APW interviewed weapon smugglers, low-level Taliban fighters, and local Taliban officials, as well as former ANDSF members and security experts on Afghanistan. Research findings confirm the presence of weapons markets in border areas and indicate ongoing cross-border weapons smuggling, despite an upsurge in weapons seizures made by the GDI. This Situation Update focuses on arms smuggling in Nangarhar due to its proximity to arms markets in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

While the Taliban have clamped down on some small-scale smuggling by unauthorized dealers, their own well-established ties with regional terrorist networks are a greater concern. These ties include longstanding and deeply personal relations between fighters and commanders who fought side by side for decades, intermarriages and family connections, as well as a shared ideology and common goals. Interviews and social media monitoring reveal evidence of cross-border smuggling, though this has yet to be fully corroborated by field investigations. Nevertheless, weapons dealers contacted in Dara Adamkhel and Peshawar claim to offer US military equipment for sale. In both Afghanistan and Pakistan, weapons dealers have become more circumspect when offering US military equipment for sale, including M4 and M16 rifles, night vision and thermal sights, and other accessories not normally in circulation in the region.

Nangarhar province

In the east of the country, Nangarhar is the third most populous province in Afghanistan and shares a long border with Pakistan. The province’s capital is Jalalabad City and its Torkham border crossing is the most important trade route connecting Kabul to Pakistan. Nangarhar has long been beset by insecurity, including assassinations, roadside bombs, and clashes between armed groups. ISKP has had a significant presence in the province since the group first emerged in 2014. According to APW’s sources, the number of ISKP fighters in Nangarhar has reportedly doubled since the Taliban returned to power.

Former NDS officials in Afghanistan previously identified Torkham as one of the main gateways for

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14 See Hussain (2022).
15 The term ‘smuggling’ is generally used in this study to refer to the transport and sale of weapons, ammunition, and other military equipment ostensibly intended for end use by the ANDSF and former Afghan government to unauthorized users, including civilians and other armed groups. Cross-border smuggling refers to the movement of weapons, ammunition, and military equipment ostensibly intended for end use in Afghanistan to other countries in the region. The exact level of authorization given by inner-circle Taliban leaders for local and cross-border ‘smuggling’ could not be independently verified by APW.
16 While the provenance of such material is unproven, in a YouTube video posted on 1 September 2021, just weeks after the collapse, a journalist interviews a weapons dealer in Lahore, Pakistan, detailing US military equipment for sale from Afghanistan. The dealer explains the origin of the equipment—noting that his collection includes ‘captured weapons’ or ‘war booty’ from Afghanistan, referred to locally as ‘mal-e-ghanimat’ in Urdu (UrduPoint.com, 2021).
17 APW interview with a local security expert, Nangarhar, November 2022.
smuggling illicit weapons under the Republic, including huge quantities of locally made weapons produced in Dara Adamkhel and Peshawar in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa—colloquially referred to as ‘Dara Wale’ weapons in the region. While some Dara Wale-made replicas—modelled after popular Chinese, Russian, Turkish, and US weapons—are extremely well crafted and difficult to distinguish from genuine items, others are poorly made and notorious for their low quality and unreliability. Many locally made pistols are chambered for locally made .30 bore calibre ammunition. These weapons are popular with civilians due to their low cost and widespread availability.

Following the Taliban takeover, the prices of weapons in Nangarhar arms markets initially fell. As the Taliban conducted door-to-door searches of former ANDSF homes and confiscated hundreds of weapons from civilians in Nangarhar, weapon prices began to increase. In one month alone, more than 545 weapons were collected in Jalalabad City. These were displayed to the media and included several different types of US-manufactured weapons.

According to one local source formerly with the Republic, at least 19,500 ANDSF personnel were present in Nangarhar at the time of the collapse, including members of the Afghan National Army (ANA), the Afghan National Police, the NDS, and the border police who had thousands of weapons in their possession. When the Taliban seized former ANDSF depots in the province, many weapons were missing—especially pistols, which could be easily concealed. Beretta pistols were reported to be particularly high demand and were kept by ANA soldiers; these weapons were later sold or smuggled, or confiscated by Taliban fighters.

In late 2022, researchers interviewed several low-level Taliban fighters who had sold and traded weapons immediately following the collapse. One Taliban fighter from Nangarhar, who was released from Pul-e-Charkhi prison by the Taliban in August 2021, was able to collect military equipment—five Beretta pistols, four AK-pattern assault rifles, one M4, and a Humvee—at various checkpoints in Nangarhar immediately following his release. Within days, he had sold the Beretta pistols for PKR 50,000 (USD 222) and the Kalashnikovs for PKR 70,000 (USD 311) in a border district in Nangarhar. He kept the M4 rifle for himself and transferred the Humvee to the local Taliban district governor.

