# Southern Sudan and DDR: Adopting an Integrated Approach to Stabilization

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*Workshop Papers*

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# Introduction

The papers collected here were generated by a Small Arms Survey workshop that was held in Juba, Southern Sudan, on 25–26 June 2009, entitled 'Southern Sudan and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR): Adopting an integrated approach to stabilization.' Organized by the Small Arms Survey and the UK Department for International Development (DfID) in consultation with the Southern Sudan DDR Commission, the workshop was officially opened by the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. James Hoth Mai, and attended by representatives from the SPLA, the Ministry of SPLA Affairs, the Government of Southern Sudan Peace Commission, and the Community Security and Small Arms Control Bureau (Ministry of Internal Affairs). Other attendees included partners from the Addis Ababa-based Centre for Policy Research and Dialogue, the University of Addis Ababa, UN DDR unit, UN Mission in Sudan, UN Development Programme, NGOs, Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS)/SPLA international advisories, and donor institutions.

The primary objectives of the workshop were to discuss the feasibility of DDR in Southern Sudan as it is being currently planned and implemented, and to explore linkages between DDR and other post-conflict stabilization measures. A workshop outcome statement containing policy considerations for the GoSS and the international community was released after the event.

This publication and the workshop outcome document can be downloaded from www.smallarmssurvey.org/sudan.

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Paper 1

# Alternatives to Conventional Security Promotion: Rethinking the Case of Southern Sudan[1]

*By Robert Muggah, Nat Colletta, and Savannah de Tessières*

The intensity of post-war violence routinely exceeds expectations. If left unchecked, mutating violence can tip fragile societies back into armed conflict. Conventional security promotion activities are regularly mobilized to prevent this from happening, including disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) and other forms of security sector reform (SSR). Meanwhile, lesser-known initiatives that deviate from—and potentially reinforce—DDR and SSR are also emerging. Innovation and experimentation on the ground has yielded a range of promising activities designed to mitigate the risks and symptoms of post-war violence including *interim stabilization* measures and *second-generation* security promotion interventions.

Drawing on experiences from Sudan and other post-conflict environments, this article considers a number of critical determinants of post-war violence that potentially shape the character and effectiveness of security promotion on the ground. It issues a typology of security promotion practices occurring before, during, and after more conventional interventions. Taken together, the identification of alternative approaches to security promotion implies a challenging new research agenda and practical entry points for policy-makers and practitioners in Sudan.

## Introduction

The security and development sectors are preoccupied with bringing stability to 'fragile' and 'war-torn' states. In addition to reinforcing the rule of law, good (enough) governance, and democratic elections, multilateral and bilateral donors routinely invest in conventional security promotion activities to ease the

'transition' from war to peace.[2] Activities such as DDR and SSR—notably arms control, mine action, and transitional justice—are now familiar pillars of the post-war recovery and reconstruction architecture. They are considered central to reinforcing state stability and advancing peace consolidation. Yet concerns are mounting that these interventions are falling short of expectations and in some instances doing more harm than good. There continues to be widespread disagreement, however, over whether their shortcomings can be attributed to external factors (for example, the 'ripeness' of the post-war setting) or intrinsic weaknesses of conventional security promotion initiatives themselves.

The aetiology of post-war violence is undergoing a critical reappraisal. Social science researchers are documenting how the spatial, temporal, and demographic dynamics of post-war violence seldom adhere to linear or predictable trajectories.[3] Instead, post-war violence frequently mutates and assumes new characteristics—including political, predatory, and communal dimensions—that are potentially mutually reinforcing. Traditional efforts to promote security and stability in the aftermath of war—including the introduction of peace agreements,[4] peacekeeping forces,[5] DDR, and SSR—seem to be unable to arrest post-war violence on their own. While large-scale efforts such as DDR can contribute in some cases to confidence building and security guarantees, some security specialists fear that they can unintentionally gloss over important, and potentially fatal, deeper complexities.[6] Premature and formulaic resort to conventional security interventions without sufficient accounting for local contextual factors can thus do more harm than good.[7]

A growing number of scholars are identifying opportunities for improving practice.[8] If security promotion is to 'work', they argue, interventions must be crafted on the basis of a sound analysis of the contextual determinants shaping post-war violence. This article proposes a range of macro- and micro-determinants that should be carefully accounted for in security promotion activities of any type. It describes the emerging *practice* of security promotion in a range of contexts, including Sudan. Specifically, it focuses on a host of embryonic interim stabilization interventions and second-generation security promotion activities designed to buy time and prevent and reduce armed violence in the aftermath of war. Although nascent and untested, many of these initiatives represent a new horizon for stabilization efforts.

While not focused exclusively on Sudan, the article offers a number of important ways of supporting and strengthening contemporary DDR and SSR efforts. It is important to recall that Southern Sudan is affected by escalating post-war violence. While the 'causes' are manifold and overlapping, it is possible to trace out a number of risk factors. These include conflicts over land and property, cattle raiding between rival tribal groups, and continued abuses by the Southern and Northern security forces. Indeed, conventional security promotion efforts—whether DDR or the formation/reform of the armed forces and police—are not equipped to properly address these multifaceted challenges. Evidence-based and carefully targeted interventions focused on key determinants of armed violence should be undertaken before, in parallel with, and following conventional security promotion efforts. Fortunately, provisions for interim stabilization and second-generation activities are already embedded in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).

## Conventional security promotion

Conventional security promotion activities such as DDR and SSR are considered a *sine qua non* of contemporary peace support and recovery operations.[9] Prior to the 1980s, disarmament and demobilization schemes and certain efforts to extend the rule of law were conceived and executed by and for the security establishments and shaped by the geopolitical imperatives of cold war cooperation. Specifically, DDR was frequently directed exclusively at former soldiers and in some cases liberation or guerrilla movements.[10] As multilateral and bilateral involvement in peace support operations expanded, the first UN-sanctioned DDR operation was launched in Southern Africa in the late 1980s, with additional missions soon taking off in Central America and the Balkans in the 1990s.

Meanwhile, efforts to strengthen the security sector were quietly pursued by inter-governmental arrangements. These activities tended to be limited primarily to military support and the discrete provision of technical assistance. During the 1990s, in the context of the 'new defence diplomacy', multilateral and bilateral institutions such as NATO and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe began promoting democratic civil–military rela-

tions in the 'transitional' countries of Central and Eastern Europe. With the entry of other actors such as the European Union, non-military elements of the security sector were targeted, including the police, border guards, and judicial institutions.[11] Civilian police components attached to UN peace support operations emerged, with growing emphasis on rule of law and judicial reform.

Since the 1990s, DDR and SSR interventions have been launched in a growing array of post-war contexts and have assumed an expanding range of goals. In the case of DDR, these have ranged from efforts to diminish the prospects for war recurrence, reduce military expenditures, and reassert the state's monopoly over the legitimate means of coercion to more micro-objectives such as the collection and destruction of weapons, neutralizing spoilers, shattering command and control of factions, and promoting sustainable livelihoods. As for SSR, interventions have been focused not only on improving and restructuring service delivery and 'rightsizing' military and police entities, but also on ensuring civilian management and democratic accountability over the entire security sector, strengthening the rule of law, enhancing transparency in procurement and budgeting, providing training in the police use of force and human rights, and investing in community policing and relevant civilian institutions.[12]

Considered indispensable to peace- and state-building, DDR and SSR operations soon began to expand in reach and multiply in number (see Table 1). A growing number of UN agencies and development organizations began to assume a more assertive role in such activities.[13] Unsurprisingly, categories of recipients or 'beneficiaries' rapidly extended beyond a narrow preoccupation with ex-combatants and military, police, and justice officials to account for vulnerable groups (such as dependents, women, children, and the infirm) and communities to which erstwhile soldiers might be returned. Conventional security promotion soon began to reflect a wider process of institutional transformation and, in certain cases, wholesale social engineering (Pouligny, 2004).[14] As prescriptions for more comprehensive and integrated approaches took hold in the late 1990s, security promotion activities were linked with other thematic priorities, from poverty reduction and good (enough) governance to food security and transitional justice.[15]

Efforts soon turned to standardizing and professionalizing DDR and SSR, and ensuring it adequately reflected security *and* development priorities. While

Table 1 **Distribution of DDR operations, per year and region, 1989–2008**

| Year | East Asia and Pacific | Europe and Central Asia | Latin America and Caribbean | Middle East and North Africa | South Asia | Sub-Saharan Africa | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1989 | | | 1 | | | 1 | 2 |
| 1990 | | | 1 | | | 1 | 2 |
| 1991 | 1 | | 2 | | | 3 | 6 |
| 1992 | 1 | | 2 | | | 6 | 9 |
| 1993 | 1 | | 3 | 1 | | 8 | 13 |
| 1994 | | | 3 | 1 | | 9 | 13 |
| 1995 | | | 3 | 1 | | 9 | 13 |
| 1996 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | | 9 | 16 |
| 1997 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | | 9 | 15 |
| 1998 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | | 4 | 9 |
| 1999 | 3 | 1 | 1 | | | 2 | 7 |
| 2000 | 3 | 2 | 1 | | | 6 | 12 |
| 2001 | 4 | 2 | 1 | | | 8 | 15 |
| 2002 | 5 | 3 | 1 | | | 10 | 19 |
| 2003 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 1 | | 11 | 20 |
| 2004 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 13 | 22 |
| 2005 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 14 | 20 |
| 2006 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 14 | 20 |
| 2007 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 12 | 19 |
| 2008 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 11 | 18 |

**Source:** Muggah (2009b)

both were characterized by distinct policy and epistemic communities, DDR-related initiatives include the *Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards* (IDDRS) (UN, 2006). Developed by 15 UN agencies and departments together with the International Organization for Migration between

2004 and 2006, the IDDRS lays out a list of standards and procedures in 24 chapters.[16] Another standard-setting exercise designed to distil lessons and good practice from DDR was the Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (SIDDR).[17] Key themes emerging from these exercises include the political dynamics of DDR during peace negotiations, the role and influence of specific contextual factors in shaping the timing and sequencing of conventional security interventions, and the centrality of 'local ownership' in the design of relevant programmes.

In the case of the SSR, donors and policy-makers aligned with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) developed an *SSR Handbook* on security *system* reform (OECD–DAC, 2007).[18] Designed to encourage more engagement from development agencies with the system of public security delivery, the guidance quickly assumed a gold standard against which future interventions would be assessed, designed, supported, monitored, and evaluated. Even certain governments traditionally wary of multilateral approaches to security promotion (including the United States) supported doctrinal shifts that mirrored key prescriptions issued in the *Handbook*.[19] While the standards and guidance in the IDDRS and the *Handbook* may well enhance coherence and integration in the long term, the vast majority of ongoing initiatives have yet to benefit from these 'best practices'. In fact, as the cases of Afghanistan, Côte d'Ivoire, Haiti, Sudan, and others amply reveal, many DDR and related SSR interventions simply failed to lift off.[20]

The effectiveness of conventional security promotion interventions is routinely confounded by a host of factors in post-war settings. On the one hand, they typically confront resistance from above; that is, national governments, warring parties, elites, and international agencies, some of whom can be deeply invested in monopolizing certain forms of violence to shore up patronage networks. As is well known to policy-makers and practitioners, DDR and SSR interventions are likewise conditioned by strategic competition among multilateral and bilateral donors, which may be preoccupied with geopolitical and sector-specific interests. On the other hand, the security promotion enterprise is invariably influenced from below by an array of local power brokers and civil society actors.[21] The extent to which these agents are invested in the benefits

of violence (or peace) and the post-war economy will shape their preparedness to promote legitimate security on the ground.[22] Since such interventions are fundamentally about (re-)establishing the state's monopoly over the means of legitimate coercion, politics and power-sharing—especially in the emerging security sector—necessarily reside at the heart of the enterprise.

## Determinants of security promotion

In thinking through options for post-war security promotion, it is useful to revisit the factors shaping post-war violence. We distinguish between macro- and micro-level determinants that condition insecurity in post-war states. Macro-level factors include: the *character of war and post-war environments*; the *configuration of the peace process*; and the *capacity and reach of governments*, particularly in relation to service provision. Micro-level determinants refer to: the *absorptive capacities of affected communities*, especially in relation to livelihoods and property rights; *the character, cohesiveness, and motivations of a heterogeneous constellation of armed groups and combatants*; and the *timeliness and appropriateness of specific entitlements* issued in the course of security promotion (see Table 2). In the rush to design and implement interventions, many of these macro- and micro-level determinants are not adequately taken into account by decision-makers and practitioners.

Table 2 **A typology of macro- and micro-determinants**

| **Macro** | Causes, dynamics, duration, and after-effects of armed conflict |
|---|---|
| | Nature of peace process including whether it was imposed, mediated, or a function of victor's justice |
| | Governance capacity/reach of the state and service delivery capacities of public authorities |
| **Micro** | Absorptive capacities, especially labour market access and productive assets (property, capital) |
| | Character, cohesiveness, and motivations of armed groups and receptor communities |
| | Security promotion entitlements such as monetary incentives, area-based assistance, and related services |

## Macro-level determinants

Whether a country or society emerges from an internal war, a war of independence, a cross-border war, or a state of generalized collective violence matters fundamentally in shaping the parameters of security provision. Different *armed conflict 'types'*—whether cross-border or internal, long or short, driven by ideology, identity, or environmental scarcity—also feature different underlying causes, risk factors, interests, and dynamics. The nature of an armed conflict will inevitably shape the level of trust and confidence of particular warring parties in the terms of the post-war dispensation. For example, in the wake of an armed conflict such as the Sudanese civil war—in which political, population, and territorial control were key objectives—widespread disarmament will be especially challenging. Rather, targeted and reciprocal civilian disarmament, the storage and management of arms (within reach of the army), and the 'professionalization' of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) are more plausible goals.[23]

The *nature of a peace process* as well as attendant parameters and funding mechanisms invariably shape the suitability and character of specific security promotion options. As such, the way in which an armed conflict is terminated (whether imposed, negotiated, or mediated by a third party) is a critical factor conditioning the willingness of various parties to enter into collective action. To the extent that there is a clear victor, certain elements of security sector reform can be (temporarily) postponed as the terms for power sharing and control (such as composition and rank allocation) within the security sector are less open to 'negotiation'. As will be discussed at length below, *military integration* can precede SSR and DDR, as was the case in Sudan, where Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) composed of members of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the SPLA were created soon after the CPA.

