

Report

March 2019



FOURTH MPOME REGIONAL WORKSHOP REPORT

Making Peace Operations More Effective

Edited by Claire Mc Evoy



MAKING PEACE
OPERATIONS
MORE EFFECTIVE



Small Arms Survey

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About the Small Arms Survey

The Small Arms Survey is a global centre of excellence whose mandate is to generate impartial, evidence-based, and policy-relevant knowledge on all aspects of small arms and armed violence. It is the principal international source of expertise, information, and analysis on small arms and armed violence issues, and acts as a resource for governments, policymakers, researchers, and civil society. It is located in Geneva, Switzerland, and is a project of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies.

The Survey has an international staff with expertise in security studies, political science, law, economics, development studies, sociology, and criminology, and collaborates with a network of researchers, partner institutions, non-governmental organizations, and governments in more than 50 countries.

For more information, please visit: www.smallarmssurvey.org



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A publication of the Small Arms Survey's Making Peace Operations More Effective (MPOME) project, with support from NATO and the Governments of Canada and Sweden.

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Making Peace Operations More Effective

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Brussels, Belgium · 12–13 December 2018

Edited by Claire Mc Evoy



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Cover photo: A Dutch soldier in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force conducts an ammunition inventory check. Kandahar, Afghanistan, October 2009. Source: Ton Koene/Alamy Stock Photo

About the MPOME project

The Small Arms Survey's Making Peace Operations More Effective (MPOME) project contributes to the reduction of violence and insecurity due to illicit arms proliferation in conflict zones. Towards that end, the project is working to build a collaborative agenda—with the United Nations, regional organizations, and troop- and police-contributing countries (TCCs/PCCs)—to reduce the diversion of arms and ammunition from peace operations. The focus is on improving practices to manage both contingent-owned equipment and recovered materiel.

Phase 1 of the MPOME project (through March 2019) has worked to:

- produce cutting-edge, peer-reviewed research on arms management and losses in peace operations and establish the Survey's Peace Operations Data Set (PODS);
- assist the African Union to develop and implement a new policy to manage recovered weapons in the peace operations it authorizes;
- support regional organizations to operationalize existing (but unimplemented) commitments on the management of arms and ammunition in peace operations;
- consolidate understanding of existing TCC/PCC practices—in particular, good practices—and training needs through a series of regional workshops in partnership with regional organizations that field peace operations and regional training institutions whose mission is to enhance these operations' effectiveness;
- design training modules for strengthening TCC/PCC practices; and
- promote a gender perspective in arms control initiatives in peace operations to strengthen the effectiveness of those efforts.

Phase 2 of MPOME (from April 2019) will further strengthen the sustainability of Phase 1 activities and expand the scope of this work by:

- expanding PODS—including its methodology and web-based interactive map—to enhance the evidence base for reform efforts and to help assess the efficacy of improved practice;
- supporting existing partners and reaching out to new TCCs and PCCs, as well as regional organizations authorizing peace operations;
- developing reform and accountability initiatives in peace operations to enhance performance, with an emphasis on applying a gender lens and promoting the women, peace, and security agenda;
- delivering the training and capacity-building efforts promoting arms and ammunition management in peace operations developed in Phase 1 and evolving norms;
- enhancing peacekeepers' participation in illicit arms flows reduction efforts in conflict zones, in line with recent UN directives; and
- identifying practical measures to strengthen the collection and sharing of information and technical weapons intelligence and analysis in peace operations.

The MPOME project is supported by the Governments of Australia, Canada, Germany, Indonesia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Senegal, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Uruguay, as well as the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States Commission, the Economic Community of Central African States, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

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Claire Mc Evoy is a projects editor with the Small Arms Survey, authoring and content editing Survey publications on conflict and violence.

About the partners

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a political and military alliance. Its purpose is to guarantee the freedom and security of its members through political and military means. NATO promotes democratic values and enables members to consult and cooperate on defence- and security-related issues to solve problems, build trust, and, in the long run, prevent conflict. NATO is committed to the peaceful resolution of disputes. If diplomatic efforts fail, it has the military power to undertake crisis-management operations. These are carried out under the collective defence clause of NATO's founding treaty—Article 5 of the Washington Treaty—or under a UN mandate, either alone or in cooperation with other countries and international organizations.

NATO is an alliance of countries from Europe and North America. It provides a unique link between these two continents, enabling them to consult and cooperate in the field of defence and security, and conduct multinational crisis-management operations together. The 2010 Strategic Concept defines NATO's core tasks as collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security.

Arms Control, Disarmament, and WMD Non-Proliferation Centre

NATO has a long-standing and active history of supporting regional and global arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation efforts dating back to its founding in 1949. The alliance continues to pursue its security objectives through these efforts, while at the same time ensuring that it meets its collective defence obligations.

NATO itself is not party to any treaty, but it supports and facilitates dialogue among allies, partners, and other countries, while also helping them to coordinate and carry out their obligations. All NATO allies are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention,

the Vienna Document 2011, and other key international arms control and non-proliferation treaties and agreements.

NATO's Arms Control, Disarmament and WMD Non-Proliferation Centre (ACDC) was created in 2017, merging the Arms Control and Coordination Section with the WMD Non-Proliferation Centre. ACDC is located at NATO headquarters and comprises national experts and personnel from NATO's international staff and international military staff. ACDC's work includes the following four areas: conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building measures; small arms and light weapons and mine action; weapons of mass destruction (WMD) non-proliferation; and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defence.

The Small Arms Survey

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Foreword

We are very pleased to present this Fourth MPOME Regional Workshop Report. It includes summaries of both the formal contributions made by presenters at the workshop and the lively discussions that ensued. The participants were mostly from NATO and the diplomatic community in Brussels, but the field-based expertise that was shared came from peace operations in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, Kosovo,¹ and elsewhere around the globe. The participation of personnel at the workshop, which included NATO staff, as well as experts from the European Union (EU), the EU Force, the Kosovo Force, the International Security Assistance Force, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, and a host of allied and partner governments, is an indicator of the interest in the subject of weapons and ammunition management in peacekeeping missions. We are confident that both policy-makers and practitioners alike who read the report will take away many observations and lessons learned that are relevant to their work and to addressing the challenge of preventing weapons losses from their peace missions.

This is the first time the Small Arms Survey has undertaken a workshop on this topic in partnership with NATO; we hope it will not be the last. The meeting outlined the scale and scope of operations that NATO has undertaken in which its forces have recovered lethal materiel. The Survey is keen to learn more about how this materiel has been securely stored, recorded, and safely destroyed or transferred as examples of good practice. This initial workshop did not permit us to explore the policies for managing contingent-owned equipment that NATO forces use. Instead it focused more on the safekeeping of arms and ammunition that NATO allies provide as part of security sector reform efforts in mission areas. The Survey is eager to explore with NATO how its experiences and improved practice in this area can help other organizations and TCCs/PCCs in the peace operations they undertake.

This workshop represented a new focus area for NATO. We appreciate the chance to examine how illicit small arms and ammunition—and other conventional weapons


systems—enter the conflict zones where NATO operates. NATO has long appreciated the excellent work of the Small Arms Survey and has benefitted from the Survey’s contributions to arms control and non-proliferation courses at the NATO school in Oberammergau. Moving forward, we will engage the NATO Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre in Lisbon to explore what it can share with the Survey regarding weapons and ammunition management in allied operations. NATO will also explore opportunities for incorporating Small Arms Survey research and expertise into its small arms control support and policy initiatives and NATO-led or -supported peace-keeping courses.

Finally, a special thanks to Roman Hunger, Eric Mietz, and Laura van de Vloet, as well as Emile LeBrun and Sigrid Lipott, for their help in organizing and running the workshop, and Claire Mc Evoy for coordinating and editing this report. We are particularly grateful to the Government of Indonesia for sending experts to the workshop, and to Canada and Sweden for their generous financial support.



Eric G. Berman

Director, Small Arms Survey
Geneva, Switzerland
March 2019



William Alberque

Head, Arms Control and Coordination Section
Political Affairs and Security Policy Division
NATO
March 2019

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List of abbreviations and acronyms

ACDC	Arms Control, Disarmament and WMD Non-Proliferation Centre
AFBiH	Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANDSF	Afghan National Defence and Security Forces
ANP	Afghan National Police
AU	African Union
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
COE	Contingent-owned equipment
CoreIMS	Core Inventory Management System
CSSB	Combat Sustainment Support Battalion
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan
DDR	Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
DoD	Department of Defense
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Union Force
EUM	End Use Monitoring
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
GAO	Government Accountability Office
IATG	International Ammunition Technical Guidelines
IFOR	Implementation Force

IS	Islamic State
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ITEF	Iraq Train and Equip Fund
KFOR	Kosovo Force
MNJTF	Multinational Joint Task Force
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MOSAIC	Modular Small Arms Control Implementation Compendium
MPOME	Making Peace Operations More Effective
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OVERLORD	Operational Verification of Reliable Logistics Oversight Database
PoA	Programme of Action
PCC	Police-contributing country
PMPP TNI	Pusat Misi Pemeliharaan Perdamaian Tentara Nasional Indonesia/Indonesian National Defence Forces Peacekeeping Centre
PODS	Peace Operations Data Set
PSO	Peace support operation
PSSM	Physical security and stockpile management
SCIP	Security Cooperation Information Portal
SFOR	Stabilization Force
SIGAR	Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
SOP	Standard operating procedure
TCC	Troop-contributing country
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNDFS	United Nations Department of Field Support
UNDPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (now United Nations Department of Peace Operations (UNDPO))
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
US	United States
USD	United States dollar
WAM	Weapons and ammunition management
WMD	Weapons of mass destruction
WPS	Women, peace, and security

Final workshop agenda

Fourth MPOME Regional Workshop

Transatlantic Room, New NATO Headquarters
Brussels, Belgium, 12–13 December 2018

Tuesday 11 December

19:00–21:00 **'Icebreaker' and dinner, Hotel Marivaux**

Wednesday 12 December

08:30–09:00 **Registration**

09:00–09:30 **Welcome and overview**

Eric G. Berman, Director, Small Arms Survey

Dr John Manza, Assistant Secretary-General for Operations, NATO

Eirini Lemos-Maniati, Deputy Director, ACDC, NATO

Eric Laporte, Political Counsellor, Canadian Joint Delegation to NATO

09:30–10:30 **Session 1:**
Global perspectives on arms management in peace operations

Moderator: Claire Mc Evoy, Projects Editor, Small Arms Survey

Presenter: Emile LeBrun, MPOME Project Coordinator, Small Arms Survey

10:30–11:00 **Coffee break**

- 11:00–12:30 **Session 2:**
Arms management in operations in Afghanistan
Moderator: Eric G. Berman
Presenter: Maj. Gen. Gordon Davis, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary-General for Defence Investment Division, NATO
- 12:30–13:30 **Lunch**
- 13:30–15:00 **Session 3:**
Experiences and lessons from Kosovo
Moderator: Mihai Carp, Deputy Head of Section, NATO Operations Section A
Presenter: Col. Hansjörg Fischer, Partner National Military Representative, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, NATO Command Centre Operations
- 15:00–15:15 **Coffee break**
- 15:15–16:30 **Session 4: Day 1 wrap-up**
Emile LeBrun

Thursday 13 December

- 08:30–09:30 **Session 5:**
Evolving global and regional legal frameworks and norms on small arms controls, gender, and peacekeeping
Presenters: Emile LeBrun, Claire Mc Evoy
- 09:30–10:30 **Session 6:**
Experiences and lessons from stabilization operations in BiH
Moderator: Emile LeBrun
Presenter: Col. Martin Trachsler, Special Advisor on Small Arms and Light Weapons Disposal to the Commander of EUFOR
- 10:30–11:00 **Coffee break**
- 11:00–12:30 **Session 7: Assessment of training and needs**
Presenter: Emile LeBrun
- 12:30–13:30 **Lunch**

13:30–14:30

Session 8: Day 2 wrap-up

Jeff Brehm and Dr Sigrid Lipott

14:30–15:00

Closing remarks

Col. Victor George and Brig. Gen. Victor H. Simatupang, PMPP TNI

Eric G. Berman

Eirini Lemos-Maniati

Opening statements

Eric G. Berman

Director, Small Arms Survey

Good morning. I am very pleased to have been given the honour to formally welcome you to the headquarters of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) here in Brussels, and to open the Fourth Regional Workshop of the Making Peace Operations More Effective (MPOME) project.