A member of the Taliban who spent four years in Bagram prison also collected five brand new M4 rifles and immediately sold them for PKR 600,000 (USD 2,660 or roughly USD 532 each) in another border district in Nangarhar. Many of the weapons initially seized by low-level Taliban fighters were quickly sold. Similarly, a group of Taliban fighters seized 90 weapons and handed over 30 weapons to the district governor’s office; the other 60 were reportedly sold to a local weapon dealer.

In another instance, 1,200 local police turned in their weapons to the district governor’s office where they were stored. Larger surrenders reportedly went to senior Taliban officials, while smaller seizures were sold or smuggled.

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18 For some context, see CAR (2022).
19 Whether such weapons should be referred to as copies or counterfeit, replica, or craft or artisanal weapons remains a discussion point among researchers. The situation is complicated by the fact that the weapons tend to be categorized along with both imitations and ‘originals’ made in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, including the whole .30 calibre bore family of weapons.
20 APW interview with local sources, Nangarhar, November 2022.
21 See Pajhwok News (2022); RFE Pashto (2022); and HRW (2021).
22 See Killid Group (2022).
23 APW interview with a former member of the ANDSF, December 2022.
24 APW interview with a local Taliban source, November 2022.
25 The exact location was withheld. APW interview with a local Taliban source, November 2022.
26 APW interview with a local Taliban source, November 2022.
27 The exact location was withheld. APW interview with a local Taliban source, November 2022.
28 APW interview with a local Taliban source, November 2022.
29 APW interview with a local Taliban source, November 2022.
in some cases kept by local Taliban fighters and later traded or sold due to their poor economic circumstances.\textsuperscript{30} The end destination of many of these weapons is unknown; however, significant quantities were reportedly smuggled to Pakistan, where demand and prices are much higher.\textsuperscript{31}

Since the chaotic period immediately following the collapse of the Republic, the Taliban have reportedly clamped down on small-scale weapons smuggling and unauthorized transfers. Price data obtained by APW seems to support these claims as weapon prices have risen over time.\textsuperscript{32} By collecting price data for a set of benchmark weapons in late 2022 from weapons dealers in Jalalabad City and Khogyani district, APW found that the prices for M4 and M16 rifles had risen to between USD 1,200 and 1,600 in Nangarhar, but these rifles were not widely available in the market.\textsuperscript{33} In other parts of the country, prices reached USD 2,400 for a US-manufactured M4.\textsuperscript{34} M4s are generally valued at higher prices than M16s, as they were primarily used by Afghan Special Forces.

The prices for AK-pattern assault rifles also initially fell from PKR 170,000 (USD 745) to PKR 50,000 (USD 220)—the lowest price in 20 years according to local sources. AK-pattern assault rifles now go for between USD 450 and 550, although prices vary widely depending on the quality and country of manufacture. In other areas of Afghanistan, AK-pattern assault rifles were sold for up to USD 620.\textsuperscript{35}

The prices for Beretta pistols also dropped from PKR 100,000–130,000 (USD 440–570) to PKR 30,000 (USD 130) during the collapse. The pistols now generally go for anywhere between USD 350 and USD 530 depending on the quality, but prices can reach up to USD 700.\textsuperscript{36} In general, prices noted were considerably higher in Helmand, where weapons markets are more tightly controlled by the Taliban, than in Nangarhar. More longitudinal work may help to explain price fluctuations by considering a host of factors, including local taxation and supply and demand dynamics.

Regarding night vision and thermal sights, and other highly sought-after accessories supplied to Afghan Special Forces, a Taliban fighter in Nangarhar interviewed by APW said night vision items recovered during the collapse were sold for between USD 500 and USD 1,000. According to the fighter, his commander had declared that the “Chinese were very interested in the night vision used by the Americans and would pay 2,500 USD for them”.\textsuperscript{37} When asked about the availability of these items in the market, the commander noted that ANDSF units had possessed these items and taken them with them when they were evacuated.\textsuperscript{38} Any night vision or thermal sights left behind are likely tightly controlled by the Taliban.

The Taliban engage in routine weapons seizures from smugglers and civilians holding weapons without Taliban authorization (that is, without paying a fee for a permit or licence). Weapon permits are issued on request at the discretion of local Taliban officials. As the Taliban have clamped down on small-scale weapons smuggling, other weapons dealers have used their ties with the Taliban to continue trading. Senior Taliban officials also have the authority to allow or shut down open-air bazaars in the areas under their control.