*Governance capacity, justice provision, and the reach of the state* are other factors that are central to the dispensation of security. Security and justice provision are (in theory) public goods, even if frequently privately administered. The legitimacy bestowed on a government and its security apparatus are thus frequently measured by the extent to which they can supply real and perceived (national and human) security. In many post-war environments, the absence of publicly administered security can lead to the creation of ungoverned spaces,

often filled with alternative forms of private security provision (Muggah, 2009a). The resulting credibility gap leaves states unable to provide a minimum of (public) security to returning combatants and communities, or through restructured military and police organs. Even so, it should be recalled that in many environments the state has no history of delivering security and justice transparently or evenly throughout its territory and people may neither expect nor demand enhanced service delivery. Such is the case of Southern Sudan, where such matters were traditionally handled by customary and local authorities or not at all.

## Micro-level determinants

Another challenge facing traditional security promotion activities relates to ensuring their sustainability. In the case of DDR, 'reintegration' is often focused narrowly on the skills and needs of individuals and their immediate dependents. More attention is devoted to the type, timing, and appropriateness of basic entitlements than to the *labour-absorptive capacity of local areas for reintegration*. Nevertheless, the economic base and market opportunities available in specific post-war contexts may play a more decisive role in shaping the outcomes of DDR and SSR.[24] This factor was recognized in the case of Southern Sudan. Specifically, in order to assess and anticipate the absorptive capacities of areas of return, a 'reintegration opportunities mapping project' was initiated in 2006 within the framework of the Interim DDR Programme (IDDRP).[25] The value of this initiative, and the need to sustain it into the near future, is reiterated in the DDR Programme (DDRP) Individual Reintegration Project Component (Republic of Sudan and UNDP, 2009, p. 18).

Another micro-factor influencing the potential for security promotion relates to the *social and cultural characteristics and motivations* of affected communities, former armed groups, and erstwhile violence entrepreneurs. For example, the nature and breadth of social capital in a particular community and the levels of human capital, extent of social cohesion, and aspirations of senior commanders and rank and file are all hugely significant factors shaping the design, execution, and outcomes of security promotion. In the cases of Aceh, Afghanistan, and Timor–Leste, for example, conventional security promotion neglected the variegated interests of armed groups and receptor communities and many gains

quickly evaporated (Muggah, 2009b). Given the duration of Sudan's armed conflict and the tremendous ethnic complexity of communities in the South, rebuilding social capital and aligning interests is a formidable challenge. It is vital, then, that appropriate efforts be undertaken to cultivate and reinforce strong community relations and ensure transparent support to the reformed armed forces.

An additional micro-level determinant of post-war violence relates to the *entitlements* introduced as part of a security promotion initiative. Proponents of DDR, for example, often unconsciously assume a number of biases in the provision of incentives and allocation of assistance. Inputs are frequently monetized and provided to individuals rather than groups or communities, inadvertently generating tensions with those who perceive violence entrepreneurs as being 'rewarded'.[26] While the CPA in Sudan and the IDDRP promoted a community-based reintegration strategy, the DDRP seems to have diverted from the original approach. Indeed, the current reintegration strategy appears to focus primarily on ex-combatants themselves even while it aims to link the reintegration process to wider national recovery programmes in order 'to facilitate a community-driven approach' (Republic of Sudan and UNDP, 2009, p. 17). Ensuring that the adopted strategy is clearly and carefully communicated to key constituencies is essential in order to manage expectations of both 'beneficiaries' and the communities to which they may be returning. What is more, the predictability of such entitlements is at least as important as the quantity of assistance.[27]

## Promoting security after war

Although the number and intensity of armed conflicts appear to be in decline since the early 1990s,[28] post-war violence simmers on. More positively, certain lessons associated with preventing and reducing armed violence in multiple contexts are being learned.[29] There is evidence that over the past decade, security promotion activities are adjusting to the dynamic landscapes of post-war armed violence. Both 'second-generation peacekeeping'[30] in the wake of operations in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia and more recent 'stabilization missions'[31] following interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have emphasized

Table 3 **A typology of security promotion activities**

| | Type | Examples |
|---|---|---|
| Interim stabilization | Civilian service corps | South African Service Corps and the Kosovo Protection Corps |
| | Military integration arrangements | UNITA in Angola and JIUs in Southern Sudan and the Transitional Areas |
| | Transitional security forces | Afghan Militia Forces, Sunni Awakening Councils in Iraq |
| | Dialogue and sensitization programmes | Rwandan *Ingando* process, Labora farm experiment in Northern Uganda |
| | Differentiated forms of transitional autonomy | Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, Mindanao Autonomy Zone in the Philippines, Transitional Areas in Sudan |
| Second-generation security promotion | Community security mechanisms | Community security and arms control programmes in Sudan (e.g. CSAC), community violence reduction in Haiti, Safer Cities in Macedonia |
| | At-risk youth and gang programmes | Gang violence reduction programmes in El Salvador, education and recreation pro-grammes in Brazilian *favelas* (slums) |
| | Weapons for development | Weapons in exchange for development in Albania, Bosnia, Mali, and Niger and micro-disarmament programmes in Southern Sudan |
| | Weapons lotteries | Weapons and violence reduction for lotteries in Haiti, Mozambique, and the Republic of the Congo |
| | Urban renewal and population health programmes | Targeted slum development in Caracas (Venezuela), health-based interventions in Medellín and Cali (Colombia) and Kingston (Jamaica) |

the value of joining up military and civilian activities. Against this backdrop, security promotion interventions have also been transforming and adapting as practitioners seek to reduce incoherence and competitive friction, but also because they explicitly recognize that DDR and SSR processes cannot reduce post-war insecurity on their own. Conventional DDR and SSR operations focused more narrowly on stability and civilian accountability over the agents and means of violence are being complemented with novel interim stabilization interventions and second-generation security promotion activities.

Such evolution and adaptation is suggestive of an element of experimentation and pragmatism. There is evidence that a growing number of security and development actors are registering and responding to risks on the ground, a process more ominously described as the 'securitization of development' (OECD–DAC, 2008a; Easterly, 2008; Duffield, 2001). Together with mainstream post-war SSR activities such as mine clearance, truth and reconciliation interventions, and international criminal courts, interventions seeking to promote safety and security are flourishing. In some cases, security promotion activities once confined to war zones are now being applied in ostensibly non-war environments.[32] And, while evidence of 'success' of these newer practices remains comparatively thin, albeit no less meagre than of other conventional security promotion activities, these interventions potentially complement and reinforce conventional strategies. At a minimum, these security promotion activities—many of them long underway—expand the menu of options available to prevent and reduce armed violence (see Table 3).

## Interim stabilization

There are numerous reasons why many negotiated peace agreements collapse within five years (Bell, 2006). In many cases, reversions occur because the conditions are not ripe in the immediate fragile post-war environment for the implementation of conventional disarmament and demobilization, key security sector reforms, or the social and economic reintegration of former combatants. In their haste to declare peace and promote exit strategies,[33] mediators and negotiating parties may forgo the detailed planning and programming required of carefully timed and sequenced interim stabilization measures that accompany conventional security promotion.[34] Alternatively, such interventions

may not even be put on the table by peace mediators and negotiating parties[35] owing to the vested interests of powerful elites and armed groups.

Interim stabilization measures are part of broader transitional integration process that seeks to balance adequate security with necessary development. While there is nothing intrinsically benign about such interventions, they can create and sustain a holding pattern focused on transitional mechanisms. These keep former combatants' cohesiveness intact within a military or civilian structure, buying time and creating space for political dialogue and the formation of an environment conducive to legitimate social and economic reintegration (Colletta, Samuelsson Schørlien, and Berts, 2008).[36] They are designed in such a way as to avoid the unintentional creation of security vacuums in the early stages of post-war transition.

Interim stabilization measures have clear and immediate objectives. These are to: dramatically reduce armed violence; consolidate peace and real and perceived security; build confidence and trust; and buy time and space for the macro conditions to ripen for more conventional security promotion activities such as DDR and SSR to take hold, including second-generation initiatives. Buying time and space is more important than it may at first appear. In most cases, it is critical to continue practical dialogue among warring parties in order to develop a conventional DDR or SSR framework that outlines parameters for specific interventions. Likewise, time is required in order to constitute administrative structures, policies, and legal instruments essential to DDR and SSR, including defence reviews, national security strategies, military laws, reintegration commissions, veterans policies and bureaus, amnesties, and peace and justice legislation.[37]

There are at least five emerging types of interim stabilization measures. These include:

i)    the establishment of civilian service corps;
ii)   military or security sector integration arrangements;
iii)  the creation of transitional security forces;
iv)   dialogue, sensitization programmes, and related halfway-house arrangements; and
v)    different forms of transitional autonomy.

These categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In most cases, interim stabilization measures integrate elements resembling the characteristics of two or more of these categories. The end goal of these activities is to ensure the conversion of potential spoilers into stakeholders during the fragile and political distribution of power (particularly with regard to the security sector) and the attendant detailed preparations for the management of arms and armies.

*Civilian service corps arrangements* are usefully illustrated with the cases of the South African Service Corps and the Kosovo Protection Corps. These transitional organizations transform former military groups into transitional civil–military entities (for example, reconstruction brigades, environmental protection–civilian conservation corps, and natural disaster prevention and response corps) through the maintenance of social structures and cohesion but with changed functions and leadership (that is, maintaining control but reshaping command). While far from perfect, they nevertheless address the pressing need to employ and occupy former combatants in some form of controlled, meaningful civilian activity. While they must be carefully managed, these types of arrangements may allow the time and space required for the political process and security situation to consolidate and early recovery efforts to generate greater labour absorption potential in the economy, while at the same time allowing individuals to strengthen their life and vocational skills as they ease into civilian life.

The strategy of *military or security sector integration* is common in many societies emerging from war.[38] It is a key interim stabilization mechanism for 'rightsizing' military and policing structures and ensuring that potential spoilers and legitimate servicemen and -women are provided with an ample livelihood. An excellent example is the creation of the JIUs mandated by the CPA in Sudan. The JIUs were not only intended to fill post-war security vacuums where the reach of the state was comparatively limited, but also, arguably more importantly, to serve as a means of building confidence between erstwhile warring parties. In other words, the JIUs were essentially a means of building the basis for a potential future (integrated) national army (HSBA, 2008). While the creation of the JIUs initially yielded certain positive outcomes, the units continue to face numerous challenges, including poor command and training, and an obvious lack of real 'integration' (Morrison, 2009). Indeed, recent reports suggest

that the units are themselves separated along political and tribal lines and even split according their former SPLA/SAF affiliations.[39]

The creation of *transitional security forces* is another interim stabilization measure. It addresses the often urgent need for temporary stabilization, legitimate employment of former combatants, and immediate cohesion (mutual self-help) that many former combatants require. The formation of the Afghan Militia Forces bringing together the various militias under a single decentralized force and uniform payroll in Afghanistan in the immediate wake of the fight with the Taliban is one clear example of a transitional security force. Many of these combatants were later demobilized or integrated into the new national Afghan security system (Ponzio, 2007).[40] Of course, the risks involved in eventually integrating such forces into the national security apparatus and assisting them to obtain sustainable livelihoods are always present and need to be carefully managed.

Other interim arrangements include *dialogue, sensitization programmes, and halfway-house arrangements.* This category is illustrated by the Rwandan *Ingando* process, through which former combatants were gathered in camps for 'problem-solving sessions' recounting the causes and taking ownership of the tragedy, exposing mutual myths and stereotypes, and endeavouring to rebuild trust after the deep trauma of the genocide in 1994.[41]

The effects sought by establishing various interim stabilization mechanisms can also be obtained by allowing a certain level of *autonomy during a transitional period*. The primary example of such schemes is the agreement between the Government of Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, with Hun Sen's Win-Win Policy.[42] In this case, social cohesion, local control over governance (including security) and natural resources, and livelihood were exchanged in a clearly defined time period (in this case, three years) for a public affirmation of loyalty to the state.

Arrangements made for the 'Three Areas' of Sudan (three geographic areas along the North-South border, otherwise known as the 'Transitional Areas') provide a further example. Consisting of frontline zones especially affected by armed conflict—Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile, and Abyei—these states were afforded special status under the CPA. Northern and Southern authorities established a power-sharing arrangement that potentially could have served

as a model for relatively stable coexistence; however, this experience of 'joint' governance has proven extremely challenging and largely unsuccessful. On the basis of the continued instability that these areas face, a limited DDR pilot initiative was launched in two of the three areas, with the UN Development Programme (UNDP) supporting community recovery and reductions in resource-based conflicts among competing pastoralist groups.[43]

Interim stabilization can be particularly effective when existing command structures are reshaped (emphasizing civilian authority) while control and cohesiveness of the rank and file combatants are maintained until conditions are ripe for social and economic reintegration and/or military integration. This approach typically plays out at three levels: at the *state* level it establishes power sharing and attendant institutional, legal, and administrative frameworks for transitional governance; at the *community* level where sensitization, transitional justice, and reconciliation mechanisms are established; and at the *individual* level by way of personal security guarantees, a sense of agency and legitimacy through transitional employment, the re-establishment of property rights (asset base), and/or life skills training and psychosocial support.