Emile LeBrun, the MPOME Project Coordinator, will discuss the project in greater detail shortly, but let me state at the outset that the objective of the Small Arms Survey's focus on weapons and ammunition management in peace operations is to improve the safety and security of peacekeepers and to allow them to more ably implement their missions' mandates, which often include the protection of civilians. The Survey's extensive research has demonstrably shown that the loss of contingent-owned equipment or of materiel recovered from negative forces happens considerably more often than previously understood, and that the scale and scope of these losses includes many hundreds of light weapons, thousands of small arms, and millions of rounds of ammunition.

Indeed, last week I had the opportunity to visit the headquarters of the Lake Chad Basin Commission-led Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in N'Djamena, Chad. Boko Haram and the non-state armed group Islamic State of the West Africa Province have carried out numerous attacks against MNJTF bases and have seized not just small arms and ammunition, but also armoured vehicles and artillery systems. Of course, the MNJTF is not the only peace operation to suffer such losses. Elsewhere in Africa armed groups such as al-Shabaab, for example, have obtained substantial materiel from the African Union Mission in Somalia.

MPOME workshops provide important opportunities for policy-makers and practitioners to share their peace operations' experiences and build on good practice. Of the 20-plus organizations that have undertaken more than 100 peace operations outside of the UN, it is clear that the European Union (EU) and NATO have been particularly active. We expect that the speakers and participants in this workshop will draw not just on their experiences in EU and NATO missions, but also on peace operations that other organizations have undertaken, as appropriate.

We are fortunate to have with us officials from the US government's Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction and the Indonesian National Defence Forces Peacekeeping Centre, which has significant experience in UN peace operations, is a partner of the MPOME project, and will host the Fifth MPOME Regional Workshop in 2019.

Before giving the floor to my NATO and Canadian colleagues, I wish to formally thank the Governments of Canada and Sweden for making this workshop possible. Canada and Sweden have been long-term supporters of the Survey; indeed, the MPOME project exists because of Canada's vision. As for Sweden, besides helping to fund this workshop, the Swedish government has also supported the development of the Survey's Peace Operations Data Set (PODS). PODS, which records attacks on peacekeepers that result in the diversion of materiel, is an important component of the MPOME project, and will be discussed in greater depth over the coming two days.

As for NATO, the Survey has long supported its arms control and counter-proliferation courses at its school in Oberammergau. The Survey appreciates NATO's decision to affiliate itself with the MPOME project. We see this workshop as an important opportunity to build on our existing relationship and to learn from one another.

Accordingly, I look forward to the remarks of Dr John Manza, NATO's Assistant Secretary-General for Operations, and Mrs Eirini Lemos-Maniati, NATO's Deputy Director of the Arms Control, Disarmament, and WMD Non-Proliferation Centre (ACDC), who have joined us for this opening session. Mr Eric Laporte, Political Counsellor at the Canadian Joint Delegation to NATO, is also with us. I am now very pleased to give the floor to each of these officials.

Dr John Manza

Assistant Secretary-General for Operations, NATO

For those of you who do not know me, I am NATO's Assistant Secretary-General for Operations, and what you are discussing here is very relevant to my daily work. What I would like to do is to quickly run through our operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, and Libya, because one of the common threads there is the proliferation or uncontrolled use of small arms. Of the more than one billion small arms in the world, some 857 million are in the hands of civilians. About eight million small arms are produced per year.

When I look at our operations in places such as Afghanistan, obviously small arms are a massive problem and have been so for the last 40 years, if not longer. They have contributed to the rise of militias, they still contribute to warlordism, and I and our staff struggle constantly to see how we can control them there. On the one hand, we manage the Afghan National Army Trust Fund, which, combined with US funds, puts about five or six billion dollars per year into the armed forces in Afghanistan. A large chunk of this is for the procurement of small arms and ammunition in a country that is already flooded with them.

So we have this dilemma. We need to support the Afghan security forces. We want to do this for several good reasons: they are in a fight with extremists, they are concerned about the rise of the non-state group Islamic State (IS), and they are trying to bring stability to Afghanistan. But, ironically, we are also fuelling the conflict, especially the spread of arms.

One of the things that bothers me, and not just in Afghanistan, is that there is virtually no penalty for soldiers and police who desert. So we train people, we arm them—typically with rifles and pistols—but when they walk away, which a significant portion of them do, they take those weapons and ammunition home with them. This is going on every day in Afghanistan, so it is a policy dilemma for us.

I looked up some statistics on Kosovo. Despite a pretty significant effort by NATO to collect the small arms there, perhaps 400,000 remain uncontrolled. Here is where this really becomes policy-relevant and not just theoretical. We have a burgeoning problem right now where the national authorities are anxious to move into the Serb municipalities in northern Kosovo. But those Serb municipalities are filled with uncontrolled small arms. If government forces were to step into those areas a firefight would immediately erupt that could spread, not just through Kosovo, but throughout the wider region.

The common thread here is the issue of uncontrolled weapons affecting our operations. In Iraq, when I was there 12 years ago, the militias and tribes were *all* armed.

The sheikhs would proudly tell me that they could raise a militia of a thousand men in a day if they wanted to, and they probably could have done so. They were all armed with rocket-propelled grenades, machine guns, and AK-47s. This really reduced the ability of the state, especially in southern Iraq, to exert control, because the real state was those armed militias.

We had the same problem in Iraq with deserting soldiers—there was no societal shame or penalty for deserting. So we armed people, they served in the armed forces for a short time, and then they walked away with their weapons. Obviously, a lot of this fuelled the rise of IS. What it allowed these disaffected Sunnis to do was to quickly form militias and armies and to use these small arms for their political purposes.

I have been looking a lot at Libya, because we have a task to deliver capacity building and security sector reform there. As you all know, the state controlled the small arms there when Muammar Qaddafi ran the country. We so frequently face unintended consequences of our well-intentioned actions: whatever people think about what we did in Libya when Qaddafi was forced out of power with the assistance of NATO's campaign there, the unintended consequence was that it opened up all these armouries throughout that country, the contents of which have fuelled violence in Mali, in Gaza, spreading all the way to Syria.

So we are trying to do the right thing in one place to support a state—or in this case to get rid of a despot—which was the stated intention of NATO's intervention in Libya. But the unintended consequence of this was the spread of uncontrolled arms.

The repeated theme in all our operations right now is the problem of uncontrolled small arms fuelling conflicts like petrol thrown on a fire. You have disaffected populations, they have access to small arms, they are able to assert a level of control, and violence erupts.

Small arms also threaten peace settlements. In Iraq you even have a kind of conventional 'victory' where we have defeated IS, but all the weapons still remain. The disaffected Sunni population still has access to those weapons, so there are significant concerns.

But let me stop there. Thank you very much.

Eirini Lemos-Maniati

Deputy Director, ACDC, NATO

Dear participants, on behalf of ACDC I would also like to warmly welcome you to NATO headquarters and the fourth regional interactive workshop on Making Peace Operations More Effective. It is a great pleasure for NATO to co-host this workshop together with the Small Arms Survey.

Small arms and light weapons are becoming an increasingly important topic in NATO's agenda, because their control represents an important area of work in our efforts to project stability. The illicit manufacture, transfer, and circulation of these weapons and their excessive accumulation and uncontrolled spread in many regions have had—and continue to have—a wide range of negative security, humanitarian, and socio-economic consequences. International organizations bear a special responsibility to formulate action against such negative consequences.

NATO used to tackle this subject from a technical or project-based point of view; now it does it from a more holistic, capacity-building point of view, working with local institutions and authorities to find ways to control these weapons.

NATO has established and strengthened regional and cross-regional cooperation and developed coordination and information-sharing mechanisms using its comparative advantage in assisting states to develop capacities to combat the illicit trade in small arms.² The alliance has developed structured partnerships, including the Partnership for Peace, the Mediterranean Dialogue, and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, as well as engaging actively with partner states on a wide range of political and security issues related to small arms challenges.

In this context we recently held a meeting with seven countries from North Africa to hear their perspectives. We recently attended the Paris summit on the French–German initiative for a sustainable solution to the illegal possession, misuse, and trafficking of small arms and their ammunition in the western Balkans. We have also developed guidelines, including for gender mainstreaming in small arms-related projects.

Today we will be looking at the operational angle; namely, the consequences of weapons mismanagement in peace operations. We will hear views from the Kosovo Force, the International Security Assistance Force, Iraq, and EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina. How have you tackled this problem? How have you addressed it from a national perspective? You will be asked to share best practices and lessons learned on tackling the challenge of managing arms and ammunition in peace operations so that we can build our knowledge in this area.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Small Arms Survey for bringing this event here. Let me also thank Sweden and Canada for making the event possible. Let us see how we can improve and develop our knowledge to address the challenge of uncontrolled small arms and ammunition proliferation.

Eric Laporte

Political Counsellor, Canadian Joint Delegation to NATO

Allow me to thank the Small Arms Survey and NATO and to say that it is a pleasure to support these discussions. The figures cited have highlighted that the proliferation of uncontrolled small arms has a significant impact on operations. It is critical that we should work together to see how to reduce the violence and insecurity caused by the loss of these weapons from missions, with a view to keeping the civilians safe that our missions are there to protect.

Today's and tomorrow's conversations will hopefully draw out a number of collective lessons learned that may be used to unpack how to tackle this issue. From our perspective, it is important to be honest and humble and to draw on, and learn from, both good and bad experiences. We see information sharing like this as being very helpful to us as troop-contributing and police-contributing countries to NATO and UN operations, as well as to donors and capacity-building programmes on weapons and ammunition management.

The demands that we put on peacekeepers are increasing as part of complex missions in very challenging environments. We need to better prepare them to fulfil the mandates of these missions. The ease with which small arms proliferate is a challenge. These weapons are increasingly in the hands of non-state actors who are involved in arms trafficking. They hinder development, contribute to criminal and gender-based violence, and exacerbate structural violence.

With regard to women and girls, in 2017 Canada launched its second National Action Plan on the women, peace, and security agenda, reflecting our feminist foreign policy. Therefore, we view the work that NATO has been doing on small arms and gender as being really interesting and hope to see through the conversations that follow how we can better consider the experiences of both men and women in the work of peace-keeping operations. I am very happy to see a session on gender in this workshop.