Key smuggling routes identified by APW in Nangarhar include the official border crossing at Torkham, as well as the much more difficult crossing at Tora Bora.
To evade detection for unauthorized transfers, weapons may be transported by pickup truck to the Tora Bora pass. From there, horses and donkeys are used to transport weapons through Zeran in Kurram District to Parachinar, the capital of Kurram District, where there is reportedly a depot for weapons. Weapons may also be transported on to Bara Bazar, in Khyber District, and on to Dara Adamkhel, Peshawar, and other locations within Pakistan. Smugglers also reportedly use an unofficial border crossing called Pacha Mina, a small town next to Torkham. The Torkham–Peshawar highway, however, provides the most direct and efficient route to other parts of Pakistan.

**Conclusions**

Preliminary investigations in Afghanistan conducted since the Taliban took control of the country suggest a highly disparate set of political, social, and commercial dynamics affecting arms smuggling and illicit arms availability. On the one hand, the Taliban’s efforts to tighten control over large stockpiles and small-scale smuggling have been successful to some degree in certain areas. After dropping sharply in markets following the fall of the Republic, weapons prices have rebounded, which also suggests a tightening of supplies.

On the other hand, arms smuggling, civilian arms sales, and even weapon registration continues where it suits local Taliban officials to collect taxes on these activities; unauthorized, clandestine arms trafficking is also taking place. Local dynamics in the region, especially the character of local leaders and their relations with the main power centres, significantly shape the extent to which smuggling is, or is not, authorized.

The situation in Nangarhar—given its long border with Pakistan, the presence of significant arms markets, and a history of cross-border illicit trafficking—is of particular concern. Field research conducted in the province in late 2022 suggests that cross-border trafficking is continuing, and that Afghan-sourced arms are both available in Pakistani markets and fuelling TTP violence against the Pakistani state.

The access of other non-state terrorist groups—especially ISKP—to Taliban-held arms currently remains unclear. If ISKP is successful in recruiting disenfranchised and marginalized fighters, this could not only put additional pressure on the Taliban, but also provide new avenues for ISKP to access military equipment. Investigations into the specific trafficking networks and intermediaries involved would help to better inform counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation interventions and outreach to regional states. The degree of overlap between smuggling and the drug trade would also benefit from further investigation.

Other non-state armed groups’ relations with the Taliban, and their possible access to Afghan-sourced arms, is one of several important questions that future research should address. The Small Arms Survey and others have previously used longitudinal pricing data to monitor illicit arms markets and serve as an early-warning mechanism, since sharp changes in prices may indicate a high risk of violent outbreaks. As the Taliban face complex internal security risks posed by emerging armed resistance and ISKP, it is increasingly important to fill in the significant knowledge gaps that exist, as well as to ensure adequate independent monitoring and reporting on weapons and terrorist group activity, in both Afghanistan and the wider region.

**Abbreviations and acronyms**

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
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<td>ANDSF</td>
<td>Afghan National Defence and Security Forces</td>
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<td>APW</td>
<td>Afghan Peace Watch</td>
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<td>GDI</td>
<td>General Directorate of Intelligence</td>
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<td>IS</td>
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<td>NDS</td>
<td>National Directorate of Security</td>
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<td>TTP</td>
<td>Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan</td>
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### About Afghan Peace Watch

Afghan Peace Watch (APW) is a US-registered non-profit dedicated to independent reporting and analysis on peace and security in Afghanistan. The organization was previously registered under the Ministry of Economy in Afghanistan in 2020. APW maintains an extensive network of journalists and civil society activists on the ground and monitors more than 200 social media accounts daily in all regional languages. Incidents are verified and added to APW’s bespoke database to track trends on violence against civilians, human rights violations, arbitrary detentions and arrests, as well as other security issues. APW draws on a wide range of expertise within Afghanistan and the diaspora to support public discourse on Afghanistan and empower those living under Taliban rule. For more information, please visit: www.afghanpeacewatch.org.

### About the Small Arms Survey

The Small Arms Survey is a global centre of excellence whose mandate is to generate impartial, evidence-based, and policy-relevant knowledge on all aspects of small arms and armed violence. It is the principal international source of expertise, information, and analysis on small arms and armed violence issues, and acts as a resource for governments, policymakers, researchers, and civil society. It is located in Geneva, Switzerland, and is an associated programme of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies.

The Survey has an international staff with expertise in security studies, political science, law, economics, development studies, sociology, and criminology, and collaborates with a network of researchers, partner institutions, non-governmental organizations, and governments in more than 50 countries.

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