The effectiveness of interim stabilization arrangements depends on a careful assessment of the local context and an appreciation of the many macro- and micro-level determinants that shape post-war violence. Ground-level and cultural realities play a fundamental role in conditioning the parameters of intervention strategies, highlighting again the importance of effective and longitudinal diagnosis and analysis.[44] There is, of course, no one-size-fits-all approach to promoting post-war security; a range of incentives and organizational or institutional arrangements are possible (ranging from non-governmental agencies, political parties, rural agri-business, and urban public service delivery to military, police, customs, and intelligence service integration). Moreover, there is recognition that interim stabilization arrangements should be tightly connected to the over-arching peace- and state-building framework and that there are adequate provisions for financing, coordination, and monitoring.

## Second-generation security promotion

Second-generation security promotion approaches are fast emerging as alternatives and complements to DDR and SSR, particularly in Latin America and

the Caribbean, but also throughout sub-Saharan Africa.[45] In contrast to conventional security promotion—particularly DDR—they tend to be evidence-led, focusing at the outset on identifying and mitigating demonstrated risk factors, enhancing resilience and protective factors at the metropolitan and community levels, and constructing interventions on the basis of identified needs. The World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, for example, have been supporting second-generation security promotion under the auspices of reducing household and community violence and poverty for more than a decade. Second-generation approaches are also inherently 'integrated' in that they bring together a combination of sectors and disciplinary perspectives to address the risks and outcomes of post-war violence.

Second-generation security promotion activities deliberately shift the focus from top-down and deterrence-based interventions designed and executed by outsiders, to activities that actively map out and respond to the agency of perpetrators, group cohesion, and the legitimacy of interventions on the ground. From Southern Sudan to Colombia,[46] El Salvador, and Haiti, examples of second-generation approaches include:

i)   community security mechanisms;
ii)  schemes focusing on at-risk youth and gangs;
iii) safer-community and safer-city activities; and
iv)  weapons for development activities and weapons lotteries.

A salient feature of these second-generation security promotion interventions is the manner in which they complement and potentially reinforce ongoing conventional interventions such as DDR and SSR and offer locally tailored solutions.

*Community security mechanisms* tend to emerge in reaction to, or independently of, DDR activities grafted onto UN-mandated peace-support operations. By virtue of their proximity to affected communities, field-based practitioners typically show more sensitivity to local contextual factors than do decision-makers and peace negotiators who formulate conventional security packages. Community security mechanisms tend to promote area-based approaches to security promotion and collective incentives to enhance compliance, harnessing indigenous power brokers and agents of change. Community security mechanisms therefore assume integrated and multi-sector approaches. They

purposefully build (from the ground up) confidence and legitimacy through enactment by affected populations themselves. It is important to note that their durability and reach may also depend in large part on robust and decentralized public and private authority structures, institutions that may indeed be severely compromised or weakened by protracted armed conflict. For example, in Southern Sudan, community security mechanisms were introduced as a direct sub-component of the IDDRP. Nevertheless, according to Gebrehiwot and Morse (2008, p. 37), the strong focus of the IDDRP on community security strategy was also one of the causes of the poor performance of the interim programme. The Multi-Year DDR Programme might therefore consider community security projects as 'parallel' reinforcing activities. Indeed, by promoting economic development and seeking to reduce competition over natural resources, they play an important role in redressing the risks of intra- and inter-community conflicts that are otherwise ignored by conventional DDR (and constitute an obstacle to durable reintegration).

The case of community security promotion in Southern Sudan can be further unpacked. The UNDP Community Security and Arms Control (CSAC) project was established in 2008 in order to support the GoSS Community Security and Small Arms Control Bureau in reaching its objectives, namely, to build confidence, stability, and security for communities in Southern Sudan by pursuing initiatives towards peaceful disarmament. Certain initiatives explicitly sought to engender community reconciliation and conflict resolution mechanisms, which are seen as pivotal for brokering meaningful disarmament. For example, in Jonglei, Lakes, and Warrap States, the non-governmental agency Pact Sudan, together with community leaders, helped recruit and train local peace committees. They also implemented early warning posts and a rapid response mechanism in order to engage communities with their own peacemaking.[47] Likewise, in order to bolster an evidence-based and targeted approach to security promotion, UNDP and the UK Department for International Development launched the Threat and Risk Mapping and Analysis system, which seeks to assess community security concerns and generate spatial analysis of key security threats.[48]

Community-driven *gang and gang-related violence reduction activities* in post-war states of Central America and the Caribbean can also be categorized as

second-generation security promotion. For example, interventions focused on so-called *clikas* and their subgroups connected to the Mara Salvatrucha or Mara Dieciocho were launched from San Salvador (El Salvador) to Los Angeles (US) (Jütersonke, Muggah, and Rodgers, 2009). Community-led groups such as the Los Angeles-based Homeboy Industries or the Centre for Formation and Orientation in Honduras seek to enhance the resilience of violence-plagued communities. Specifically, they aim to reinforce coordinated public and private sector responses and to provide mentorship, risk education, and alternative livelihoods for would-be perpetrators and victims—particularly boys and young men—in poor and marginal communities in countries such as El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, (Jütersonke, Muggah, and Rodgers, 2009).[49] They offer important alternatives to enforcement-based *mano dura* (iron first) approaches that are dangerously popular in the region (WOLA, 2008).

Meanwhile, *safer-community and safer-city initiatives* are further examples of second-generation security promotion. In some cases, innovative urban design and the effective use of the built environment by city planners, architects, social scientists, and community leaders can contribute to a reduction in the opportunity for predatory violence and related fear of victimization (Moser, 2004; 2006). Interventions that support 'territoriality' by fostering neighbourhood interaction and vigilance, 'surveillance' through the identification of hot spots, 'hierarchy of space' through the encouragement of use and ownership of public spaces, 'target hardening' through the strategic use of physical barriers and security devices, 'environment harmonizing' by reducing space for conflicting groups, and 'image maintenance' through the creation of well-maintained spaces all appear to enhance local resilience against violence.[50] Other safer-community activities that consciously integrate youth reportedly improve routine safety and security.[51]

Second-generation interventions consciously engender local ownership and locally legitimate approaches by focusing on existing institutions rather than forming new national administrative structures. They also advance a distinctly demand-side approach to arms control as compared to the supply-side emphasis of conventional security promotion activities (Brauer and Muggah, 2006). The introduction of *weapons for development* projects in Albania, Liberia, Mali, and the Republic of the Congo, *weapons lotteries* in Haiti and Mozambique's

slums, and gun-free zones in Brazil and South Africa all offer a multi-pronged approach to preventing and reducing armed violence.[52] Rather than focusing exclusively on the tools of violence, the emphasis is on the motivations and means shaping their misuse. At the very least, such activities can complement the strengthening of national regulatory frameworks associated with civilian arms ownership, weapons stockpile management, and even civilian oversight of the security sector.

It is important to take stock of the lessons emerging from second-generation security promotion activities and their implications for thinking beyond DDR and SSR in Southern Sudan. In all cases, an underlying principle is the scaled-back and facilitative or enabling role adopted by international agencies. Central to their effectiveness is locally generated evidence and analysis. Instead of re-creating new national-level institutions, such as commissions or focal points, or relying on blunt instruments, second-generation security promotion activities are forged on the basis of formal and informal cooperation with existing (including customary) sub-national institutions. Where possible, the initiative, control, and responsibility of overseeing interventions reside in the hands of local partners. Local ownership is a hallmark of such initiatives. Although many second-generation initiatives are nascent, and empirically demonstrated evidence of their effectiveness is only gradually being assembled, they potentially offer a radical departure from more traditional approaches to encouraging post-war security.

## Concluding reflections

In Sudan—as elsewhere—multilateral and bilateral donors are preoccupied with identifying the most effective route to stability, security, violence reduction, and state-building in the aftermath of war.[53] Security promotion and peace-building interventions routinely feature DDR and other forms of SSR as critical stopgaps to stem post-war violence. Normative and operational standards and principles that seek to define lessons learned and codify best practices are rapidly emerging. Most of these activities are promoted through a national, state-centric framework with a view to ensuring the reach of effective public security and neutralizing violence entrepreneurs. Notwithstanding the growing

appetite for such activities, there is meagre evidence that DDR and SSR yield effective outcomes during (or after) the transition from war to peace.

A recurring challenge facing proponents of security promotion relates to tailoring interventions to local political and economic realities on the ground. Accounting for key contextual variables in the design, execution, and evaluation of conventional security promotion has proven frustratingly difficult. Southern Sudan is no exception. By contrast, interim stabilization and second-generation security promotion initiatives are consciously established on the basis of existing realities and local capacities. They are deliberately crafted from the political, economic, and social facts on the ground and may not always draw exclusively on state institutions, much less the prescriptions and expertise from the headquarters of multilateral, and bilateral, security and development agencies. Taken together, they offer bottom-up, area-based approaches to security promotion, drawing on a combination of individual and collective incentives to enhance compliance while harnessing indigenous power brokers and agents of change. ◼

# Abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| **CPA** | Comprehensive Peace Agreement |
| **CSAC** | Community Security and Arms Control |
| **DDR** | Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration |
| **DDRP** | DDR Programme |
| **ICRC** | International Committee of the Red Cross |
| **IDDRP** | Interim DDR Programme |
| **IDDRS** | Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards |
| **JIU** | Joint Integrated Unit |
| **OECD** | Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development |
| **SAF** | Sudanese Armed Forces |
| **SIDDR** | Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration |
| **SPLA** | Sudan People's Liberation Army |
| **SSR** | Security sector reform |
| **UNDP** | United Nations Development Programme |

# Endnotes

1   This paper draws from Colletta and Muggah (2009) and Muggah and Downes (2009).

2   See, for example, OECD–DAC (2008a; 2008b; 2009).

3   See, for example, Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2008).

4   Bell (2006) distinguishes between pre-negotiation agreements (e.g. 'talks about talks'), framework and substantive agreements (e.g. 'aimed at installing ceasefires to reduce violence'), and implementation/renegotiation agreements (e.g. 'development of key aspects of peace frameworks').

5   Fortna (2008) notes that peacekeeping missions are not all alike and can be divided into smaller 'observation missions', 'inter-positional missions', 'multidimensional missions', and more robust 'peace-enforcement missions'.

6   See, for example, Hänggi and Scherrer (2007).

7   See, for example, Colletta, Samuelsson Schjørlien, and Berts (2008) and Muggah (2009b).

8   See, for example, Özerdem and Jacoby (2008).

9   It is worth emphasising that while SSR is a 'contested concept, particularly regarding understandings of the scope of the security sector', it is often used in a 'broad' sense to include DDR, small arms and light weapons control, and mine action (Hänggi, 2009).

10  Specifically, interventions such as DDR emphasized the collection and decommissioning of small arms, cantonment, support packages, and various forms of vocational training. These activities were frequently accompanied by conventional arms collection by the United Nations.

11  It is useful to note that despite the growing interest in security sector reform in the 1990s, most interventions were not labelled as such. See, for example, Hänggi (2009).

12  It should be emphasized that according to some specialists, SSR explicitly includes the disbanding (or integration) of non-statutory armed forces, DDR, humanitarian demining, redressing of past crimes, and reconciliation. See Brzoska and Law (2006) and Bryden and Hänggi (2005).

13  See, for example, Klem and Douma (2008).

14  The *SSR Handbook* of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, for example, describes how SSR implies the transformation of the security system 'which includes all actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions—working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance and thus contributes to a well-functioning framework' (OECD–DAC, 2007, p. 20).

15  See, for example, OECD–DAC (2008a; 2008b).

16  The IDDRS will be undergoing updating and review in 2009 and 2010.

17  The SIDDR aims to define predictable frameworks for successful implementation within an international working process—with non-governmental and UN involvement.

18  It should be noted that 'security system reform' is frequently used by 'development actors' to describe the multi-sector nature of security and justice sectors (OECD–DAC, 2007). Likewise,

agencies such as UNDP refer to 'justice and security sector reform' in order to emphasize the linkages between the respective sectors. Some observers fear that this conflation could unintentionally lead to the 'securitization' of the justice sector. See, for example, Hänggi (2009).

19 The US Army's 2003 doctrine for (post-war) stability operations reflects a general disinterest in DDR. Appearing weeks before the invasion of Iraq, it recognizes 'disarmament' as a 'typical flash point' (US Army, 2003, p. 1–14). Its only words on the subject are to warn commanders that 'the mandate may require the PE [Peace Enforcement] force to disarm or demobilize the belligerent parties. These tasks are complex, difficult, and often dangerous' (US Army, 2003, pp. 4–8). The 2008 doctrine is much more sensitive to the challenges of post-war military occupation and security provision. Influenced by experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan and other less conspicuous missions, DDR is embraced as a major element in state-building. Considerable space is devoted to SSR—an entire chapter (US Army, 2008, ch. 6). Moreover, in contrast to the earlier doctrine, it states that often the post-war situation 'requires disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating personnel associated with armed forces or belligerent groups before and as part of SSR. Military forces can expect to assume a primary role in disarmament. . . . The DDR program is a critical component of peace and restoration processes and is accounted for in initial planning. . . . The DDR program is a central contributor to long-term peace, security, and development' (US Army, 2008, pp. 6–5, 6–21). What is also curious is the way the US situates DDR as a subset of SSR. It implies military ownership and control over programmes more typically associated with UN mandates, though this does not minimize the importance of the shift in doctrinal focus. See also Small Arms Survey (2009, p. 186).