Thank you very much. ●

Session summaries

The sessions were conducted under the Chatham House Rule to encourage a frank exchange of views. Therefore the names of speakers from outside the Small Arms Survey have been removed from the discussion summaries.

Session 1: Global perspectives on arms management in peace operations

Emile LeBrun opened the workshop with a review of the origins of the MPOME project, its research findings, and related policy developments since the project's inception in 2016.

He explained that the impetus for the project came from the realization that demands on peacekeepers were changing in increasingly dangerous settings; that the diversion of weapons and ammunition was posing humanitarian, security, safety, and financial problems; and that the scale of these losses of materiel was unclear. Three particular attacks that occurred in Sudan illustrated the challenge:

- **Haskanita attack (September 2007).** A fixed base of the African Union (AU) Mission in Sudan at Haskanita staffed by 157 personnel was attacked; 12 personnel were killed and 10 injured. Most of the site's equipment was reportedly looted before the Sudanese military was able to retake the base the same day. Approximately 100,000 rounds of ammunition and caches of small arms were taken (Berman and Racovita, 2015, p. 104).
- **Raiba Trans incident (April 2008).** A shipping convoy run by the Raiba Trans company, a commercial contractor acting on behalf of the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), was hijacked. It was carrying 12.5 tonnes of mainly 5.8 × 42 mm and 9 mm ammunition from Port Sudan to UNAMID's Chinese military engineer contingent in Nyala, South Darfur. The entire shipment was stolen, comprising over 600,000 rounds of ammunition. There were no known casualties (Berman and Racovita, 2015, pp. 76, 104).
- **Nigerian patrol 'ambush' (March 2010).** A UNAMID patrol of 63 mostly Nigerian infantry tasked with stabilizing fighting in Kawara, Darfur, was overwhelmed and detained. The peacekeepers were stripped of most of their weapons and equipment, including their vehicles (three armoured personnel carriers). The attack resulted in the losses of 55 assault rifles, 8 machine guns, 4 anti-tank weapons, more than 14,000 rounds of ammunition, and 13 rocket-propelled grenade rounds (Berman and Racovita, 2015, p. 108).

Mr LeBrun said that this led the Survey to pose two key questions that underpinned the MPOME project's subsequent research:

- What is the scale and scope of diversion within peace operations in Sudan/South Sudan?
- Are losses just part of the 'cost of doing business'?

Initial observations in the project's first publication, *Under Attack and Above Scrutiny? Arms and Ammunition Diversion from Peacekeepers in Sudan and South Sudan, 2002–14* (Berman and Racovita, 2015), were that losses were neither infrequent nor negligible. The authors documented that recorded losses significantly underestimate the scale and scope of the problem, that imperfect recording is a challenge (including due to political 'sensitivities'), that diversion is not always the result of being in the wrong place at the wrong time, and that oversight of recovered weapons—those taken into the custody of mission personnel during operations—is a 'grey' area.

The project's next publication, *Checks and Balances: Securing Small Arms during Peace Operations* (Schroeder, 2016), found that stockpile security, record-keeping, and reporting practices vary significantly from mission to mission; that inadequate resources affect control measures; and that there is a need for a consolidated and accessible compilation of best practices for securing contingent-owned equipment (COE).

A subsequent, expanded study, *Making a Tough Job More Difficult: Loss of Arms and Ammunition in Peace Operations* (Berman, Racovita, and Schroeder, 2017), found that the losses incurred in Sudan and South Sudan represented an underestimate of the true scale; that notable losses (incidents where either 10 or more firearms or 1,000 or more rounds of ammunition are lost) had occurred in more than 20 missions; and that oversight of and accountability for losses differed markedly among these missions. It concluded that thousands of arms and millions of rounds of ammunition had been lost from peacekeeping operations.

The MPOME project has continued to expand the geographical coverage of its research (see Infographic 1). It has developed the only public dataset on losses from peace support operations (PSOs), with more than 150 incidents documented to date from more than 30 missions, fielded by more than 10 organizations, including the AU, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa, the European Union (EU), the Lake Chad Basin Commission, NATO, the Southern African Development Community, and the UN. Eventually the Survey's Peace Operations Data Set (PODs) will be expanded to include losses of equipment such as communications devices and vehicles.

The project has also moved into the area of capacity building to help entities that authorize peacekeeping missions to address the problem of losses of arms and ammunition. This includes the AU, which signed a memorandum of understanding with the Survey in 2015. MPOME project activities in these areas include policy development and pre-deployment training.

Policy development. The Survey has supported AU member states, regional economic communities, regional mechanisms, and the leadership of AU PSOs to develop

the AU's Policy on the Management of Recovered Small Arms and Light Weapons in Peace Support Operations through a consultative, inclusive process. The new policy was validated in November 2018 at the AU's headquarters in Addis Ababa and will be submitted to its Specialized Technical Committee on Defence, Safety and Security in mid-2019. In the months to follow, the Survey will support the AU to sensitize its member states and peace operations to the policy's contents; and to develop related training modules to implement the policy. It will have special relevance for the AU Mission in Somalia, MNJTF, UNAMID, and future AU-mandated missions.

The Survey is also supporting two subregional organizations—ECOWAS and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)—both of which have committed to establishing mechanisms to improve controls of peacekeepers' weapons and ammunition—including recovered materiel—during peace operations in key conventions.

- **ECOWAS.** The ECOWAS convention on small arms (ECOWAS, 2006), which came into force in 2009, is a legally binding instrument requiring the organization's 15 member states to report to the ECOWAS Commission on the small arms, light weapons, ammunition, parts, and accessories their forces take into peace operations, as well as what they resupply, recover, destroy, and depart with (ECOWAS, 2006, art. 11). This applies to peacekeeping operations both in and outside ECOWAS territory. The commission's Small Arms Division is currently developing reporting templates for ECOWAS member states to use to meet the above commitments, and the Survey is supporting it in these efforts.
- **ECCAS.** The ECCAS convention on small arms, known as the Kinshasa Convention (ECCAS, 2010), is legally binding for the organization's 11 member states and became operational in 2017; it addresses the management of COE in ECCAS-mandated peace operations. The convention requires the ECCAS secretary-general to establish and maintain a subregional database of weapons and ammunition for use in PSOs, with data provided by the states parties, including on marking procedures. The same data must also be kept in a series of national registers (ECCAS, 2010, art. 22).

Pre-deployment training. The Survey is developing a three-day counter-diversion training course that includes train-the-trainer modules. It was validated in March 2019 and will be piloted shortly thereafter. The course will subsequently be adapted for an e-learning platform.

Since 2016 interest in the MPOME project has expanded at both the political and financial levels. As of late 2018 it counts 15 supporters, including Australia, Canada, Germany, Indonesia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Senegal, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Uruguay, as well as the AU, ECOWAS, and NATO.

Discussion

Workshop participants discussed:

- the extent to which losses due to corruption and illicit sales of arms and ammunition are captured by the MPOME project's research; and
- the project's outreach to obtain data on losses.

Eric Berman explained that so far the project has assessed large-scale events, whereas corruption-related events tend to be both smaller and more difficult to measure. Sensitivities on the subject of corruption remain extremely high and people are reluctant to speak about it on the record. While it does not appear that there are large numbers of sales of weapons and ammunition, he acknowledged that recovered and confiscated weapons continue to pose a challenge. The MPOME case study on Sudan and South Sudan showed that force commanders do not receive guidance from the UN system on how to handle recovered weapons and that sometimes materiel is circulated as a result (Berman and Racovita, 2015).

Mr LeBrun added that while COE appears to be fairly well controlled, corruption and the recirculation of weapons may be a bigger issue when donor countries procure and provide national forces with weapons during conflicts, such as has occurred in Iraq and Afghanistan (see Session 2). These scenarios are of interest to the MPOME project, but little concrete data is available. He added that the project does not have data on illicit sales of weapons and ammunition from PSOs due to the difficulty of obtaining it.

He said the Survey engages with interested partner countries to expand our insights into loss events. The Survey's partnership with Uruguay was the first bilateral partnership to be formed, followed by those with Senegal and Indonesia. These kinds of partnerships facilitate conversations with key interlocutors to not only add to PODS, but to explore practices, guidance, and capacities for stemming losses.

Session 2: Arms management in operations in Afghanistan

Maj. Gen. Gordon Davis focused the second session on the ways in which the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) approaches the management of weapons and ammunition in Afghanistan from a US policy and legal perspective. This included measures taken to improve transparency and oversight of deliveries to Afghan national forces and challenges that have been experienced.

He began by noting that large numbers of small arms were already present in Afghanistan before NATO forces arrived in 2003 (see Box 1) and that many more were provided during the NATO mission (although not necessarily by NATO allies). As part of the UN-mandated effort there was a division of labour among participating nations, in which the United States focused on working with the Afghan army, Germany on the police, Italy on justice, Japan on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), and the United Kingdom on countering illegal drug flows. A number of NATO nations joined US efforts to support, train, and equip the Afghan National Army (ANA), and later the Afghan National Police (ANP). Equipping the army was primarily a US effort; the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) was the primary US Department of Defense (DoD) entity responsible for overseeing the delivery and transfer of weapons to Afghan forces.

Box 1 NATO's involvement in Afghanistan

NATO took command of the UN-mandated ISAF—governed by UN Security Council resolutions 1386 (2001), 1413 (2002), 1444 (2002), 1510 (2003), 1563 (2004), 1623 (2005), 1707 (2006), 1776 (2007), and 1833 (2008)—from August 2003 until December 2014.³ ISAF's mission was

to enable the Afghan authorities and build the capacity of the Afghan national security forces to provide effective security, so as to ensure that Afghanistan would never again be a safe haven for terrorists (NATO, n.d.a).

The transition to Afghanistan taking responsibility for its own security started in 2011 and was completed in December 2014, when the Afghans assumed full responsibility for the security of their country, with NATO taking on an advisory role (NATO, n.d.a). In January 2015 NATO's Resolute Support Mission was launched, a non-combat mission to train, advise, and assist Afghan security forces and institutions. By mid-2018 more than 16,000 personnel from 39 NATO member states and partner countries were deployed in support of the mission (NATO, 2018).

Initial efforts were undertaken without ‘an end state’ in mind, based on the concept of a ‘collaborative and building effort over time’. At the outset the focus was on DDR and collecting weapons from Afghan militia forces. Then NATO started to equip the ANA, which was about 70,000 strong. DDR stopped in 2005, followed by the demobilization of illegally armed groups until 2010, as part of which significant numbers of weapons were collected (approximately 100,000). From 2010 to 2016 the focus was on the Afghan peace and reintegration process, and on disarming armed opposition groups and collecting their weapons on a smaller scale. About 8,000 weapons were collected during this period. The UN Development Programme had control of the weapons collected; serviceable ones may have been given to the Afghan security forces.

Maj. Gen. Davis went on to discuss a number of factors that influenced NATO’s oversight of the weapons it distributed to Afghan forces.

Drawdown of NATO troops. At their height in 2011–12 NATO forces numbered more than 100,000, with 50 NATO and partner nations contributing troops. By 2015–16 there was a significant drawdown to approximately 12,000 troops. This had a major impact on NATO’s presence outside of Kabul and its ability to track weapons distributions. Its ‘ephemeral’ presence at brigade level meant that only anecdotal oversight was possible. Once troop numbers were reduced to 12,000, the focus was on ensuring that the Ministry of Defence and the Interior Ministry, which were receiving the weapons, could track them to their destinations.

Inventory management challenges. The Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP) tracked the movement of weapons from the United States, or donations from other nations, to the Afghan ministries, and the Operational Verification of Reliable Logistics Oversight Database (OVERLORD) tracked their distribution.

Starting in 2014, the Afghans used the Core Inventory Management System (Core-IMS), which was designed as a ‘one-stop shop’ to track all equipment, its operational readiness, and accountability for its distribution. This system provides oversight at the brigade level, tracking what is available in terms of equipment, including by using serial numbers for weapons and vehicles. Hundreds of Afghan operators were trained to use the system, but with mixed success due to:

- commanders blocking its accurate usage to maintain leverage over resources and people;
- a lack of honesty and incomplete or partial reporting;
- delays in receiving receipts and related reporting; and
- the inability to monitor the process remotely.

The system developed slowly over time. Regular reports were being made, but not in real time: there were always delays, and it was difficult—if not impossible—to verify

the data. This led to a lack of confidence in the accuracy of reports and a need for constant reconciliation efforts between SCIP and CoreIMS.

Legal framework and the introduction of ‘conditionality’. End-use monitoring is a requirement of the US legal framework, including enhanced end-use monitoring for sensitive or highly priced items such as night-vision goggles.

The US Congress requires the DoD to account for all weapons and equipment supplied to foreign militaries. Key legislation includes the following:

- Under the **Leahy Amendment** (1997) the United States may not supply foreign security forces that have committed gross human rights violations with impunity (United States, 1997, sec. 570).
- Under the **Foreign Assistance Act** (United States, 2019, sec. 505), the **Arms Export Control Act** (United States, 2018, secs. 3–4), and the Letter of Offer and Acceptance standard terms and conditions, the Afghans had to agree to use weapons for their intended purpose only.
- The **National Defense Authorization Act** requires the DoD to register and monitor ‘defense articles’ transferred to Afghanistan and Pakistan (United States, 2009, sec. 1225).⁴

Initially the ANA was supplied with Russian Federation weapons donated from former Warsaw Pact countries. Only special security forces were given US weapons, where controls were easy because the United States also provided advisory assistants at battalion level. From 2017, however, there was a transition from Russian Federation to US weapons that was motivated by political considerations, the weapons’ effectiveness, and the availability of spare parts. This resulted in the transfer of the Russian Federation weapons from the ANA to the ANP.

At the same time, from 2015, the policy of ‘conditionality’ was introduced for NATO-supplied materiel, including weapons and ammunition. This required the Afghan ministers of defence, the interior, and finance to agree to a series of conditions related to receiving funds and equipment. Inventory management or consumption reports were required for items such as weapons, ammunition, night-vision goggles, and fuel. This led to a ‘drastic change’ in purchases, including of ammunition, which had previously been purchased based on tables that had been developed decades earlier and were very inaccurate.

Sanctions. Sanctions were introduced following any failures to report, including on the consumption of ammunition. Resupplies were no longer provided following a failure to report. Resupplies of fuel were also used as leverage, with great effect.

Challenges to oversight of the system included the following:

- **Safe storage.** At the brigade level there were no handlers to ensure the safe storage of ammunition and explosives, including protection from environmental

degradation. In late 2015 an inspection programme identified ‘huge issues’ and began a process to dispose of dangerous or unserviceable ammunition.

- **Corruption.** A number of commanders and staff officers allegedly sold items from their stocks, including ammunition, clothing, and comfort items.
- **Accountability.** A new human resource system using biometric data and known as the Personnel and Pay System was introduced in 2016 for the army and police, and revealed the degree to which ‘ghost’ employees had been assigned weapons.
- **Distribution blockages.** From 2016 the focus was on ensuring that the relevant national ministries knew what supplies they had and could track them. Although inventory management had improved, distribution systems remained a problem. National ministries continued to use their ability to provide items to national forces as leverage to exert control over them. This led to a lack of overall confidence in the system within the Afghan army.
- **Lack of consequences for desertion.** A key challenge was the absence of repercussions for members of the armed forces who were equipped and then deserted with their weapons.

Discussion

The moderator, **Eric Berman**, took a number of questions on inventory management and oversight in Afghanistan from the floor, including the following:

- Were steps taken to mitigate commanders’ blockage of inventory management?
- How did US forces deal with recovered weapons?
- Was all end-use monitoring done electronically?
- Did the United States coordinate with other countries donating weapons in order to track such weapons?
- How did NATO deal with expectations regarding ‘reasonable’ levels of ammunition consumption?

Maj. Gen. Davis responded that, from his knowledge of operations, training on battlefield exploitation focused on the Afghan special security forces and that they kept some of the weapons they recovered from the Taliban (from 2008 to 2016). With the exception of two items that were traceable back to US forces, no recovered weapons originated from NATO forces.

He said that when discrepancies were found he would personally speak with relevant commanders, threatening to stop resupplies if CoreIMS was not updated. This approach was ‘pretty draconian’, but was generally respected. When it did not have the desired impact he would stop fuel supplies, which made a real difference. Condi-

tionality also meant that fuel consumption had to be reported on and was confirmed by inspections. In this manner several problems were resolved, but successes were often short lived.

Maj. Gen. Davis explained that for enhanced end-use monitoring it was necessary to physically send US forces to the relevant location, citing a distribution of night-vision goggles as an example.

Donor money, mostly from the United States, was used to purchase weapons that were to be donated and to track them. But Afghanistan often obtained weapons elsewhere. The Russian Federation delivered tens of thousands of small arms, for example. This fell outside the official inventory and there was no information on who was providing what. Equally, there was no information on weapons being supplied to insurgents across Afghanistan's porous borders. The insurgents used revenues obtained from unofficial taxes and drug trafficking to pay for them. The only oversight was of weapons provided by ISAF or Resolute Support nations. The United States almost exclusively provided these weapons for both missions.

Related challenges included the difficulty of exporting inventory management and accountability systems from Western countries to the Afghan context, including because of high levels of illiteracy. Furthermore, it was impossible to enter Russian (Cyrillic) alphabet letters that appeared in serial numbers into the CoreIMS system. So there was a good case for keeping written copies of these records.

Maj. Gen. Davis recalled that originally NATO was purchasing and supplying more than 50 different types of ammunition to Afghan forces. In 2015 NATO supervisory officials looked at relevant consumption reports and were able to reduce this to just 20 types of ammunition, saving about USD 100 million in the first year. The plan was to refine orders over time by using a 'supply discipline management principle'. Similarly, they reduced the types of vehicles that NATO was supplying and were able to adjust the expectations for spare parts to more realistic levels. They also reduced fuel supplies by 30 per cent and required a monthly reconciliation of fuel consumption. This drew a very strong response, because fuel was being redirected to other government departments.

Maj. Gen. Davis finished by noting that when weapons were captured they were generally destroyed, as were those taken from captured insurgents. Some rarer items that were difficult to replace were transferred to the Afghan army. The United States and its allies were not buying all of the advanced weaponry that Afghan forces needed at the time. One way to supply this weaponry was to redirect weapons in this manner. Brigade commanders were given discretion on the issue.

Session 3: Experiences and lessons from Kosovo

Moderator **Mihai Carp** opened the session by noting how different the context in Kosovo was in 2018 compared to 1999, when the Kosovo Force (KFOR) began its mission (see Box 2). He added that Kosovo is still considered ‘unfinished business’ in terms of small arms challenges and that the mandate to transform local security forces continues to open up new challenges, for both NATO and the wider region.

He then introduced **Col. Hansjörg Fischer**, whose presentation focused on the Swiss army’s role as a KFOR mission contributing partner in preventing third parties from illegally obtaining KFOR weapons. He therefore focused on a series of measures and processes within KFOR to ensure proper weapons control.

National training. Col. Fischer began by explaining the importance of consistent and precise pre-deployment training, which is a national responsibility. KFOR troops are evaluated before deployment. Part of the compulsory training offered by Switzerland focuses on integrity and anti-corruption, in addition to familiarizing troops with the historical background and culture in Kosovo. Rules on carrying weapons and ammunition, handling, storage, and transport are all found in national manuals—based on international humanitarian law—and controlled by military police. Within KFOR the maintenance of equipment is also viewed as being a national responsibility (as stipulated in the KFOR Operational Plan) and if losses occur the nation involved is required to provide clear guidance for its nationals on actions to be taken.

Monitoring of losses. Losses of weapons must be reported immediately and investigated, so it is necessary to have a monitoring system in place and to frequently check sensitive equipment. A (regularly updated) full inventory list is necessary to clarify what weapons and ammunition are available and what may be needed in the future. Various other rules are observed to facilitate the management of ammunition and weapons. Following shooting training, for example, empty cartridges have to be returned to prove that the rounds have been used.

Storage and identification. All weapons have to be stored in containers under lock and key. These are supervised and monitored. Furthermore, all weapons are numbered and assigned to an individual soldier. It is forbidden for a soldier to carry a weapon that is not assigned to him or her.

Post-rotation checks. It is strictly forbidden to take foreign weapons and ammunition home from the mission, and this is checked in Switzerland after each rotation.

Peer pressure. Each member state of KFOR has its own regulations to minimize risks. KFOR relies on national regulations, and because no nation wants to be accused of being responsible for diversion, all states have an interest in maintaining the system.

Col. Fischer said there were no incidents in Kosovo of misuse, theft, or losses of either Swiss army COE or personal weapons.

Box 2 NATO's involvement in Kosovo

Under the authority of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (UNSC, 1999), NATO has been leading a PSO in Kosovo since 12 June 1999 in support of wider international efforts to build peace and stability there. KFOR's original objectives were

to deter renewed hostilities, establish a secure environment and ensure public safety and order, demilitarize the Kosovo Liberation Army, support the international humanitarian effort and coordinate with the international civil presence (NATO, n.d.b).

While KFOR's mandate remains unchanged, today 'it continues to contribute towards maintaining a safe and secure environment in Kosovo and freedom of movement for all' (NATO, n.d.b).

Col. Fischer added that a number of challenges affect the general circulation of weapons among the Kosovar population. The greatest danger is the sheer number of these weapons. Approximately 30 per cent of Kosovo's 1.8 million inhabitants were presumed to have one or more weapons. In its early years KFOR searched for weapons and ammunition in house searches and at checkpoints and found large numbers of them. These were confiscated, registered, stored, and then destroyed by specialist disposal teams through blasting or mechanical destruction. Tens of thousands were also destroyed following an appeal for voluntary disarmament, but for the most part only old weapons were handed in.

Col. Fischer recommended a focus on training in the handling of weapons among local forces so that national policies can be implemented. He noted that the international community has an obligation to support the Kosovars to develop their own roadmap on weapons control, in recognition of Kosovo's sovereign status.

Discussion

Mr Carp opened up the floor to questions, noting that people were always surprised that training for KFOR was a national responsibility. He added that the fledgling rule of law in Kosovo continues to be hampered, especially in the northern parts, and that the ongoing transformation of the national Kosovo Security Force adds an additional layer of complexity to the issue.

Workshop participants posed a number of questions regarding Switzerland's access to NATO standards and guidance on weapons management as part of KFOR, as well

as changes in regulations over KFOR's 20-year lifespan. Questions included the following:

- As a non-member of NATO, what, if any, NATO standards were shared with Switzerland prior to deployment?
- When Switzerland deployed personnel to KFOR, its national manual on all aspects of the handling of weapons was in line with NATO standards. Has the manual changed over time?