20 It is important to stress that many of the aforementioned interventions were initiated before the IDDRS and OECD *SSR Handbook* were fully developed and disseminated.

21 Policy-makers typically undertake cross-sectional conflict analysis, assessments of drivers of change, and other diagnostics to better understand these dynamics.

22 Hänggi (2009) observes how the privatization and internationalization of the provision of security is more common in post-war environments, together with the strong presence of armed non-state actors whose political ambitions and economic stakes are considerable.

23 In another example, sub-national armed conflicts—such as the Moros in Mindanao or the Tamils in Sri Lanka—are often more identity- than ideology-driven. This appears to allow for *de facto* if not *de jure* governance and territorial control (e.g. ancestral domain in the case of the Moros and regional autonomy in the case of the Tamils), maintenance of social cohesion (identity), and legitimacy within an accepted national government. In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge started as an ideological struggle and gradually transformed into a resource struggle, making limited control over territory and resources a basis for an interim stabilization measure in the *de facto* granting of 'limited autonomy' in the north-west of the country, as played out through the Hun Sen government's 'Win-Win Policy'. Similarly, the war in Colombia has shifted somewhat from an ideologically driven conflict to a conflict of resource control and criminalization of the national economy (Colletta, Samuelsson Schørlien, and Berts, 2008).

24 Of course, the extent to which international agencies and outside investment impacts the economic environment—for better (through injection of credit and capital) or worse (through inflation)—are also important considerations.

25 See UNDP (n.d.).

26 In many cases, as in Afghanistan, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, cash incentives may be rapidly spent by former combatants or appropriated by middle- and upper-ranking officers.

27  Where inputs are promised but not delivered on time, they can contribute to moral hazard. When promised assistance does not materialize in a consistent or routine fashion, material (and social) conditions of households and individuals can also deteriorate. Where training and other inputs are offered belatedly, individuals may have insufficient incentives to continue the course.

28  See, for example, HSRP (2005).

29  See, for example, USIP (2007) for lessons from the US government in Iraq and Afghanistan.

30  Second-generation peacekeeping began in the early 1990s and featured large military and civilian personnel deployments. These were the first examples of multifunctional missions in which political, military, humanitarian, and electoral components were coordinated and fully integrated. In contrast to first-generation missions, which were composed of smaller and more lightly armed contingents, second-generation missions included larger contingents of civilian and military personnel, with fewer constraints tied to geographic representation and more emphasis on interoperability, efficiency, and unity of command and control.

31  The UK government, for example, has developed a Stabilisation Unit to support countries 'emerging from violent conflict'. Core objectives are to prevent and reduce violence, protect people and key institutions, promote political processes that contribute to stability, and prepare for non-violent political and developmental processes and bargaining. Crucially, stabilization implies joint military and civilian support, with a focus on reinforcing the 'legitimacy and capability of the state, and tangible benefits to the population to underpin confidence in the state and the political process' (UK, n.d.).

32  The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), for example, is undertaking limited 'protection' functions in a number of Brazilian *favelas*. Activities focus on family reunification, prison visitations, mediation between 'armed groups' and the police, certain forms of care and treatment for the injured, and training for the police in the proportionate use of force. Correspondence with ICRC officials in Geneva, Colombia, and Brazil, December 2008.

33  See, for example, UNPBSO (2008).

34  A recent exploratory study on Cambodia, Colombia, and Uganda, financed by the Swedish government as a follow-up to the SIDDR accents the importance of assessing contextual factors, unbundling reintegration processes, and identifying interim stabilization measures that support sufficient security in the short term in order to create the enabling conditions for sustainable development in the long term (Colletta, Samuelsson Schørlien, and Berts, 2008).

35  See, for example, the work of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue for a review of mediator approaches to promoting DDR and other forms of security promotion during peace negotiations (CHD, n.d.).

36  This is not to be confused with reinsertion or sustainable reintegration.

37  There is a need to create space for participants in conventional security promotion. As expectations of a peace dividend begin to rise, time may also be required to allow the state to reinforce its capacity and reach, to promote community involvement in local security provision, and to facilitate opportunities for markets to regenerate and allow for rapid labour absorption.

38  See, for example, Hänggi (2009); Hänggi and Scherrer (2007); and Hoddie and Hartzell (2003).

39  Tensions have led to fighting between the two groups, the last episode of which broke out in February 2009 in Malakal, killing 62 people (HSBA, 2009).

40  The more recent experience with the Sunni Awakening Councils in Iraq is yet another example whereby local militia with strong ethnic, religious, or tribal 'identity' roots were incor-

porated into local community security forces. In this way they were provided with recognition and paid a salary. Local tribal or culturally based leadership was assured through a loose national command structure. It was expected that they would later be integrated into more formal security forces and/or demobilized when other local security, governance, and economic conditions ripened, though a poor handling of this transition, and a failure to account for critical historical and structural factors shaping patterns of grievance, could generate new challenges (Roggio, 2007).

41    See Rusagara (2004).

42    See, for example, Colletta, Samuelsson Schørlien, and Berts (2008).

43    Likewise, the North Sudan DDR Commission, with IDDRP support, is developing community security projects to address simmering conflicts that could erupt in areas to which ex-combatants are returning.

44    See, for example, Kinzer (2008).

45    See, for example, Muggah (2005a) for a review of second-generation security promotion.

46    In Colombia, for example, a rash of evidence-based programmes focusing on temporary alcohol and weapons-carrying restrictions, interventions targeting prospective gang members, and urban renewal contributed to the fastest decline in homicidal violence ever recorded in the Western hemisphere. See, for example, Small Arms Survey (2006, pp. 214–45).

47    See Pact Sudan (n.d.).

48    See UNDP Sudan (n.d.).

49    Other gang-violence reduction programmes that appear to have contributed to sharp declines in armed violence in the United States include Identity (Montgomery County, Maryland), Community Mobilization Initiative (Herndon, Virginia), and Gang Intervention Partnership (Columbia Heights, Washington, DC). Examples of Central American activities include Group Ceiba (Guatemala), Paz y Justicia (Honduras), and Equipo Nahual (El Salvador). See, for example, WOLA (2008).

50    Prominent examples in post-war contexts include work undertaken by Saferworld, the Balkan Youth Union, the Centre for Security Studies–Bosnia and Herzegovina, and CIVIL and the Forum for Civic Initiatives (FIQ) in south-eastern Europe. See, for example, Saferworld (2006).

51    Examples of how youth can be engaged range from participation in bicycle and foot patrols, neighbourhood watch, and early warning systems to advancing crime reduction education, prevention strategies, and escort services.

52    See, for example, Muggah (2009a; 2005a) for a review of these second-generation approaches.

53    World Bank President Robert Zoellick notes that: 'too often, the development community has treated states blighted by fragility and conflict simply as harder cases of development. Yet these situations require looking beyond the analytics of development to a different framework of building legitimacy, governance, and the economy. This is not security or development as usual. Nor is it about what we have come to think of as peace-building or peacekeeping. Securing development is about bringing security and development together first to smooth the transition from conflict to peace and then to embed stability so that development can take hold over a decade and beyond. Only by securing development can we put down roots deep enough to break the cycle of fragility and violence' (Zoellick, 2008).

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Paper 2
# The Feasibility of Disarmament and Demobilization in Southern Sudan

*By Mulugeta Gebrehiwot*

## Introduction

More than four years have passed since the signatories of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Sudan began to engage in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) activities. Continued political support for DDR in Sudan has been demonstrated at the highest levels of the Government of National Unity (GNU) of Sudan and the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) through:

- the signing of the CPA (and DDR requirements);
- the establishment of the National DDR Council, Experts Committee, and two DDR Commissions;
- the president's approval in 2007 of the National DDR Strategic Plan;
- the signing of the Multi-Year DDR Programme (MYDDRP) by the GNU and the GoSS with the UN;
- the concurrent commitment to provide USD 45 million of Government of Sudan funds for DDR; and
- repeated public statements of support.

DDR activities in Sudan had already begun before the official signing of the CPA. The Preparatory Support Project (PSP) was carried out through a project led by the UN DDR Unit, including the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF). One of the PSP's objectives was to provide critical information on DDR to the parties involved in the conflict with the aim of helping them to begin conceptualizing and designing a national DDR strategy. Subsequent to the signing of the CPA, an Interim DDR Programme

(IDDRP) was launched with the key objectives of building DDR-related capacity among the national commissions and conducting DDR activities for special needs groups.[1]

After running for three years, the IDDRP fell short of meeting the target number of special needs groups to be demobilized but achieved significant success in providing critical information on DDR to the CPA parties. The programme created awareness of DDR and provided lessons that shaped the National Reintegration Policy (GNU, 2008) and the national MYDDRP for Sudan, a programme document signed by the GNU, the GoSS, and UNDP in August 2008. The MYDDRP focuses on individual reintegration of ex-combatants instead of the community-based approach adopted in the IDDRP, which had raised concerns regarding the diversion of DDR funds to broader and longer-term programmes of recovery and reconstruction (GNU and GoSS, 2008, pp. 11–12). The plan further establishes agreed eligibility criteria and a number of target beneficiaries, two issues on which consensus had previously been elusive. Moreover, the MYDDRP has entrusted overall programme ownership to the national commissions while charging UNDP with interim financial management and procurement as well as technical capacity building of national bodies so that these may eventually take over UNDP's tasks.

Recently, both commissions and the Integrated UN DDR (IUNDDR) Unit jointly launched a pilot DDR programme in the Transitional Areas (TAs) with the goal of expanding it to cover the rest of the TAs and later all CPA areas. Moreover, the donors have pledged significant funds to the DDR programme in the CPA areas; the DDR offices are expected to be involved in full programme implementation.

This paper is written in an attempt to assess the challenges and opportunities for demobilization and disarmament in Southern Sudan and to indicate some key lessons and policy options the parties might consider in the process. The key findings of this paper are that the DDR of Phase I candidates before 2011 is feasible from both the political and institutional perspective, and that the proper consideration of the following policy issues is essential for its successful implementation:

- Although the incremental approach adopted by the programme is appropriate, it is important that all available candidates in an area be processed together

regardless of any imbalance in numbers from either side. Furthermore, concurrent disarmament and demobilization of candidates in inter-community conflict areas should be conducted so as to address positively the security of those communities.

- Because planned information counselling and referral services are limited to a sensitization exercise of a few hours, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) will be required to handle comprehensive reorientation before handing over candidates for disarmament and demobilization processing. Among other things, the main objectives of the reorientation should be to address the key political reasons for demobilization, to highlight its importance to the improvement of the overall human security of Southern Sudan, and to create appropriate expectations of programme benefits.

- Strong adherence to the principle of equitable treatment of combatants is essential not only with regard to the allocation of benefits, but also to having clear, transparent criteria for selecting DDR candidates. Candidates should see that neither ethnic background nor previous political alignment is considered in the demobilization selection process.

## Are DDR objectives realistic?

There are varying opinions as to whether DDR in Sudan is feasible before the referendum of 2011. Some suggest that most security sector policy decisions that might lead to DDR can only be taken after the results of the 2011 referendum and thus think that DDR at this stage of the CPA is not a feasible exercise.[2] Proponents of this view argue that the SPLA is engaged in regularizing its army and, therefore, focused on military spending rather than reduction to support civilian reconstruction.

This paper argues that it is of utmost importance to understand the aims of the DDR programme as set by its owners—in this case the GNU—to determine whether the project is feasible. The Sudan National Strategic Plan for DDR articulates that the basic aim of the DDR programme is to consolidate the peace process and to create an enabling environment to undertake activities related to human security, reconstruction, and development. The plan further states that the DDR programme shall take place within a comprehensive process of:

peace and national reconciliation; post-conflict stabilization; peace-building; conflict reduction; confidence building; and, most importantly, reintegration of ex-combatants into civil society. Priority is given in the plan to vulnerable and high-risk groups such as children, women, the disabled, and the elderly (GNU, 2007). One can, therefore, summarize the objectives of Sudanese DDR as promoting the enhancement of security in Sudan—and that of Southern Sudan in particular—and creating an enabling environment for recovery and reconstruction by meeting the human security needs of targeted ex-combatants. The feasibility of Sudanese DDR should therefore be measured primarily against these objectives.

The Sudanese DDR programme that is currently being considered for implementation and funding is the MYDDRP, a programme agreement signed on 25 June 2008 by the GNU, the GoSS, and the UN. That agreement calls for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration back into civilian society of 180,000 ex-combatants (90,000 each from the North and South) between January 2009 and the end of 2012. The total donor funding required for the reintegration is estimated at USD 385 million. The plan further considers an additional cost of USD 135 million for reinsertion[3] to cover a package of food, non-food items, and cash, totalling USD 750 per beneficiary. The programme stipulates that USD 99 million of the reinsertion package will be directly covered by the UN through the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) budget from assessed contributions, with the remaining USD 36 million to be covered through World Food Programme requests for funding (GNU and GoSS, 2008, p. 15). The reintegration funds will be requested from donors and the Sudanese government.