Col. Fischer responded that the KFOR Operational Plan states that national authorities are responsible for their own weapons. But KFOR members also have access to NATO standard operating procedures (SOPs). Before the Swiss parliament decided that Swiss forces would join KFOR, Switzerland had to evaluate whether any mission requirements would have been contrary to Swiss national laws. This was found not to be the case. He said that most partner nations have standards that are equal to NATO's, and in some cases are even higher. In the Swiss case, national rules and regulations were tailored to the mission and were sometimes above the required standard.

Col. Fischer added that originally there were approximately ten sentences in writing (in a 20-page document) explaining the processes for safeguarding personal weapons and storing weapons in KFOR. As the mission grew older it became more bureaucratic, and there are now about 350 pages of rules and regulations. He added that it is advisable to keep any instructions clear and brief so that everyone from the lowest ranks upwards can understand them. Furthermore, ideally, just two or three people should be permitted to make changes to the inventory system for dealing with munitions, weaponry, and items such as night-vision goggles, and supervision from national capitals is essential.

Participants further discussed the need for:

- consistent training and standards for national police from international partners, which is currently not the case;
- an understanding of the cultural aspects of weapons use and ownership: 'You have to understand how a society works to be effective'; and
- clarity on what happened to weapons collected as part of Operation Essential Harvest and other programmes that collected or confiscated weapons.

They also discussed the unpredictability of supplying weapons to the various groups in conflict zones whose status may change over time from that of an army or other official security force to a 'terrorist' group (or vice versa). Weapons may be delivered to trusted sources at a particular moment in time, but with hindsight there may later be cause for regret.

Session 4: Day 1 wrap-up

Emile LeBrun closed Day 1 of the workshop with a review of the day's main points of interest. These included the following:

1. **Widening the MPOME lens.** The discussions on Afghanistan and Kosovo take the MPOME project into new territory, beyond its traditional focus on losses of COE from fixed bases, convoys, and patrols to the counter-insurgency realm where forces such as ISAF and KFOR are supplying national forces. There is a need to consider how the project can incorporate these new areas of focus under its umbrella. The significance of the scale of arms and ammunition supplied (and diverted), and the overlap of many of the key issues identified in the discussions with challenges that the MPOME project had already identified, would suggest that these areas merit MPOME's attention.
2. **Effective sanctions.** Strategies such as conditionality and the use of the leverage provided by prized items such as fuel can deter losses and save money. The MPOME project should review other contexts in which conditionality may have been applied or where it may be applied to good effect.
3. **Corruption.** Western systems designed to tackle corruption and fraud focus on identifying exceptional cases. In countries where corruption and impunity are endemic a different approach is required. It also remains extremely difficult to obtain data on weapons and ammunition that are traded or given away, but this is an important area that should continue to be explored.
4. **Suitable inventory systems.** The example of Cyrillic characters not being insertable into CoreIMS illustrates the need for systems that are adapted to the context for which they are designed.
5. **Destruction of weapons.** Experiences from Afghanistan and Kosovo indicate that most collected weapons seem to have been destroyed, with the exception of high-value equipment. The degree to which records of destroyed weapons are kept for verification purposes remains unclear.
6. **The role of national training and regulations.** National training, rules, and regulations are adapted for control of COE and weapons recovered during PSOs. There is a clear need for the requirements of missions and national authorities to conform, to ensure that the standards required by PSOs are met (and exceeded).
7. **The role of accountability and integrity.** The management of weapons and ammunition goes beyond merely technical policies and procedures that directly relate to weapons, and extends to much broader values like integrity and professionalism.

8. **Expanding the role of peacekeepers.** The proliferation of small arms in mission areas impacts PSOs' ability to project force, thereby constraining operations. At the same time peacekeepers are becoming more involved in small arms control, including through their participation in investigating possible arms embargo violations in and around mission areas.

Session 5: Evolving global and regional legal frameworks and norms on small arms controls, gender, and peace-keeping

Emile LeBrun focused the first part of Session 5 on the global policy environment pertaining to small arms controls, and recent regional developments. He noted that the development of international policy on small arms control began in 2001 with the UN Programme of Action (PoA) (UNGA, 2001), followed by the International Tracing Instrument (UNGA, 2005) and the Arms Trade Treaty (UNGA, 2013); the latter focuses on halting exports that may have a destabilizing effect. Although not legally binding, the PoA has a robust reporting mechanism, as part of which states are encouraged to report on progress annually using various indicators. Biannual meetings of states are also held to review global progress.

He stressed the key role of national-level policy and practice on arms control. Two sets of guidelines developed by the UN are particularly important references in this regard:

- The **Modular small-arms-control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC)** is designed for practitioners and policy-makers as a set of voluntary, practical guidance notes on best small arms practice (UNODA, n.d.).
- The **International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG)** provide guidance on a ‘whole-of-life’ approach to stockpile management (UNODA, 2015).

Increasingly, linkages are being made between the small arms control agenda and peacekeeping efforts to secure conflict and post-conflict zones. A key 2017 UN Secretary-General report on small arms notes that in peace operations

Adequate management of contingent- and civilian-controlled materiel, both arms and ammunition, is of utmost importance to ensure that ... weapons are not lost, including through theft, seizure or diversion (UNSC, 2017, para. 18).

The report of the Third Review Conference of the UN PoA also calls for including provisions related to preventing and combating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in the mandates of UN peacekeeping missions, and to the securing of weapons stocks in conflict and post-conflict settings (UNGA, 2018, para. 36).

In early 2018 two inter-agency UN working groups on weapons and ammunition management in peace operations were established under the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) chief of staff to review current practice and develop guidance on weapons and ammunition management (WAM) for COE, UN-owned equipment, and seized weapons and ammunition in field missions. Their work is expected to yield three concrete outputs:

- **WAM policy.** This overarching policy will provide a conceptual and operational framework to ensure the effectiveness and coherence of UN WAM in peace operations. The draft policy covers COE, weapons owned by the UN, and seized and captured weapons and ammunition. It has been drafted and is currently being shared with UN member states.
- **UN Manual on Ammunition Management.** The manual is being developed against the backdrop of TCCs and PCCs being responsible for the safe storage of ammunition used in PSOs. The guidance is in line with the IATG and NATO SOPs in order to standardize good practice in field missions.
- **SOPs on the loss of weapons and ammunition.** These SOPs will set out measures for preventing and addressing the loss of weapons in UN PSOs and special political missions. They will address both COE and recovered weapons.

An **online registration tool** has also reportedly been developed, to keep records of losses from UN missions.

Mr LeBrun went on to note a number of notable regional developments. The AU's Policy on Management of Recovered Small Arms and Light Weapons in Peace Support Operations, which is expected to be approved for dissemination in mid-2019, has components on:

- data collection and record-keeping;
- physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) and transport security;
- disposal;
- compliance and monitoring; and
- training and operational guidance and support.

This policy will be applicable to all AU-mandated missions, but will also be a useful reference for all African forces, regardless of the missions to which they contribute troops.

Mr LeBrun added that data collection and record-keeping are at the heart of the AU policy, because a lack of record-keeping on recovered weapons—including in places such as Somalia—has been identified as a key challenge. When implemented, the policy should help bring the AU and African TCCs into line with best practice from the IATG and MOSAIC, and in some cases will go even further. He noted that no matter what happens to recovered weapons—which depends on local laws, mission mandates, and agreements with host governments—a record should always be kept. He went on to reiterate the importance of Article 11 of the ECOWAS Convention (ECOWAS, 2006) and Article 22 of the Kinshasa Convention (ECCAS, 2010), which commit ECOWAS and ECCAS to establishing mechanisms to improve controls of peacekeepers' weapons and ammunition during peace operations (see Session 1).

Claire Mc Evoy continued the session by reviewing the status of relevant legal obligations and norms on gender, small arms control, and peacekeeping and their application in the management of arms and ammunition in peace operations. The legally binding framework for this is found in the women, peace, and security (WPS) agenda's eight Security Council resolutions: 1325 (2000); 1820 (2008); 1888 (2009); 1889 (2009); 1960 (2010); 2106 (2013); 2122 (2013) and 2242 (2015).⁵ These resolutions focus on two core areas:

- women's empowerment and active participation in peacebuilding and leadership; and
- the prevention of conflict-related sexual violence and the protection of women from such violence.

Resolution 2242 (UNSC, 2015) also commits states to the following as part of peacekeeping missions:

- integrating women's needs and gender perspectives into missions' work (para. 4);
- undertaking gender analysis in 'all stages of mission planning, mandate development, implementation, review and mission drawdown' (para. 7);
- doubling 'the numbers of women in military and police contingents of UN peacekeeping operations over the next five years' (para. 8); and
- empowering women to participate in the prevention and eradication of illicit small arms transfers (para. 15).

Politically binding norms and guidance include several UN General Assembly resolutions on women, disarmament, non-proliferation, and arms control, as well as general guidance documents, all of which fall under two distinct headings:

- gender and small arms control/WAM; and
- gender and peacekeeping.

Ms Mc Evoy then introduced a number of key gender and small arms control/WAM documents:

- the UN's 'OG [Operational Guide] 5.10: Women, Gender and DDR' (UN, 2014, pp. 205–16);
- the AU's *Operational Guideline on DDR for Women* (AU DSD, 2014);
- the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs' MOSAIC, *Module 06.10: Women, Men and the Gendered Nature of Small Arms and Light Weapons* (UN, 2018);
- NATO's *Guidelines for Gender Mainstreaming in Small Arms & Light Weapons Projects* (NATO, n.d.c); and
- NATO and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council's *NATO/EAPC Women, Peace and Security Policy and Action Plan 2018* (NATO and EAPC, 2018).

The Survey will also be developing a gender and arms control handbook in 2019.

Ms Mc Evoy also mentioned a number of key gender and peacekeeping documents:

- *DPKO/DFS Guidelines: Integrating a Gender Perspective into the Work of the United Nations Military in Peacekeeping Operations* (UNDPKO and UNDFS, 2010);
- *DPKO/DFS Gender Forward Looking Strategy 2014–2018* (UNDPKO and UNDFS, 2014); and
- The Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations' *Whose Security? Practical Examples of Gender Perspectives in Military Operations* (NCGM, 2015).

She said explicit guidance on gender and small arms control *in peacekeeping operations* is an identified gap, and therefore constitutes a gap in peacekeepers' training. However, more general guidelines on small arms control can be applied to peacekeeping arenas.

Ms Mc Evoy noted that gender mainstreaming is the process, or tool, that can lead to the operationalization of the various commitments that have been made. In 1997 the UN's Economic and Social Council defined gender mainstreaming as the process of

assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action ... in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women's as well as men's concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes ... so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality (DAW, 1997, sec. IA).

In practice, gender mainstreaming in PSOs is a broad concept that covers the following areas:

- *understanding* how the proliferation of arms in conflict affects women and men differently. The identification of vulnerable subgroups is an essential part of this process;
- *understanding* the different roles of men and women in conflict;
- *understanding* behavioural patterns among men and women in conflict-affected communities;
- *understanding* the differential impact of peacekeepers and their security-related activities on males and females;
- the *inclusion* of women in PSOs, including in senior/leadership roles;
- the *inclusion* of local women in all peacekeeping activities such as consultations with local communities, intelligence gathering, outreach activities, quick-impact projects, and hearts and minds activities;

- *using sex-disaggregated data to inform decisions where possible* (thereby using facts, not assumptions, as the basis for decision making); and
- *tracking progress* on activities/programming using gender-sensitive indicators.