The disarmament and demobilization (DD) elements include disarming the ex-combatants, counselling the participants and referring them for continued medical and other related services if necessary, distributing reinsertion packages, and transporting the demobilized beneficiaries to their respective communities. The funds required for DD are secure and the non-food items required for the reinsertion package were identified, purchased, and made ready for distribution by UNMIS more than two years ago.[4] From the project design it is understood that the start date of DD is subject to the availability of reintegration funds, for very clear reasons: a demobilization programme that is not

linked to the immediate start of reintegration can create a serious security threat in the form of frustrated ex-combatants. Sudan has already experienced significant problems because these two steps were not properly linked. One of the reasons for the collapse of the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement between the GoS, led by President Gaafar Nimeiry, and the Anyanya forces was a failure to reintegrate the rebels into either the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) or civilian life. It is for this reason that the start of the demobilization programme has been delayed until sufficient reintegration funds have been pledged. UNMIS and the Sudanese authorities had failed to raise sufficient reintegration funds by the donor roundtable in February 2009, during which a significant level of reintegration funding was pledged.

The project is to take four years, with first-year targets to process 51,560 ex-combatants through DDR (see Table 1). According to the plan, the reintegration funding requirement for Phase I is USD 164 million; UNMIS raised USD 92 million in its February donor roundtable.[5] The plan further elaborates that the national government will raise USD 250 per capita to bridge the reintegration funds. Moreover, the GoSS has committed to providing land for returning combatants (GoSS, 2009). One can anticipate, therefore, that approximately USD 103 million is available for reintegration funding to be used in 2009, leaving a shortfall of USD 61 million in pledges for Phase I. Further, the donors must be in a position to release pledged funds in a timely fashion to ensure effective programme implementation.

The main factor impeding donor pledges has been donor scepticism about meeting desired DDR outcomes, with most having questions that are unlikely

Table 1 **Number of candidates and cost per DDR Phase**

| Phase | Number of candidates | Estimated cost (USD) |
|---|---|---|
| I | 51,560 | 196,433,948 |
| II | 40,000 | 139,295,224 |
| III | 46,730 | 86,721,472 |
| IV | 41,710 | 7,693,310 |
| **Total** | **180,000** | **430,143,954** |

**Source:** GNU and GoSS (2008, p. 36)

Table 2 **Estimated total funding requirements**

| Contributor | Value (USD) |
|---|---:|
| MYDDRP budget | 430,143,959 |
| Government contribution (USD 250 x 180,000) | 45,000,000 |
| Total voluntary contribution | 385,143,959 |
| **Additional budget** | |
| UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations assessed budget | 99,000,000 |
| World Food Programme | 36,000,000 |
| UNICEF | 30,000,000 |

Source: GNU and GoSS (2008, p. 36)

to receive answers before 2011.[6] Furthermore, after two preparatory projects, there is significant uncertainty within the donor community about the capacity of the Sudanese governments and the UN to implement a DDR programme of the MYDDRP's size and complexity. It is therefore appropriate to question the feasibility of DD in Sudan from both a political perspective—whether any DDR in Sudan before 2011 is going to meet the desired objectives of the programme—and an institutional perspective, that is, whether the respective DDR institutions have the required capacity to implement the programme.

The SPLA is engaged in a process of regularizing its army,[7] and interviews with senior SAF officers at the North Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Commission (NSDDRC) indicate that the SAF is similarly engaged in a process of 'army modernization' (Gebrehiwot and Morse, 2008).[8] It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze the progress of 'SPLA regularization' and 'SAF modernization' and whether these activities can produce the expected number of ex-combatants for DDR. However, given the limited time-frame, the current pace of security sector reform/transformation in the South, and the ongoing conflict in Darfur, meeting the DDR objectives before 2011 is clearly unfeasible. In fact, successful processing of Phase I candidates before the 2011 election results would be a more reasonable target under current circumstances.

Phase I candidates are 'non-essentials' to the army, predominantly special needs groups but also some elderly and volunteers from the SAF and Popular Defence Forces (PDF).[9] It is now more than one year since these candidates passed through the pre-registration process. They have been waiting since the formation of the DDR commissions to receive the promised DDR benefits, and the delay of committed assistance has increased their frustration. This frustration is leading them to create roadblocks and organize demonstrations in the North. Similarly, self-demobilized combatants have been alleged to be responsible for a recent crime-wave in Southern Sudan and the TAs. Several instances have been reported in the last two years of combatants with disabilities and women associated with armed forces and groups (WAAFG) entering government and military compounds armed and threatening to kill themselves (GNU and GoSS, 2008, p. 8). Thus there is ample evidence that the reintegration of Phase I candidates is a matter of serious security concern and needs to be addressed.

Moreover, there is a desperate need for a compassionate assistance to these candidates as most of them are incapacitated veterans, WAAFGs, the elderly, and volunteers who decided to return to civilian life; addressing the humanitarian needs of this group is an important intervention to promote stability and human security. Most of the SPLA Phase I candidates are not on active duty in their armies and are assembled in semi-urban centres in the South. They are on the army payroll and some of them are still carrying their arms. While army salaries remain a financial burden for the GoSS, arms carried by these ex-combatants are a security threat to the community as the army's control of them is loose. Their disarmament, though not difficult, is essential in addressing the security needs of the communities.

As noted, the aim of DDR in Sudan is to create an enabling environment for development and reconstruction by addressing the human security needs of ex-combatants. As discussed, this programme can address the human security needs of Phase I candidates and support the peace and stability of Sudan to the extent that it addresses the security risk posed by these candidates. Therefore, one can confidently conclude that the objectives set for DDR are achievable but with a lesser caseload of Phase I candidates.

Available funds can now allow the programme to start, but the outstanding reintegration funds required for the caseload must be put in place during the

course of 2009 and donors should be encouraged to bridge this gap. According to a joint press release of UNMIS and the UNDP in Sudan, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Sudan argued that pledged funds could only address the reintegration needs of 20,000 combatants while the targeted Southern candidates in this phase numbered 35,000 (UNMIS and UNDP, 2009). The successful demobilization of Phase I candidates could also serve to educate strong national DDR commissions ready to undertake full-scale DDR. The demobilization of Phase I candidates is thus feasible and the implementation of this phase will enhance the stability and human security of Southern Sudan, thereby meeting the desired political objectives of the DDR programme.

A recent study commissioned by the UK Department for International Development evaluates the capacity of DDR institutions in Sudan and concludes that improved IUDDR Unit leadership is required to provide adequate technical support for DDR in Sudan (particularly in Southern Sudan, which is short of DDR funding). The funding problem seems to have been addressed to a certain extent and the Unit is now expected to come to the required strength with accelerated recruitments of DDR technical experts. The assessment further states that the South Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Commission (SSDDRC) did not have the capacity to start a January 2009 implementation of the MYDDRP and recommends the following actions to be taken by both the IUNDDR Unit and the SSDDRC to reach the required capacity:

a)    accelerated recruitment of reintegration support staff to the IUNDDR Unit and expert secondments to the SSDDRC;
b)    a DDR concept course;
c)    targeted technical, multiple programme component training, including the training of support staff along their functional responsibilities;
d)    management training;
e)    bottom-up reintegration planning and implementation training;
f)    tailored orientation for the new SSDDRC chairperson;
g)    financial management systems development and related training to underpin UNDP procedures; and
h)    reporting and systems training at all levels, including in the programme, operations, finance, management information, and monitoring and evaluation.

With the reported successful implementation of the pilot project,[10] it seems that both the SSDDRC and the IUNDDR Unit have started addressing the institutional constraints on implementing DDR. Therefore, one can conclude that the DDR of Phase I candidates before 2011 is feasible from both the political and institutional perspectives.

## Key DDR policy issues: an incremental approach

Building an incremental, integrated, and manageable DDR process to enable the development of adequate national capacities was taken as the key objective of the programme's implementation strategy (GNU and GoSS, 2008, p. 9). Following this strategy, the programme is divided into phases that will be implemented sequentially. Given the capacity and resource limitations, varying degrees of vulnerabilities of the targeted groups, and the ongoing political process in the country, the phased approach seems appropriate. It will allow implementation to go hand in hand with fundraising, enable the building of capacity of the implementing agencies over the course of the implementation, and enable the programme to prioritize candidates based on their vulnerability. Recently, the phased approach has involved piloting the programme in the TAs, strengthening their security and stability while looking for lessons to expand the DDR to the rest of Sudan when adequate resources and institutional capacities are available.

The TAs are areas where the political stakes of the CPA signatories were, and continue to be, high. They present complicated security situations and are thus deserving of priority. Success of DDR in these areas will not only provide important security and stability to highly contested areas, but also allow DDR implementing parties to gain critical experience and capacity in implementing the programme in a complicated political and security environment.

Until recently, SPLA and SAF forces were not fully redeployed out of these areas; the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) have not taken full control of the TAs, and sections remain highly militarized. A great proportion of young men remain reliant on some income from the SPLA in the Blue Nile region. In the absence of active DDR, and with very limited livelihood opportunities, banditry, militia work, and enduring dependence on the SPLA are real risks. The SAF presence

is very strong and the JIUs are not fully integrated (Vaux, Pantuliano, and Srinivasan, 2008).

SPLA forces remain in former Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) strongholds within South Kordofan. The integration of Other Armed Groups (OAGs) and of the PDF into the SAF also continues to create tension; the PDF demands absorption into the SAF and compensation for the years of fighting alongside the Sudanese army. A number of militias exist throughout the region and, recently, the creation of a new armed group, the Central Movement for the Liberation of Sudan–Nuba Mountains Region, was announced.[11] The group is seeking links with Darfuri opposition movements and threatening to attack oil fields and government institutions in the triangle between Kordofan and Darfur (Vaux, Pantuliano, and Srinivasan, 2008).

There are many military groups north of Abyei town, in particular around Meiram, where the SAF, the SPLA Debab Force (largely Misseriyya PDF), the National Congress Party–PDF, and other Misseriyya PDF groups can be found. There are contemporary borders and historical linkages and blood relations between Misseriyya and the Rezeigat in Darfur. The environs of Meiram are fertile ground for recruitment by Darfuri groups. It is important to note that a number of incidents have already taken place in South Darfur, in areas where Meiram, Abyei, and Northern Bahr el-Ghazal border each other (Vaux, Pantuliano, and Srinivasan, 2008).

The OAGs and other ex-combatants in the TAs are forces that have been fighting on opposing sides during the war. For this and other more significant reasons, these areas are jointly administered by both the GoSS and the GNU, and the DDR of combatants in these areas will be handled by the jointly formed commission offices. The successful implementation of the project in these TAs should thus not only address the DDR needs of the target group but also forge a culture of collaboration and set the pace for joint recovery and reconstruction endeavours. Yet the following issues require special attention in such a phased approach.

### Equitable DDR—considering all available candidates
The issue of processing equal numbers of candidates from both the North and the South is underlined in the DDR in Sudan. The 180,000 combatants targeted

Table 3 **Number of DDR candidates in the Transitional Areas**

|               | SAF    | SPLA  | WAAFG | TOTAL  |
|---------------|--------|-------|-------|--------|
| Blue Nile     | 4,212  | 788   | 674   | 5,674  |
| South Kordofan| 13,750 | 3,794 | 1,150 | 18,694 |
| Abyei         | 3,030  | 332   | n/a   | 3,362  |
| TOTAL         | 20,992 | 4,914 | 1,824 | 27,730 |

Source: IUNDDR Unit (2009)

for DDR in the MYDDRP are planned to be 90,000 each from the SPLA and associates, and the SAF and associates (see Table 3). There is a certain logic behind using equal numbers from both sides, but once an area is selected for a pilot, it is important that all available candidates in the area be considered together for the programme regardless of any imbalance in the numbers of candidates from each side.

Failing to address the DDR of all candidates in an area for the sake of balanced processing can generate disgruntled members who fall out of the selection and complicate the security situation. The already complex political situation in Darfur and the fact that the TAs are in close proximity to the ongoing conflict means such a failure would generate higher insecurity in those areas.

## Flexibility in addressing community security

The impacts of the long war in Southern Sudan are much greater than the number of dead and displaced persons, and the destruction of economic and social infrastructure. One of the long-term impacts of the decades-old conflict is the proliferation of the conflict at the community level, complicating the already existing tribal conflicts over scarce resources of pasture and water. These conflicts need to be resolved and the former adversaries must pass through a healing period as part of the reconstruction process in Southern Sudan.

It is expected that ex-combatants coming from conflicting communities will align themselves along existing alliances. Their presence will become a deterrent factor for inter-community violence or they will use their arms to defend their communities in the case of erupting conflict. Unilateral disarmament of piloted areas experiencing inter-community conflict could, therefore, trigger

more violence and leave the disarmed community at a disadvantage. It is therefore important to consider concurrent DDR in such areas to avoid triggering renewed conflict among communities.

## Individual counselling and referral services

Candidates for demobilization are usually reluctant at the prospect. They compare their situation with that of their colleagues retained in the army and consider themselves disadvantaged. Some of them might even exhibit a high degree of mistrust and lack confidence when a government against which they have been fighting is handling their demobilization and reintegration. Such distrust could be grave, particularly if the selection of DDR candidates fails to be based on clear and transparent criteria. It is, therefore, important that demobilization candidates understand the underlying political reasons for their demobilization. The programme should be understood in terms of its importance to the overall improvement in the social welfare of the country.

The social and economic problems of ex-combatants are immense when compared to those of the civilian population. Ex-combatants have been away from civilian life for a long period and are considered to have no economic means to survive as civilians. They only know how to fight and they may have inherited war trauma and psychological problems that could limit their productive capacity in civilian life. Many candidates also have physical impairments that restrict their options. It is impossible to solve all these problems through DDR. These are problems that require time and huge resources, and DDR can only support ex-combatants as they begin to tackle these problems as civilians. It is thus essential that ex-combatants have realistic expectations of DDR. Failure to understand the limitations of the programme will not only generate dissatisfaction but also cripple the initiative and dedication of combatants to their reintegration. Demobilized former combatants who have not been reintegrated could resort to violence and cause instability.