Ms Mc Evoy cautioned against considering gender mainstreaming in PSOs as an exercise in political correctness, quoting from the NATO guidelines:

Gender mainstreaming in SALW [small arms and light weapons]-related activities is not a self-serving exercise simply designed at having more women involved in specific projects, but rather aims at *improving the overall effectiveness of the activity* through the better utilization of the perspectives and input of both women and men (NATO, n.d.c, p. 10; emphasis added).

Evidence from MPOME workshops and elsewhere indicates that gender mainstreaming in peacekeeping activities can lead to enhanced situational awareness and operational effectiveness. Evidence shows that female peacekeepers can be particularly skilful at gathering intelligence, developing early warning systems, and gaining the trust of local communities. They can gain access to people—both male and female—and places as part of patrols and searches that would otherwise be forbidden due to cultural norms. They can also become role models for local women wishing to become involved in peacebuilding or security. Similarly, local women can become agents of change in their own communities by helping to build consensus, including in terms of peacebuilding, disarmament, and reintegration. The ‘Do no harm’ principle is of the utmost importance when engaging women in conflict zones to avoid negative repercussions or retaliation.

Ms Mc Evoy went on to describe how women can and should be involved in technical areas of weapons management and control in peacekeeping arenas. NATO provides practical guidance and checklists that can be applied to PSOs, including on weapons collection and destruction, PSSM, and weapons identification. She noted that there is always a gender angle to any activity if you are prepared to look for it. Suggested roles include the following:

- **Weapons collection.** Women can be targets of awareness campaigns/public information on weapons collection and facilitators in their communities, and can convince family members to disarm, provide intelligence, and strengthen confidence in arms control activities via monitoring.
- **Destruction of weapons.** Women (including ex-combatants) can be employees in destruction facilities, and builders of awareness and transparency on destruction activities.
- **Weapons identification, marking, and registration.** Women can be taught technical skills and given training, and can work in relevant facilities.

- **Arms flows monitoring and illicit trade prevention.** Women can be influencers of demand, sources of intelligence, and part of early warning systems.

Ms Mc Evoy concluded by noting that while the normative alignment between the WPS agenda and small arms control is positive, the shift to practical implementation remains a challenge. Despite the increased acceptance of the gender-responsive agenda, there is still reluctance in many circles to bridge the gap between small arms control and the WPS agenda. There is still a pervasive lack of understanding of key gender-related concepts, including the question of how to operationalize them. On a positive note, the relevant framework is in place and it is clear what steps need to be taken.

Discussion

Ms Mc Evoy moderated a brief discussion following the session. Pertinent questions were the following:

- How and why is it important to include more women in peacekeeping missions?
- How can missions target females in conflict-affected populations, given cultural barriers?
- What indicators can be used to measure the effectiveness of females' participation in missions, beyond simply counting the number of women?
- What is the extent of the need for national-level progress to be made on the inclusion of females in armed forces?
- What is the role and value of female and mixed engagement teams?

Eric Berman reflected on the Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations, which Canada launched in 2017. The initiative will focus on overcoming barriers to increasing women's meaningful participation in PSOs. Security Council Resolution 2242 (UNSC, 2015) sets targets to double the current rate of women's participation by 2020. But the question is more about whether and how increased participation will contribute to the effectiveness of PSOs, he said. Indicators need to be developed and should not be purely numerical. The more evidence is available, the easier it is to make a case at the national level, where reforms are necessary, that states should recruit more women into their national armies.

A participant reaffirmed that female participation is not about being politically correct and is not just about numbers: it is about how those numbers contribute to missions' increased operational effectiveness.

Another participant noted that in some peacekeeping arenas such as Afghanistan it is thought to be impossible to gain access to women in Taliban-controlled areas, so peacekeeping forces stop trying to do so.

Ms Mc Evoy cautioned participants that cultural awareness is essential to gaining access to local people, as is ‘thinking outside the box’, so that contact can be established in a non-threatening, culturally appropriate manner that has benefits and does not lead to negative repercussions. Depending on the context, contact may be established very informally. She cited the example of speaking with groups of women washing clothes by a river. Female engagement teams or mixed male and female teams can be used to widen access to local populations.

Session 6: Experiences and lessons from stabilization operations in BiH

Col. Martin Trachsler focused the session on the experience of weapons and ammunition control within the EU Force (EUFOR) operating in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), known as ‘Operation Althea’ (see Box 3). He explained that EUFOR Althea’s role is to:

- mentor the armed forces of BiH and the country’s Ministry of Defence (MoD);
- coordinate international support (both bilateral and multinational) for the Ammunition, Weapons and Explosives Master Plan, which EUFOR and the international community developed and the BiH MoD owns;
- provide ammunition- and weapons-related technical expertise at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels;
- use multinational mobile training teams to train the Armed Forces of BiH (AFBiH) and MoD staff; and
- engage with external donors.

He then discussed EUFOR’s role and tasks specifically in terms of ammunition and weapons control.

Box 3 EUFOR’s involvement in BiH

UN Security Council Resolution 1575 (2004) (UNSC, 2004b) authorized the establishment of EUFOR, a multinational stabilization force, as a legal successor to the NATO-led Stabilization Force in BiH (SFOR), which had been in place since 1996. EUFOR’s Operation Althea ‘has the main peace stabilization role’ under the Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement and has been operational since December 2004 (EU External Action, n.d.).

Ammunition

Col. Trachsler explained that the priority of EUFOR and the EU’s international partners is to significantly reduce arms stockpiles in BiH and introduce life-cycle management of ammunition that will be sustainable and extend from procurement through disposal. The coordinated programme started in 2013 and should be completed by the end of 2019. The EU’s international partners and the AFBiH have already disposed of 10,000 tonnes of ammunition out of a total stockpile of 23,000 tonnes (as of 2013)

earmarked for disposal and have inventoried the entire stockpile. By the end of 2019 the stockpile should be reduced to less than 10,000 tonnes.

The international partners are also upgrading ammunition storage sites in BiH. Bosnian forces used to use 17 separate storage sites. By the end of 2019 the goal is to reduce these to five storage sites and one destruction site. So far EUFOR has focused on two main locations and one destruction site, where the buildings have been renovated. It has also engaged in capacity building and training in areas such as record-keeping, ammunition handling, delaboration, surveillance, inventory management, and the maintenance and transport of dangerous goods.

Finally, EUFOR supports work on the development of a series of regulations as part of SOPs on ammunition inspection and surveillance, and the maintenance and transport of dangerous goods. These regulations are currently 80 per cent completed and should be finalized by the end of 2019.

Weapons

The second priority is weapons management, with a focus on life-cycle management and disposal that includes sales, donations, and destruction. The technical inventory involving the marking and registration of all small arms and light weapons started in November 2018.

The entire stockpile in BiH contains 66,000 weapons, 62,000 of which are small arms and light weapons. The plan is to reduce the stockpile to 25,000 by the end of 2020. The international partners are upgrading two locations for weapons storage out of a total of 30.

EUFOR's Mobile Training Team began work on capacity building and training in 2017, which will finish by the end of 2020. The focus is on weapons and ammunition destruction, WAM, technical inventories, marking and registration, and the training of trainers. SOPs on weapons inspection, marking, registration, and destruction are also 80 per cent complete and will be finalized by the end of 2020.

General issues

Col. Trachsler went on to discuss a number of related challenges in the BiH context. The president of BiH has to approve any decision on disposal, and the process of obtaining such permission is slow. The MoD implements relevant decisions.

Sustaining ongoing commitment at both the national and international levels remains a challenge. A great deal of work still has to be done in BiH on training and the maintenance of equipment. Externally, a commitment from the international community is key to ensuring the sustainability of relevant programmes. Without ongoing

donations of money, technical expertise, and equipment it will be impossible to move forward in key areas such as disposal.

Col. Trachsler said that lessons learned included the importance of only handing over stockpiles to a national authority when and if they have the capacity to deal with them (an aging stockpile was handed over to the AFBiH in 2006 without the necessary capacity, training, or equipment being in place). Local ownership is also key, which has worked well in BiH. International support should be coordinated with a clear division of labour and tasks to avoid duplication and save time and money. Furthermore, it is important that the partner organization or force with the strongest mandate should lead the coordination of such efforts. Finally, it is essential for international partners and the host nation to agree on a desired end state from the outset.

Discussion

Under the moderation of **Emile LeBrun**, workshop participants discussed a number of key issues in BiH, including the following:

- follow-up plans for after 2019 to accompany local efforts on stockpile management;
- standards used to train local forces on inventory controls and registration systems;
- the conditions and policies under which the precursor NATO missions—the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) and SFOR—collected arms and the record-keeping systems in place when EUFOR came into existence in 2004; and
- how the ethnic balance in BiH affects decisions on locations for ammunition storage sites.

Col. Trachsler explained that by the end of 2019 the AFBiH should be capable of managing their ammunition stockpile. International partners, including EUFOR, will stop providing direct support in this area, but will continue with mentoring activities as needed. In terms of weapons, they will do the same at the end of 2020–21. In 2020–21 they will also focus on heavy weapons and will provide the necessary technical expertise.

He said that every activity dealing with ammunition or weapons is always undertaken in line with international standards such as MOSAIC and the IATG. Whenever SOPs were drawn up, for example, such as for weapons marking and registration, this was also done in line with national law, which in this particular case has very high standards and follows international good practices.

He explained that the first handover was from the NATO-led IFOR to SFOR. IFOR had introduced an Excel-based record-keeping system, but due to time pressures the quality of the data was not as good as it currently is. The handover from SFOR to EUFOR involved a partly restickering and resealing process, because EUFOR inher-

ited the old inventory system. EUFOR continues to have an oversight function: for example, the AFBiH cannot move inventory without EUFOR being informed.

Col. Trachsler noted that ethnicity has to be taken into account in BiH, even in choosing ammunition sites. Whereas safety and security normally come first, in this particular context ethnic considerations were critical.

A participant added that the Council of the EU adopted a new strategy on illicit firearms and their ammunition on 19 November 2018 with a very broad scope covering legislation, cooperation, and export controls, among other areas (Council of the EU, 2018). It will apply to Common Security and Defence Policy missions with a small arms mandate, such as EUFOR Althea, and will apply best practice standards such as MOSAIC and the IATG.

Session 7: Assessment of training and needs

Emile LeBrun focused the final workshop session on lessons from the MPOME project on gaps in peacekeepers' training. He said that feedback from the previous MPOME regional workshops has provided a number of relevant observations in terms of arms control, WAM, and training needs, including the following:

- Record-keeping standards and databases vary from mission to mission.
- There is a lack of clarity regarding policy on WAM (with SOPs in some missions, but not in others).
- There is a lack of coordination and centralized command at field level (for example, between the mission and sectors in multinational operations) that is not just related to WAM, but applies to many areas.
- Relevant expertise and adequate personnel are necessary to avoid losses of weapons and ammunition, and these are frequently not available or provided to missions.
- A mission's posture and the projection of appropriate force can prevent attacks and materiel losses.
- National policies, culture, and leadership are important factors in creating an environment where weapons and ammunition losses are regarded as unacceptable.
- Adequate physical infrastructure for the safe storage of weapons and ammunition is often needed, such as containers.
- The coordination of sources of intelligence, which may be fragmented, is essential to understanding the context in which armed actors operate, in addition to sources of arms and ammunition, supply chains, and possible pressure points for reducing illicit arms flows and risks of attack.
- A host state's laws may not be clear or aligned with activities and operations focused on arms and ammunition control and interdiction.
- Pre-deployment training is necessary, but is not sufficient to bring missions up to the required standard on weapons control and WAM.