The plan for information, counselling, and referral services (ICRS) indicates that the overall stay of ex-combatants at DD sites is limited to a maximum of two days and each candidate is expected to go through a total of five hours of orientation (IUNDDR, 2008a). Given the number of combatants and the very basic level of the DD sites, it is understandable to limit the number of days of

their stay at the sites. It should be clearly understood, however, that the process of mentally preparing the candidates for DD requires a more concerted effort that may take several days or weeks. The DDR institutions have realized this and have tried to reflect the need for SPLA sensitization prior to disarmament. The SSDDRC and IUNDDR Unit Juba regional office joint DD plan suggests that the SPLA should inform all commanders and identified DDR candidates what will happen to them, what the process consists of, and what the programme support packages are, as part of the preparation for disarmament (IUNDDR Unit, 2008a, p. 12). The draft plan further stipulates that both bodies be willing to assist the SPLA in this sensitization exercise. This is an important realization, but the task should go beyond sensitization and include a comprehensive reorientation programme by the SPLM/A before candidates' arrival at the demobilization sites. Among other things, the reorientation programme should cover:

- the significance of regularizing the SPLA and the role DDR can play in this programme;
- the level of war devastation in Southern Sudan and the limited resources the government has to address this devastation;
- the existence of competing priorities, among which are the needs of 1.9 million organized and spontaneous returnees to Southern Sudan (Steering Committee on Returnees, 2008);[12]
- given the limited amount of resources and competing priorities, the fact that the reintegration package allocated by the GoSS to ex-combatants is limited to USD 3,000 per capita;
- issues related to pension payments and gratuities to be paid by the GoSS; and
- reintegration plans and how candidates could access reintegration assistance. For example, whether they need to identify their choices of reintegration, the role of reintegration partners, and how to access these partners' resources and assistance.

## Equitable treatment of ex-combatants

Candidates for DDR in Southern Sudan come not only from diverse ethnic communities but also from varying political and military backgrounds. Some

of the beneficiaries come from the South Sudan Defence Forces, which fought against the SPLA during the war. Other candidates might be Southerners who have been members of the SAF or other affiliated militias. These candidates will fear that the GoSS might not treat them equally with SPLA combatants in the demobilization and reintegration programme. In such instances, 'how much' an ex-combatant receives is not the only issue that matters; the fairness of her or his treatment is also important. The equitable treatment of combatants is, therefore, one of the key principles that needs to be adhered to for a successful demobilization programme.

The MYDDRP articulates that all DDR candidates will be treated fairly and equally irrespective of past or present political or military affiliation (GNU and GoSS, 2008, p. 11). This principle is also expressed in several SSDDRC documents and plans,[13] and it is one that must be observed. Equitable treatment of combatants is not limited to the allocation of benefits to candidates but also to having clear, transparent criteria of selecting the candidates for DDR. It is important for candidates to see that neither their ethnic background nor their previous political alignment is a reason for their being selected for demobilization.

## Conclusion

The implementation of the pilot programme in Blue Nile State has been progressing well and with the collaboration of the NSDDRC and SSDDRC was commended highly by UNMIS (UNMIS and UNDP, 2009). A press release from the Regional Coordinator for Southern Sudan, David Gressly, reports that more than 2,500 ex-combatants had been demobilized by April 2009. The release also states that preparations to demobilize another group of 4,300 combatants in and around the localities of Kauda and Julud in South Kordofan has been finalized (Gressly, 2009). Furthermore, the SSDDRC has announced that it will launch DDR in Central Equatoria in the first week of June 2009. It seems the momentum for the demobilization of candidates is increasing in Southern Sudan.

There are, however, concerns regarding the flow of donor funding for reintegration. In May 2009, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General expressed the view that, despite generous donor contributions, the programme

was facing a serious shortfall in its financing. He added that available funds could only address the reintegration of approximately 20,000 combatants and appealed to donors and the Sudanese governments for additional funding (UNMIS and UNDP, 2009). Failure to keep the momentum alive is going to have serious repercussions.

Both the IUNDDR Unit and the SDDRC should therefore launch a renewed fundraising effort. The successful start of DDR implementation could help address the scepticism of donors with respect to the institutional capacity to implement the programme. The DDR institutions could consider repackaging the funding justification of the phase under implementation based on the security needs of Southern Sudan. This would tacitly address the multifaceted political questions from the donors that are unlikely to get answered before the 2011 referendum.

In the funding arrangement for the whole DDR programme in the MYDDRP, it is indicated that the Sudanese governments have committed themselves to contribute USD 250 per person to bridge reintegration funds. As the targeted number of ex-combatants is made up equally of both Northerners and Southerners, the total contribution of the GoSS to the programme over a four-year period is going to reach USD 22.5 million. The SSDDRC should look into the possibility of bringing the GoSS commitment forward in case of donor funding delays. ◙

# Abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| **CPA** | Comprehensive Peace Agreement |
| **DD** | Disarmament and demobilization |
| **DDR** | Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration |
| **GNU** | Government of National Unity |
| **GoSS** | Government of Southern Sudan |
| **ICRS** | Information counselling and referral services |
| **IDDRP** | Interim Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Project |
| **IUNDDR** | Integrated United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration |
| **JIU** | Joint Integrated Unit |
| **MYDDRP** | Multi-Year Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Programme |
| **NSDDRC** | North Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Commission |
| **OAG** | Other Armed Group |
| **PDF** | Popular Defence Forces |
| **PSP** | Preparatory Support Project |
| **SAF** | Sudan Armed Forces |
| **SPLA** | Sudan People's Liberation Army |
| **SPLM** | Sudan People's Liberation Movement |
| **SSDDRC** | South Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Commission |
| **TA** | Transitional Area |
| **UNDP** | United Nations Development Programme |
| **UNICEF** | United Nations Children's Fund |
| **UNMIS** | United Nations Mission in Sudan |
| **WAAFG** | Women associated with armed forces and groups |

# Endnotes

1   The 'special needs group' consists of disabled veterans, women and children associated with armed groups and forces, and elderly people.

2   Interview with donors, Khartoum, August 2008.

3   Reinsertion is different from reintegration; the former looks into immediate bridging assistance and the latter addresses the long-term economic and social integration of the ex-combatant.

4   Interview with head of UNMIS Joint Logistics Committee.

5   Email communication with Sarah Douglas, donor relations head of the IUNDDR Unit, Ferurary 2009.

6   Interviews by DfID consultants with donors indicate that most doubt whether security sector reform/transformation will generate the planned number of combatants for DDR. They observe that the candidates for Phase I are the disabled, women associated with armed forces and groups, and militias who could be considered 'non-essentials'. Consequently, the donors question whether there is real downsizing of the armies and whether DD in this case means reduced defence spending. Some also doubt that ethnic balance will be considered and are concerned that funding might be used to 'cleanse' some ethnicities from the armies (Gebrehiwot and Morse, 2008).

7   The SPLA Act has now been enacted and the SPLA 'white paper' has been adopted by the GoSS. Several support initiatives commissioned by bilateral donors are also now under way to enable the SPLA to reform into a regular army.

8   Interview with Brig. Gen. Abdulkarim, head of disarmament and demobilization of the NSDDRC, Khartoum, August 2008.

9   The pre-registration data from both commissions indicates that the majority of these candidates are disabled and women associated with armed forces and groups (NSDDRC and SSDDRC, 2008).

10  See UNMIS and UNDP (2009).

11  See also HSBA (2008a; 2008b).

12  It is estimated that there have been 373,300 organized and spontaneous returnees between 2004 and the end of 2007 (Steering Committee on Returnees, 2008). In the same period, 373,300 returnees returned to the three TAs.

13  See also SSDDRC (2007).

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Paper 3

# United Nations Mission in Sudan: UN Support to DDR

*By Wally Vrey*

## Introduction

The United Nations has adopted common standards—the *Integrated United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards* (IDDRS)—through which to guide its support to DDR operations. The IDDRS has been deployed to two pilot missions, Sudan and Haiti, in an effort to test whether it is an efficient mechanism for the DDR programme. It was subsequently terminated in Haiti as the peace model does not comply with a traditional DDR programme, but in Sudan it has been implemented with reasonable success. In general the IDDRS allows for the establishment of UN capacity for funding disarmament, demobilization, and short-term reinsertion through the assessed budgets of peacekeeping operations, where relevant. Reintegration, however, depends on voluntary contributions from participating donor countries. DDR is now implemented across Sudan and the system functions with some success. The national institutions are thus supported through the Integrated UN DDR (IUNDDR) Unit, comprising members of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF).

## Design of the DDR structures

### DDR mandate

The mandate for UN support of DDR in Sudan is defined in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and Security Council resolution 1590 of 24 March 2005. It can be summarized as follows:

*To assist in the establishment of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme as called for in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, with particular attention to the special needs of women and child combatants, and its implementation through voluntary disarmament and weapons collection and destruction.* (UNSC, 2005, para. 4(a)(iv))

Further elaboration of the mandate supports the CPA, indicating that the UN is required to assist DDR through the national institutions in the form of technical and logistical support.

## National ownership

In the guiding principles of the CPA, the Government of National Unity (GNU) is clear about national ownership. International partners will play an active supportive role by facilitating activities, providing material, and through technical assistance (GoS and the SPLM/A, 2005, Chapter VI, Annexure 1, part III, arts. 24.2, 24.3). The Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General provided further clarity by explaining aptly that this implies 'engaging without replacing'.[1] Our interpretation and guiding attitude would be to acknowledge that DDR is a nationally led process through the establishment of a partnership with the UN for the required support in the form of facilitation, material items, and technical assistance.

## The Interim DDR Programme

The Interim DDR Programme (IDDRP) initially focused all DDR organizations—the GNU, the UN, and potential implementing partners and donors—on a specific way forward. Due to delays of various natures, it has never been successful in actual operations, but it has been a platform for engagement at the national and regional levels. An inability to implement the IDDRP is also the main reason why most partners regard the DDR process as a failure. In addition, the special needs group (SNG)[2] addressed by the IDDRP still requires urgent attention and corresponding implementation. Due to all these challenges, the national institutions, the UN, and international partners jointly agreed to terminate efforts to launch the IDDRP, replacing it with the actual DDR programme and focussing first on the SNG as a priority.

## National and UN DDR structures

The GNU developed its structures for the implementation of DDR in the CPA. The structures consist of: the National DDR Coordination Council (NDDRCC), responsible for policy formulation, oversight, review, coordination, and evaluation; the Northern Sudan DDR Commission (NSDDRC); and the Southern Sudan DDR Commission (SSDDRC). The NSDDRC and SSDDRC are charged with the mandate to design, implement, and manage the DDR process at the Northern and Southern sub-national levels, respectively, but based on joint decision-making on the implementation modalities. The CPA also provides for the establishment of state DDR commissions responsible for the implementation of programmes at the state and local levels.

In comparison, and to facilitate the national DDR process, the UN has established a DDR Steering Committee at the level of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, created a national DDR Office, and established Northern and Southern Regional DDR Offices to support the two national commissions.

In addition to the above structures, the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) is also to be consulted by the SSDDRC to ensure that policy carries its support. Both the SSDDRC and the UN were hoping for an inter-ministerial Advisory Board under the GoSS First Vice President through which to ensure that the GoSS adopts all policy matters. Although this board has indeed met a few times for specific purposes, it has never existed formally. It may still be a good idea to consider the establishment of this board on a quarterly basis to ensure that the programme is followed through properly.

## Numbers

The national institutions, the UN, and the international community agreed to allow 182,900 candidates access to the DDR programme. Of these, 90,000 candidates were allocated to the North and 90,000 to the South, while the remaining 2,900 are allocated for the DDR programme in the east. In addition, a number of 8,000 possible child soldiers or children associated with armed groups and forces is used as a planning figure.

While the above numbers are agreed upon, it has been important to break the DDR programme down into specific phases. The first phase, agreed between the national institutions, will address all SNGs, constituting a caseload

of approximately 35,000 people for Southern Sudan. First Vice President of Sudan and President of Southern Sudan Kiir Salva Mayardit has indicated that the GoSS would be satisfied if this first phase were completed by the end of the interim period. He made it clear that the government remains committed to demobilizing 90,000 members of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and that new modalities might need to be considered on how to proceed after the interim period.

## Concept for DDR in Sudan

DDR in Sudan is a national programme and while there are some minor differences (due mostly to logistical and geographical factors), all expectations are for similar modalities across the board to ensure equity throughout the country. The remainder of this document reflects mostly what the procedures will be for Southern Sudan.

### Disarmament

Disarmament will be carried out by the SPLA. The disarmament activity will have been completed before the candidates are delivered to the demobilization sites for processing and the SPLA will record the disarmament data on the discharge certificate for each individual. The national institutions, the UN, and international donors are jointly considering modalities for verification procedures that will allow both the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the SPLA to manage the resulting stockpile of weapons.

### Demobilization

Demobilization centres will be established in state capitals in Southern Sudan, co-located with state offices. The UN will set up both the state offices as well as the additional facilities for the demobilization. In addition, the UN will consider providing tents to the SPLA for up to 250 people[3] to accommodate candidates assembled for the demobilization process.

The demobilization process is guided through the National DDR Strategic Plan agreed between the national institutions and adopted by the UN and the international community. This strategy informed the development of technical

Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs), which guide operations. Needless to say, these procedures are likely to undergo some revision from time to time.

The plan is to incrementally establish three demobilization teams for Southern Sudan. One has already started to function in Juba, the next will be deployed in Jonglei (Bor) towards the end of August 2009, and the third in Lakes (Rumbek) at the end of October 2009. These three teams will then leapfrog into the other states in accordance with SSDDRC and GoSS priorities for demobilization.

## Reintegration

Reintegration will be implemented by the SSDDRC in collaboration with UNDP. The Multi-Year DDR Programme document that guides this process has already been agreed among the National DDR Coordinating Council, the international community, and the UN. It has also been adopted by the GoSS Inter-Ministerial Appraisal Committee, including specific modalities explaining co-management of the reintegration programme.

Once demobilized, a candidate should be able to sustain him- or herself through the short-term reinsertion support for a maximum period of six months, at which point the reintegration programme will take effect. Based on needs assessments in Southern Sudan, reintegration opportunities will focus on agriculture, small business, and educational support. The development of these support packages is at an advanced stage. When the final decisions regarding funding were made, it was agreed that the reintegration programme would undergo review after the first 12 months to confirm the actual per capita cost of the programme.

It is worthy of note that there is a very important link between demobilization and reintegration. It would be irresponsible to demobilize candidates unless it was certain that the contributions for reintegration were guaranteed. The IUNDDR Unit will thus always ensure that this risk is minimized and not recommend continuing with demobilization when available funding for reintegration is insufficient.

## Child DDR

The SSDDRC also leads the child DDR programme, receiving its support from UNICEF. Child focal points for each state have been trained and up to 1,000

children have been returned to their families. There are still a number of children with the SPLA, but the SSDDRC and UNICEF have assessed the SPLA's progress to date and are in the process of updating plans to deliver an improved programme to the children.

## Summary of UN contributions to DDR

- The IUNDDR Unit assisted the national institutions with technical support for the development of the National Strategic Plan and subsequent SOPs for the demobilization process.
- Short-term reinsertion support through the UN Security Council consists of the following:
  - SDG 860 (USD 360) in cash: SDG 800 (USD 335) for the individual and SDG 60 (USD 25) as a transport grant to return home after demobilization;
  - non-food items with 20 personal items (Juba market value around SDG 500 (USD 210)).
- The World Food Programme and the SSDDRC will deliver a food ration to demobilized candidates as close as possible to their home communities for a period of three months for a family of five people.
- UNMIS will provide all the equipment required for the demobilization process, including all operational equipment, tents for the SPLA, and fuel for SPLA transport.
- UNMIS agreed to establish ten DDR state offices in all states from where both short-term demobilization and long-term reintegration will be managed.
- The SSDDRC staff has access to UNMIS transport resources to assist them in moving throughout the region for management purposes.
- UNDP will support the SSDDRC with the fiduciary responsibility of managing the funding received from international donors.
- UNDP staff provided technical assistance for the completion of the National Reintegration Policy and the Multi-Year DDR Programme document for reintegration.
- UNDP funding will also cover most of the logistics required by the SSDDRC to implement and manage the reintegration programme.

*Summary of international community and government contributions to DDR*

- The international community, national institutions, and donors have agreed on an amount of USD 1,500 per capita for reintegration with the understanding that the amount will be reviewed after the first 12 months of operations to determine more accurately the actual cost.
- Recently, the international community also offered to establish an expert panel to visit the programme regularly and to provide the national institutions and the UN with advice in areas where challenges are experienced. This arrangement is not yet formalized, but there is general agreement on the utility of the idea.
- Both the GNU and the GoSS agreed to contribute an additional USD 250 per capita to the reintegration programme.
- Furthermore, the GoSS has announced that it will allocate land to the candidates on which to start their livelihood practices as part of their reinsertion benefit. Instructions have gone to the state governors in this regard.
- The GoSS announced that it has received some USD 30 million support from the GNU, which it would like to invest in low-cost housing for demobilized combatants.

## Implementation of DDR

Implementation of DDR is also phased. Both the GNU and the GoSS requested UN support in commencing DDR in the Three Areas first. That would support the separation of forces in compliance with the CPA. Operations were thus launched as a small pilot in Blue Nile state (Damazin) during February 2009. Since March, operations have extended in Kordofan with two demobilization sites operating in Kauda and Julud. At the end of May, more than 5,000 candidates from both the SAF and the SPLA had been demobilized in these areas.

In Southern Sudan, operations commenced in Juba on 10 June 2009. The first caseload was successfully demobilized and operations are ongoing. It is a learning experience for the SPLA, the SSDDRC, and the IUNDDR Unit, but the process has now been cleared. As mentioned earlier, and according to current

planning, the programme will deploy two additional demobilization teams for a total of three teams conducting simultaneous operations before the end of 2009.

If all goes well, and based on the above plan and current estimates, the SSDDRC will be able to demobilize the estimated 35,000 SNGs by June or July 2010, well within the initial time-frame requested by the GoSS. The government is experiencing financial difficulties, however, and there is an expectation that DDR should increase its tempo in an effort to complete the 35,000 caseload by the end of 2009. The IUNDDR Unit is willing to increase its own capacity in an effort to support the SSDDRC in such an attempt. It will also be important for both the SSDDRC and the SPLA to increase their capacity to make that possible. In addition, as noted above, it is important to ensure that sufficient funding is also available for reintegration if demobilization is increased; demobilized candidates without a reintegration programme could potentially represent a major security risk, which would be contrary to the aims of the DDR programme.

## Conclusion

The DDR programme in Southern Sudan has come a long way from initial difficulty to actual implementation. The national institutions, the UN, and international donors all deserve congratulations for this effort. DDR is now one of the few CPA areas in which there is a national effort under way, a high level of cooperation and communication, properly formalized procedures, and initial funding. It is hoped that sufficient capacity on all sides will be developed to see this process through, including the mobilization of sufficient resources to fulfil commitments made with the signing of the CPA. It remains important to realize that the success of DDR depends very much on the peaceful implementation of all aspects of the CPA.

# Abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| **CPA** | Comprehensive Peace Agreement |
| **DDR** | Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration |
| **GNU** | Government of National Unity |
| **GoSS** | Government of Southern Sudan |
| **IDDRP** | Interim Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme |
| **IDDRS** | *Integrated United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards* |
| **IUNDDR** | Integrated United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration |
| **NDDRCC** | National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Coordination Council |
| **NSDDRC** | Northern Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission |
| **SAF** | Sudan Armed Forces |
| **SDG** | Sudanese pound |
| **SNG** | Special needs group |
| **SOPs** | Standing operating procedures |
| **SPLA** | Sudan People's Liberation Army |
| **SSDDRC** | Southern Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission |
| **UNDP** | United Nations Development Programme |
| **UNICEF** | United Nations Children's Fund |
| **UNMIS** | United Nations Mission in Sudan |

# Endnotes

1    Comment by UNMIS Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General Manuel Aranda da Silva, October 2007.
2    The SNG consists of the elderly, the disabled, and women and children associated with armed groups and forces. Support to the DDR programme for all adults will be targeted mainly through UNMIS and UNDP while UNICEF focuses on children.
3    Calculated at 50 people per day for one week.

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Paper 4
# SSR and DDR in Post-CPA Southern Sudan

*By Lt. Gen. (ret.) Gebretsadkan Gebretensae*

## Background

In dealing with issues relating to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) in the context of security sector reform (SSR) in Southern Sudan, the obvious starting point is the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which was signed in January 2005 between the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the National Congress Party (NCP). Not only has the CPA brought about peace between the North and the South of Sudan, but it has also clearly set the political direction for both SSR and DDR programmes at the national level and in Southern Sudan in particular. The CPA recognizes two systems within Sudan as an interim arrangement until the 2011 referendum, which will determine whether Sudan will remain one country or be divided into two. As part of this overarching political arrangement, the CPA stipulates that there will be two legitimate armed forces in Sudan during the interim period—the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the SPLA—although it also provides for the establishment of the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs), which shall be equally composed of the SAF and SPLA (GoS and SPLM/A, 2005, ch. 6).

It is important to recognize that the CPA was the fruit borne of sustained joint engagement of the people of Southern Sudan, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) sub-region, and the international community at large. Implementation of the CPA will require at least the same level of engagement from the same actors. If the fundamental objective of the exercise in SSR and DDR is to contribute towards enduring peace and stability, implementation of the CPA is vital to shaping the ultimate nature and outcome of the SSR and DDR programmes. The scenarios that can be imagined in the event of the implementation of the CPA and in the event of its failure

are completely different. If one assumes reneging on the implementation of the CPA as a possibility, the future security environment in Sudan will be entirely different and dangerous. Hence, whether the CPA is implemented determines the content and approaches of SSR and DDR programmes. At the same time, the peace in Sudan was a negotiated peace; it is not a peace imposed by a victor. This reality also has an enduring influence on how SSR and DDR programmes are designed and implemented.

Another important reality to recognize is that, even though the CPA was the most comprehensive and realistic peace agreement that could be achieved at the time, it was signed by only two parties: the SPLM and the NCP. While the two signatories may have been the strongest parties—with the NCP being the ruling party and the SPLM the strongest insurgent party—other political forces (parties and armed groups) were consequently excluded from the peace agreement in both the North and the South. This fact will have an impact on the implementation of the CPA in general and above all on the design and implementation of SSR and DDR programmes in Southern Sudan. The continued existence of non-statutory forces (those not recognized by the CPA or the interim constitutions) is one manifestation of the exclusion of political forces during the peace agreement. The Juba Declaration of January 2006—which brought the bulk of the Other Armed Groups (OAGs) that were mainly organized under the Southern Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF) into the SPLA—was an agreement to rectify the exclusiveness of the CPA, at least in Southern Sudan.

On the basis of the CPA, the Interim National Constitution of the Republic of the Sudan and the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan have legitimized the three armies and further defined their mission and roles:

> *The Sudan Armed Forces and the Sudan People's Liberation Army shall remain separate, regular professional and non-partisan armed forces and shall be treated equally as the Sudan National Armed Forces.* (Sudan, 2005, pp. 81–82)

The composition and nature of the JIUs is defined in the same constitutions. The same principles and concepts for the establishment of the Sudan Armed Forces during the interim period are accepted as guiding principles in the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan (Southern Sudan, 2005, pp. 93–97).

Next to the CPA, the interim constitutions are the basis for the organization and definition of roles and mission of the SAF and all other security institutions.

It is understandable that after a long and protracted armed struggle in Sudan, the SPLA—the SPLM's armed wing—is apportioned a proportionally heavy influence in the overall arrangement of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS). This position is clearly recognizable in the security sector since law enforcement agencies such as the police, prisons, and wildlife services are comparatively weak and are staffed by personnel from the SPLA. In post-CPA Southern Sudan, the SPLA plays a significant role not only as an army but also in other security-related activities. When assessing the effectiveness of the SPLA, it is important to consider aspects such as the ethnic division within the Southern Sudanese community, which persisted during the armed struggle and was compounded by the policy of the NCP government in Khartoum. The resulting dynamic has an impact on programmes such as forced disarmament of the communities. Even though SSDF forces have been brought into the SPLA, problems persist, mainly in relation to issues of integration.

The SPLA is transforming itself from a non-paying, voluntarily mobilized guerrilla army into a modern professional armed force under democratic civilian control on the basis of state legislation. This major undertaking should be accomplished without undermining the security of Southern Sudan or the GoSS. In fact, the objective of the transformation should be to enhance the security situation. But this challenge is compounded by the extensive structural weaknesses in Southern Sudan; indeed, the GoSS itself was only established with the signing of the CPA and relies on effective implementation of the agreement to undergo necessary consolidation. This overall weakness affects the security sector as well. There is no accumulated knowledge or experience to organize and lead the security sector. This problem is exacerbated by the lack of a skilled and educated workforce. In addition, the uneasiness and intermittent clashes—particularly along the North–South border—create a burden on the security structures. The conflicts in Darfur and the activities of the Lord's Resistance Army complicate the situation even further. All together, the political and security environment under which SSR and DDR are being carried out in Sudan is extremely complex.

## Conceptual links between SSR and DDR

Before considering SSR and DDR programmes, it is essential to recognize, at least conceptually, the need for properly organized and operationally effective security institutions. Unless there is a properly functioning state with security institutions trained to appreciate the monopoly of the use of coercion (when the need arises) and the responsibility that goes with it, the security and stability of society will be endangered. The case of Somalia is an excellent example of the dangerous security situation that can be generated when a state fails and security intuitions malfunction. This is an important point to keep in mind when we plan for SSR and DDR programmes in a post-conflict environment such as Southern Sudan. All programmes should give priority to reconstructing the security institutions to make them operationally effective. Yet this does not mean that SSR and DDR programmes should be postponed until security institutions are organized and operational. What it does mean is that while SSR and DDR programmes are initiated and carried out, the main thrust of post-conflict security sector reconstruction must be operationalizing security institutions.