Mr LeBrun noted that it is clear that while technical training on WAM is essential for peacekeepers, it is far from the only need and must be embedded in a wider discussion about issues such as integrity and anti-corruption strategies.

From these points and other lessons learned the MPOME project has developed an interactive classroom-based counter-diversion training course with a number of components, lectures, scenarios, and case studies, using a variety of pedagogical techniques. The course targets mid-level peacekeeping staff. The Survey plans to engage

subject experts to lead the training, working with peacekeeping training centres of excellence to deliver it.

The course has seven modules, some of which fall outside of a traditional technical approach to WAM. The modules are the following:

1. The module on **normative frameworks** focuses on frameworks governing peace operations, the WPS agenda, regional and subregional instruments, the monitoring of illicit arms transfers and flows, assisting host states with WAM, and ensuring the application of and improving WAM practices more generally.
2. The module on the **loss of arms and ammunition in peace operations** highlights current understanding of the scale of losses by introducing case studies and identifying key factors and situations that may influence the likelihood of losses.
3. The module on **fixed-site security** discusses the importance of advanced mission planning and resourcing, UN requirements for weapons and ammunition security and accountability, operational base security and force protection, and the IATG.
4. The module on **situational awareness and movement control** focuses on why movement operations are planned in peace operations and how such planning affects WAM. The training highlights such issues as understanding who contributes to decision making regarding how to reach remote field locations; how the various movement models endanger staff and assets, including COE; and new technologies for reducing risk.
5. The module on **intelligence in peace operations** discusses how intelligence is gathered and used in a mission and its relevance for WAM, the roles of the various actors involved in generating intelligence, how information management and new technologies help intelligence sharing, and the hazards and challenges facing information gathering in peace operations.
6. The module on **building integrity and preventing corruption** is designed to raise awareness of the overall threat posed by corruption and its impact on WAM, the importance of individual and collective integrity, the impact of lack of integrity on risks to personnel and the loss of materiel, and the key components of an effective anti-corruption plan.
7. The module on **record-keeping and reporting on arms and ammunition in peace operations** highlights the value of timely and accurate record-keeping and reporting for stockpile security, movement control, and tracing illicit small arms; international, regional, and subregional organizations' current policies and principles governing small arms record-keeping; and emerging best practices in these areas.

Following an authors' meeting planned for January 2019 and a validation meeting in Accra in March 2019, the modules will be ready for piloting later in 2019. The training standards are all in line with MOSAIC and IATG best practice and are based on a consultative process, which will continue.

Discussion

A brief discussion on the Survey's future training plans and the myriad ways in which weapons and ammunition may be lost in peacekeeping arenas followed the presentation.

Mr LeBrun said that concrete plans for a roll-out of the Survey's training programme would be developed in 2019.

One participant noted that materiel may be lost to PSOs because of administrative or obstructive delays; for example, the Sudanese government has still not released rifles sent to the UN Mission in South Sudan four years ago. Another said that for peacekeepers operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) there is a risk of weapons shipped into Mombasa port in Kenya and transported via Burundi getting lost en route. The forced abandonment of materiel also occurs in peacekeeping environments.

Mr LeBrun reminded participants that the IATG address the issue of expired ammunition, which is highly relevant during long deployments. Munitions may be in situ for years and in some cases are nonetheless used by contingents or even 'gifted' to locals. The UN Mine Action Service destroys such ammunition in Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia.

Finally, one participant suggested the need for a training module that focuses on the tracking of weapons in PSOs. ●

Session 8: Day 2 wrap-up

Before the closing remarks on Day 2 of the workshop **Jeff Brehm** and **Dr Sigrid Lipott** from the Small Arms Survey summarized some of the key insights of the day.

- National responsibilities for record-keeping, capacity building, training, and WAM procedures are fundamentally important. Change is needed at the national level if standards are to be improved when troops and police deploy to missions.
- It is crucial for missions to consider national, cultural, ethnic, and gender perspectives in their work. These are variables in any operational environment that determine the efficacy of a mission.
- Record-keeping of weapons and ammunition is always central to effective controls. It is important not just for tracking progress and measuring performance, but also to ensure that recovered weapons are destroyed (and not passed on), if that is what a mission's mandate requires.
- Entities with the strongest mandates should lead coordinated WAM efforts in operational environments.
- Materiel should only be handed over to national authorities when full ownership and adequate control are ensured. Before a handover it is essential to understand what standards national authorities are trained to apply.
- There is considerable experience on weapons control and WAM to draw on and learn from in contexts such as Afghanistan, BiH, Iraq, and Kosovo. A common thread is that weapons captured or recovered as part of missions' peacekeeping activities are usually destroyed, although some are recycled to national forces. Data on this issue is lacking.

Closing remarks

Closing remarks

Col. Victor George and Brig. Gen. Victor H. Simatupang

Col. Victor George, Director of International and Information Management at the Indonesian National Defence Forces Peacekeeping Centre (PMPP TNI),⁶ thanked the Survey and NATO for receiving the Indonesian team, noting the significance of the workshop. He then introduced the Indonesian team of four and provided some background about the PMPP TNI, which was established in 2007, by showing a film on it.

Approximately 3,000 Indonesian personnel are currently deployed in PSOs,⁷ in line with the Indonesian government's policy to deploy a total of 4,000 by 2019. The PMPP TNI's role is to plan missions, select and train personnel, and provide administrative and logistical support to these missions; to evaluate Indonesian forces' participation in missions; and to engage in international cooperation in support of PSOs. Diplomats from EU countries deployed in the Asia-Pacific region have been trained at the centre, which has also co-hosted training with partners such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the UN Integrated Training Service. For the third year, the centre will be hosting a hostile-environment training course with the EU in 2019.

In 2019, in addition to the next MPOME workshop, the PMPP TNI will also be hosting a female officer military course with UN Women and UNDPKO–UNDFS, and multilateral exercises with 18 countries (see Box 4).

Brig. Gen. Victor H. Simatupang, Commandant of the PMPP TNI, also expressed his gratitude to the Survey and NATO for their invitation to participate in the workshop and their support for the PMPP TNI. He said he highly appreciated the MPOME initiative, noting that the loss of weapons from peace operations is an under-studied area, in part because relevant discussions have tended to focus on casualties and

Box 4 Indonesia's role in peacekeeping

Indonesia's role in peacekeeping is grounded in its constitution, which pledges the country 'to contribute to the implementation of a world order based on freedom, lasting peace and social justice' (Indonesia, 1945, Preamble). Indonesia views peacekeeping as a way to strengthen its foreign policy, as a diplomatic instrument, and as being consistent with its current status as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. It currently has troops operating in Lebanon (UNIFIL⁸), the Central African Republic (MINUSCA⁹), the DRC (MONUSCO¹⁰), Western Sahara (MINURSO¹¹), South Sudan (UNMISS¹²), Sudan (UNAMID), and Abyei, Sudan (UNISFA¹³), and ranks among the top ten contributing countries to UN peacekeeping missions (UNDPKO, 2018).

not on force protection and mandate implementation. He commended the Survey on its research and noted that insufficient control of small arms in conflict areas had profound humanitarian consequences and led to violations of international humanitarian law, as well as displacement and sexual and gender-based violence.

He said the workshop was intended to brainstorm ideas on challenges in managing arms and ammunition in peace operations and that the active involvement of TCCs/PCCs in this effort is essential. He explained that because Indonesia has a strong commitment to contributing to the establishment of world peace and security, it actively engages in peacekeeping efforts and initiatives in order to promote a better world, including by supporting the MPOME project.

He reiterated the importance of the workshop, and the need for efforts to enhance protective policies and measures governing WAM in peacekeeping arenas, and said that Indonesia is extremely keen to host the next MPOME workshop in 2019.

Eric Berman added that the Survey had reached out to the PMPP TNI to partner with it because of Indonesia's strong reputation in the peacekeeping field. It is known at UN's headquarters as being a very important TCC, with a strong reputation for being effective and taking its peacekeeping roles seriously. Furthermore, the partnership with the PMPP TNI offers the possibility for the MPOME project to be more active in the Asia region and to engage the UN Security Council. He added that he was very much looking forward to planning the next MPOME workshop to be held in the Indonesian National Defence Force's excellent facilities in Sentul, West Java, in 2019.

Eric G. Berman

Director, Small Arms Survey

Mr Berman focused his concluding remarks on the next phase of the MPOME project, which starts in April 2019. 'Phase 2' will focus on the following core elements:

- pre-deployment training;
- additional policy-relevant studies and workshops;
- additional regional workshops;
- the further development of PODS;
- operationalizing the frameworks of regional organizations; and
- exploring and expanding ongoing cooperation with the UN, the EU, and NATO.

He said that the training would focus on the three-day peacekeeping counter-diversion course (discussed in Session 7). It is hoped that an e-learning course would also be developed, subject to resources. Train-the-trainer modules have already been developed.

Possible ideas for future MPOME studies include the following:

- losses of arms and ammunition in non-UN peace operations;
- the effects of losses of arms and ammunition on civilians, viewed with a gender lens;
- the significance of losses of non-lethal materiel such as uniforms, communications devices, fuel, or night-vision goggles;
- distinguishing between inevitable and preventable losses (a tricky task, given that in the public sphere losses tend to be presented as being attributable to ‘ambushes’);
- assessing the effectiveness of arms control measures; and
- the practices of ‘unarmed’ missions such as armed protection for VIPs.

Mr Berman reminded participants that feedback on MPOME publications is always welcome. He added that the MPOME project’s data gathered on losses from NATO missions is extremely thin and that additional information would be gladly received. He said the Survey had documented more than 50 ‘notable’ incidents of losses so far (meaning incidents where either ten or more firearms or 1,000 or more rounds of ammunition are lost), out of a total of about 150 incidents. Eventually, existing MPOME maps of such losses will become interactive.

The methodology underpinning PODS will be further developed in the second phase of the MPOME project, with a greater focus on the exploration of ‘notable incidents’ of losses, more efforts to distinguish the causes of losses, an examination of losses of non-lethal materiel, and an enhancement of web-based maps and users’ ability to access data. PODS will eventually be sortable by year and location, but not by TCC.

Regional frameworks will also be a focus, including AU members’ obligations under the organization’s forthcoming Policy on Management of Recovered Arms and Ammunition in Peace Support Operations, ECOWAS members’ obligations under Article 11 of the organization’s small arms convention, and ECCAS members’ obligations under Article 22 of the Kinshasa Convention.

Mr Berman finished by acknowledging the support of the MPOME project’s donors and partners, which started in December 2016 with Canada and the United States and has grown exponentially since then. He added that the fifth and sixth MPOME workshops will be held in 2019 for the Asia-Pacific and Central and Southern Africa regions, respectively.

Eirini Lemos-Maniati

Deputy Director, ACDC

Mrs Lemos-Maniati thanked the Survey for making NATO more aware of the issue of losses from PSOs. She said the discussions held during the previous two days had confirmed that the issue of WAM in peace operations is one of the many small arms and light weapons-related challenges that deserve a closer look.

She noted that the operational aspect of the discussions was very useful, because NATO has a responsibility to support such initiatives or to find solutions to challenges that arise such as those related to WAM. She added that she was extremely pleased with the workshop and wants to see how NATO can support the second phase of the MPOME project. Many military colleagues are willing to cooperate with the project, for example. They are well placed to share their expertise, because they are grappling with the issues identified in the workshop every day.

In closing, and on behalf of ACDC, she thanked the Small Arms Survey, the speakers for their sharp and informative presentations, and the participants for their active contributions. She also thanked Indonesia for its participation and wished the Survey and the PMPP TNI luck for the next MPOME workshop. She reiterated that NATO would like to be a partner in this effort and said that, in the future, various related ideas would be developed. ●

Endnotes

- 1 Throughout this report, the designation of Kosovo is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UN Security Council 1244 and the International Court of Justice Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.
- 2 For the purposes of brevity, the term ‘small arms’ includes small arms and light weapons.
- 3 See UNSC (2001; 2002a; 2002b; 2003; 2004a; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008b), respectively.
- 4 For more detail, see Jeffrey Brown’s subject matter expert background paper, ‘The US government’s oversight of weapons and military equipment delivered to Afghanistan’, below.
- 5 See UNSC (2000; 2008a; 2009a; 2009b; 2010; 2013a; 2013b; 2015), respectively.
- 6 See PMPP TNI (n.d.) for background on the centre.
- 7 A total of 3,065 personnel were deployed in UN missions at the end of 2018 (UNDPKO, 2018).
- 8 UN Interim Force in Lebanon.
- 9 UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic.
- 10 UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC.
- 11 UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara.
- 12 UN Mission in South Sudan.
- 13 UN Interim Security Force for Abyei.

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Subject matter expert background paper

The US government's oversight of weapons and military equipment delivered to Afghanistan

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The United States has been working to rebuild the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP), the two major components of the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) charged with providing security for the Afghan people. Since the US government's involvement in Afghanistan after 11 September 2001, accounting for and ensuring the proper use of weapons and other military equipment provided to the ANDSF has been a major challenge.

These donated weapons and military equipment fall into two categories: those in the supply chain and those in the field. In my experience, more weapons and equipment are lost in the supply chain (for example, in production, transit, and storage) than in the field, largely because they are not used regularly in the supply chain and their absence is therefore less likely to be noticed.

The following paper reviews the relevant US legal framework and the work conducted by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) in the oversight and accountability of weapons provided to Afghanistan. The paper also cites work conducted by other agencies seeking to improve oversight in Afghanistan and similar work conducted in Iraq, as relevant.

US Congressional requirements

Section 1225 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (United States, 2009) requires the Department of Defense (DoD) to register and monitor 'defense articles' transferred to Afghanistan and Pakistan. According to the standard operating procedures (SOPs) of the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A),¹ Congress included these requirements in various national defence authorization acts because several reports from oversight agencies had shown weaknesses in the DoD's procedures for tracking weapons provided through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS)² programme.

The Golden Sentry End Use Monitoring (EUM) programme is designed to verify that defence articles or services that the US government transfers to foreign recipients are being used in accordance with the terms and conditions of the transfer agreement or other applicable agreement (Defense Security Cooperation Agency, DoD, n.d.). In accordance with Section 505 of the Foreign Assistance Act (United States, 2019, para. 2314) and Sections 3 (para. 2753) and 4 (para. 2754) of the Arms Export Control Act

(United States, 2018), and as reflected in the terms and conditions outlined in the Letter of Offer and Acceptance,³ recipients must agree to the following:

- to use US-provided defence articles, training, and services only for their intended purpose;
- not to transfer title to, or possession of, any defence article or related training to anyone not an officer, employee, or agent of that country or of the US government without prior written consent of the government;
- to maintain the security of any article with substantially the same degree of protection afforded to it by the US government; and
- to permit observation and review by, and to furnish necessary information to, representatives of the United States with regard to the use of such articles.

The EUM programme sets forth the requirements for US oversight to ensure that these conditions are met. All potential end-use violations must be reported through Department of State channels. Monitoring the use of US-origin items is a joint responsibility of partner nations and the US government, and includes military departments, combatant commands, and security cooperation organizations. In the case of Afghanistan, this includes the CSTC-A.

Reporting on accountability for weapons

Afghanistan

Three oversight agencies have reported on accountability for weapons the US government has supplied to the Afghan military:

- the DoD Inspector General (Inspector General, DoD, 2009);
- the Government Accountability Office (GAO) (GAO, 2009); and
- SIGAR (SIGAR, 2014).

In its 2009 report the DoD Inspector General identified material internal control weaknesses in accounting for weapons provided to the ANA. The report found that the CSTC-A did not have a formal process in place to transfer weapons. In addition, the CSTC-A was unable to properly account for these weapons (Inspector General, DoD, 2009, p. i).

In 2009 the GAO reported that the DoD did not provide clear guidance to US personnel on accountability procedures for managing, transferring, and storing weapons procured for the ANDSF, resulting in significant lapses in accountability (GAO, 2009, p. 3). The report concluded that the weapons the CSTC-A provided to the Afghans were at serious risk of theft or loss due to:

- a lack of complete inventory records for 36 per cent of weapons procured and shipped to Afghanistan from 2004 through 2008;
- inventory records failing to include serial numbers for weapons and locations; and
- a lack of training and mentoring of ANDSF personnel on inventory maintenance and accountability procedures (GAO, 2009, pp. 3–4, 19–20).

In 2014 SIGAR reported on inaccurate data in the DoD’s databases that contained records of weapons shipped to Afghanistan for the Afghan military (SIGAR, 2014, p. 12). The department maintained information on the weapons in the Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP) and the Operational Verification of Reliable Logistics Oversight Database (OVERLORD). DoD personnel used SCIP to track weapons shipped from the United States and used OVERLORD to track receipts for these weapons in Afghanistan. Errors and discrepancies often occurred because the two systems were not linked, so personnel had to enter the data manually. This created a problem because no accurate record of the number of weapons given to the Afghans existed at any one time. Without such a record, no real-time evaluation of the Afghans’ weapons accountability could ever be accurately performed.

Compounding this problem, the inventory system the US government bought for the Afghans, called the Core Inventory Management System (CoreIMS), was not linked to or compatible with US systems. This required the Afghans to conduct another round of manual data entry for their weapons. The system was also plagued by internal challenges such as a lack of internet connectivity and system capacity issues (SIGAR, 2014, p. 6).

The Afghans were uncomfortable using an electronic system and often reverted to maintaining paper records. This was understandable because of frequent power outages and connectivity problems. But using paper records made it impossible for US personnel to remotely monitor inventory levels. Had the Afghans’ inventory system been fully capable of providing current, accurate records remotely—as the system was designed to do—US personnel could have generated inventory lists and conducted accurate inspections. The impact of this lack of capability became more evident after the major withdrawal of US troops at the end of 2014. From then on US advisors left in the country had less interaction with Afghan troops and were able to conduct fewer in-person inspections of weapons storage facilities, thereby increasing the likelihood that weapons could be lost due to corruption.

During SIGAR’s recommended follow-up procedures DoD personnel indicated that they had stopped using OVERLORD and had begun recording all inventory shipping and receiving data in SCIP. The DoD said it had reconciled approximately 90 per cent of its inventory records between the two systems by the end of 2016.⁴ However, by all accounts the system is still having the same problems today as it did when SIGAR

published its report in 2014, and DoD personnel are still unable to monitor inventory levels remotely.

The last major finding of SIGAR's 2014 report was that the DoD did not have a process to retrieve weapons and equipment that the ANDSF no longer needed (SIGAR, 2014, pp. 11–12). As a result there were stockpiles of excess weapons that could be lost or stolen. For example, before 2010 the DoD issued to the Afghans both NATO-standard weapons, such as the M-16, and non-standard weapons, such as the AK-47, because manufacturers could not produce enough NATO-standard weapons to keep pace with the ANDSF's rapid growth. After 2010 the DoD and the Afghan Ministry of Defence determined that interoperability and logistics would be enhanced if the ANA used only NATO-standard weapons. However, no provision was made to return or destroy non-standard weapons, and more than 100,000 weapons that were no longer needed were kept in a large central depot (SIGAR, 2014, pp. 11–12).

The DoD and the Department of State tried to negotiate a stipulation in their 2015 Bilateral Security Agreement with the Afghan government that would require it to return or destroy unneeded weapons before the US government would provide additional ones. However, this stipulation was ultimately dropped from the agreement.

Iraq

Other reports from the GAO and DoD Inspector General have also noted the lack of proper accountability for weapons in Iraq. For example, a February 2017 DoD Inspector General's report on equipment and weapons accountability noted that the responsible DoD entities did not have effective procedures for securing Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF) weapons in Kuwait and Iraq (Inspector General, DoD, 2017). More specifically, the outgoing and incoming Kuwait commands did not consistently conduct inventories of weapons or secure weapons in accordance with Army Regulation 190-11 (Inspector General, DoD, 2017, p. i). This occurred because the first Theater Support Command and Sustainment Brigade did not maintain effective oversight of the Kuwaiti operations, including failing to establish guidance to ensure that inventories were conducted and weapons stored in accordance with army regulations.

In addition, the Iraq Combat Sustainment Support Battalion (CSSB) did not effectively secure ITEF weapons at an Iraq Building Partner Capacity site, in accordance with Army Regulation 190-11 (Inspector General, DoD, 2017, p. i). For example, the Iraq CSSB received incoming ITEF weapons at a central receiving and shipping point (a yard) that had a surrounding fence with multiple holes. This occurred because the yard in question was the only area provided to the Iraq CSSB to receive incoming ITEF weapons until an alternative designated location was refurbished.

Conclusion

Ultimately, accountability for weapons delivered to Afghanistan has suffered greatly from these issues and has probably complicated the reconstruction effort. It is hoped that future efforts to ensure the appropriate management of weapons provided to the Afghans will take these issues into account and improve security in the country.

SIGAR is examining the possibility of reviewing weapons accountability again in the near future with a focus on how relevant US agencies are implementing the required EUM programme. This potential audit will probably focus on accountability for not only weapons, but also other military equipment provided to the ANDSF that is subject to EUM requirements.

Endnotes

- 1 The multinational CSTC-A ‘trains, advises, and assists within Afghan security institutions to develop resource management capability, Inspector General and rule of law capability, and provides resources in accordance with the Afghan National Defense Security Forces requirements while ensuring fiscal oversight and accountability of funds and materiel delivered’. The CSTC-A focuses on ‘helping Afghanistan develop a sustainable, effective and affordable ANDSF in support of the Afghan Government’. Contributing nations are Australia, Austria, Denmark, Germany, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States (NATO, n.d.).
- 2 Under the FMS programme a foreign government identifies requirements for military-related items or services and then purchases them from the US government.
- 3 A Letter of Offer and Acceptance is the legally binding document that outlines the terms of each transaction for FMS goods with foreign governments.
- 4 Author email correspondence with the director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency Central Command Country Portfolio, December 2016.

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