Ideally, DDR should follow at least the conceptual development of SSR programmes. That is, there has to be a clear package of ideas that defines the policy both at the state level—as for general security policy—and at the institutional level—as for defence policy (SPLA, 2008). The CPA recognizes DDR as an important programme in the stabilization period:

> *The parties agree to implement with the assistance of the international community DDR programmes for the benefit of all those who will be affected by the reduction, demobilization and downsizing of forces as agreed in 1(c), 3(d) and 7(b).* (GoS and SPLM/A, 2005, ch. 6)

One aspect of security policy is to define the responsibility of the state for the security of both the citizens and the state itself. The policy is the overarching framework that deals with all security issues, providing the broad political guidance and direction to both SSR and DDR programmes. Potentially, it has the capacity to lay the foundation for stability and enduring peace, creating an environment conducive to reducing violence levels. It elaborates the funda-

mental directions that the state should follow in safeguarding the security of its citizens and the stability and proper functioning of that state. Here I am assuming that the definition of security also encompasses the broader concept of human security. It is encouraging that the draft security policy of Southern Sudan does encompass these aspects. Indeed, its chapters include calls on the state 'to provide for public welfare through public education, public health and food security; engage all facets of our society to promote human rights, dignity, harmony and human security within our cultural diversity; build the institutional framework that will ensure governance and rule of law through democratic processes' (SPLA GOSSG, 2008).

On the basis of the guidance provided by the CPA and the proposed security policy, the SPLA White Paper on Defence defines its role, mission, objectives, and structure as well as its civil–military relations. The CPA and the draft security policy identify SPLA transformation and DDR as important issues that require attention; in turn, the SPLA White Paper refers to its transformation as a key activity to be carried out during the interim period. Now that the defence policy has been developed and endorsed, a military strategy must also be developed. While the defence policy mainly articulates the leadership's political aims—which are to be executed by the armed forces (SPLA)—a military strategy will lay out how to create and deploy the forces necessary to carry out the policy. In other words, a military strategy will deal with operationalizing the intent of the political leadership as expressed in the defence policy. As part of this process, a military strategy will set out a desired force structure while taking financial and other limitations into account. In particular, the military strategy will define the structure, size, and capabilities that will allow the SPLA to implement defence policy. This process also helps in assessing the magnitude—both quantity and quality—of SPLA members to be demobilized.

It is clear that this process will take a substantial amount of time. DDR programmes should not be delayed until all SSR programmes are developed and legislated—particularly in a post-conflict scenario. While the sequential approach does have its merits, especially since the transition to peace requires a fundamental transformation of the security sector, it is not the only way forward. There will obviously be a need to go ahead with DDR programmes both

in the interest of would-be discharged ex-combatants and in order to rightsize the army. At the same time there will be obvious candidates for demobilization—wounded heroes, women associated with the army, under-aged soldiers, etc. It will thus be necessary to push SSR and DDR programmes forward simultaneously and with close coordination. As noted above, DDR follows the development of a package of ideas to transform the security sector; this is where DDR and SSR are linked conceptually.

SSR and DDR are also conceptually linked with respect to the security environment itself. In a post-conflict scenario, the ultimate objective of both SSR and DDR is to contribute effectively towards enduring peace and stability. SSR does so by operationalizing security institutions so that they can effectively protect the community and the state in the case of security threats, and by ensuring that these institutions are democratically governed and under civilian control. An effective DDR programme successfully demobilizes ex-combatants and properly integrates them into communities, whose security is thereby enhanced instead of destabilized. These objectives can only be achieved through thought-out, well-planned, and properly coordinated activities in both programmes.

In a mainly rural community such as Southern Sudan—and particularly in a post-conflict situation—the availability and flow of small arms and associated problems are a major concern, with implications for both SSR and DDR. How do we deal with this challenge? The answer to that question must take into account that the bearing of arms is associated with economic, social, and political prestige; that the state structure is not developed enough to provide the necessary level of security—at either the individual or the community level; and that people and communities at large provide security by arming and organizing themselves within their communities. In this context, how do we deal with civilian disarmament? Do we forcefully disarm? Or do we try to control the use of arms with minimal disarmament while gradually replacing the traditional security arrangements with a properly functioning security system that takes the livelihood of the communities into consideration? There are no easy answers. Research on the 2008 civilian disarmament programme in Southern Sudan reveals numerous problems (O'Brien, 2009). This issue needs careful scrutiny as it could create instability if mishandled or serve as the basis for solid community security if managed properly. Experience can help

us learn valuable lessons for SSR and DDR. Clearly, the programmes are conceptually and practically linked in the areas of security and civilian disarmament.

# Development of SSR programmes in Southern Sudan

The security sector transformation programme was initiated and has been conducted in close collaboration with the GoSS, mainly through the SPLA and the donor community. The need for a fundamental transformation after the armed struggle is obvious. As indicated earlier, the SPLA had to transform itself from the voluntarily mobilized, unpaid guerrilla army of the SPLM into a professional, conventional armed force of the GoSS. It had to transform itself from an army that emphasizes initiative at the unit and individual levels to one that stresses coordination of various efforts in military engagements. In addition, it had to coordinate its activities with other efforts—security, political, diplomatic, and economic—of the state. This requires new legislation (security policy, defence policy, and the SPLA Act of 2009) as well as the development of clear directions and programmes (military strategy, a strategic plan), all of which are to guide the activities of the transformation process. This need was the reason for the development of SSR programmes in Southern Sudan, as clearly indicated in the original terms of reference that were developed and agreed between the SPLA and the UK Department for International Development (DfID).

In addition to the CPA and the interim constitutions, there was a need to develop overarching policy directions to guide, harmonize, and coordinate activities of the security structures and the GoSS, and above all to ensure that the political objectives of the GoSS are consistently carried out. Such policy directions—designed to guide security organs as well as diplomatic and economic activities—are provided in the form of a security policy (traditionally called the 'national security policy'). Once that security policy is formulated, defence policy can be developed to deal with the armed forces (that is, the armed aspect of security).

## *SPLA White Paper on Defence*
The GoSS has developed and the Legislative Assembly of Southern Sudan has endorsed both the security policy of Southern Sudan and the SPLA White Paper

on Defence. The SPLA White Paper analyses the security environment as it affects Southern Sudan and discusses the transformation process of the SPLA. It further defines the mission, role, and functions of the SPLA. On the basis of the CPA, it identifies the transformation the SPLA 'into a professional armed force fully able to contribute effectively to peace and stability' as a key element of the process (SPLA, 2008, pp. 8–9). The need for clear and practical policies consistent with principles of wider SSR is also emphasized, as are key challenges to overcome in the transformation process. Identified tasks include the following:

- to articulate clearly the mission and function of the SPLA;
- to ensure that all SPLA activities contribute to improvements in human security under the principles of democratic control and the rule of law;
- to develop policies and programmes that will ensure that the SPLA develops into a force that is appropriate, affordable, and effective in relation to its agreed mission;
- to develop effective democratic governance and oversight procedures in harmony with the need for overall operational effectiveness; and
- to provide clear direction and a framework for the implementation of DDR.

In the chapter that deals with the SPLA's mission, role, and functions, the White Paper reflects the provisions in the CPA and interim constitutions and states that the SPLA's mission is:

- to defend the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan;
- to protect the people of Southern Sudan;
- to secure the territorial integrity of Southern Sudan;
- to defend Southern Sudan against internal and external threats and aggression; and
- to be involved in addressing specified emergencies, to participate in reconstruction activities, and to assist in disaster relief within the terms of the constitution and the law.

The SPLA's role and functions are to:

- serve as one of the armed forces of Sudan;
- serve as the armed forces for the GoSS;

- protect the CPA;
- provide forces to the JIUs;
- participate in command and developing the common doctrine for Sudan's national armed forces;
- provide assistance in maintaining law and order within the legal framework of Southern Sudan;
- on the direction of the GoSS, coordinate with regional militaries on security issues;
- participate in regional and international security operations through the provision of peacekeeping forces;
- provide assistance in disaster management whenever directed by the GoSS; and
- participate in the reconstruction of Southern Sudan's infrastructure.

The White Paper further discusses defence structures and management, force structure and development, human resources, logistics, and financial management. In the chapter that deals with force structure, it states that the SPLA will be organized 'in both active and reserve forces'. It elaborates that the active forces shall consist of ground forces supported by air and riverine units and that they will include the SPLA component of the JIUs. The chapter also specifies that 'the SPLA will remain a light infantry-based force'.

A defence policy can only serve for a certain period of time. When the political and security environment that dictated the development of the policy changes, the policy has to change as well. This is also true of the SPLA White Paper on Defence. It is meant to serve the security requirements of the interim period, which will end with the 2011 referendum. Regardless of the outcome of the referendum, the policy will have to be revised to reflect the new political and security realities. Until then, the SPLA White Paper on Defence indicates the desired direction to be followed during the interim period. The transformation of the SPLA has been identified as a key activity and with it providing clear direction and a framework for the implementation of DDR. It is obvious that transforming a guerrilla army into a conventional professional army in a post-conflict environment is not an undertaking that can be completed within three years. It will take more than that. Yet the groundwork can be laid so that

further transformation can take place after the interim period. The White Paper does set that approach and has clearly addressed the critical substantive issues. It is an adequate policy framework to lay the basis for SSR to take place. Thereafter, the most critical element in the whole chain of SSR programmes in Southern Sudan is implementation.

## *The SPLA Act of 2009*

Next to the SPLA White Paper on Defence—which defines the mission, role, and functions of the forces—the SPLA Act of 2009 is another important direction-setting document. Its 11 chapters and 100 articles were thoroughly discussed and endorsed by the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly. One of the most important aspects of this document is that it defines the relationship between citizens and the state. It formally changes the SPLA from an unpaid, voluntarily mobilized army into an army of the state. By stipulating the legal provisions for recruitment, military service, entitlements, and final discharge from the military, the Act defines the contractual agreement between the defence establishment of the state and the citizen who wants to serve in the army. Such a relationship did not previously exist. The second important element in the Act is that it defines the decision-making architecture within the defence establishment. On the basis of the CPA and the interim constitutions, it defines the powers, authorities, responsibilities, and functions of the most senior leadership positions within the SPLA. Finally, it also defines the military justice system and the proceedings of military courts, thereby setting a standard for justice within the defence institution. As a whole, the SPLA Act creates the framework for the smooth functioning of a massive institution as well as the structure within which the defence establishment will coordinate and interact with other government offices.

In addition to the guidance provided by the SPLA White Paper of Defence and the SPLA Act of 2009, the SPLA also needed assistance at the strategic management level. Originally, the areas of engagement were identified as human resources, public expenditure, logistics, military training, and information systems. Consistent assistance was provided in the areas of human resources and public expenditure. The military training advisory programme started late but has continued consistently. The logistics advisory programme

began but was terminated, and has not yet restarted. The information systems advisory programme has not yet been launched. The objective of the advisory programme is to enhance the knowledge and technical capabilities of the SPLA to manage the defence establishment at the strategic level. The programmes aimed at policy development and those focused on strategic management are designed to reinforce and complement each other. It is very difficult to implement and carry out effective SSR programmes without an adequate human resources management system. The same is true of financial management, since any SSR programme will require appropriate budgeting. At the same time, there is a need for a training programme that reflects set directions and is able to pass on professional skills required to implement the envisioned SSR programme. So far, the challenges and problems have been identified, as have the directions and programmes to resolve them.

## Implementation

On the basis of the current SPLA transformation programme, DfID established an enhanced Southern Sudan Defence Development and Transformation (SSDDT) programme. To facilitate ongoing efforts to implement the various programmes developed so far, a five-day dissemination workshop was conducted at two levels on 24–28 March 2009. The objectives of the workshops were to mobilize the necessary political support at all levels—particularly from the top political leadership—and to create a favourable environment for the implementation of SPLA transformation. The first workshop was organized at the GoSS level; the most senior political leaders, ministers, advisers to the president, and top brass of the SPLA participated. The president of the GoSS, Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit, opened the workshops. On the agenda were the SPLA White Paper and the SPLA Act, both of which were discussed in the context of implementation challenges. Support for the SPLA transformation and implementation of the policy documents was strong and very clear. At the same time many participants expressed concerns, particularly with regard to the issue of rightsizing the SPLA and DDR programmes.

Since the workshops were conducted in Sudan at the height of the global financial crisis, and since the report of Chief of General Staff Gen. Oyay Deng Ajak highlighted financial constraints facing the SPLA, the issue of rightsizing

was on the table. Because of the linkages between SSR and DDR, and in order to create the necessary political environment, DDR was an agenda item in the workshop from the very beginning. A representative from the Southern Sudan DDR Commission, Ambruce T. Kambaya, made a presentation on the current status. It was clear that the audience was not satisfied with the presentation. Instead of focusing on current activities and results, the presentation was on general concepts and principles. Nevertheless, it was clear that interest in DDR is substantial. While some of the political and military leaders were in favour of rightsizing, some others expressed concern, especially regarding security issues and the likelihood that DDR may be used to further ethnic agendas. They advised against rightsizing in view of the unstable security situation and the high possibility of going back to war. They argued that rightsizing could create dissatisfaction within the ranks of the SPLA and the communities. Yet most agreed on demobilizing vulnerable groups.

## Conclusion

The commitment of the GoSS and the SPLA to the transformation process has been demonstrated on various occasions. So far, the political and legal frameworks for the transformation of the security sector in general, and the SPLA in particular, are complete. Southern Sudan's security policy is finalized, as are the SPLA White Paper on Defence and the SPLA Act of 2009. The SPLA pension policy is in its final stages. SPLA General Headquarters is developing a military strategy, which will be the basis for force development and size and for strategic planning. It is clear that the strategic direction and the fundamentals for the transformation are in place. It must be understood, however, that these policy directions are only as good as their implementation. The next level of engagement will be the development of programmes to assist the implementation process. In this regard, the strategic planning process will be key.

The GoSS owned the process by which policies were developed. Not only did SPLA leaders provide directions, but SPLA members were also chairing and leading the various committees that were instrumental in the development of the documents. The Legislative Assembly of Southern Sudan, the cabinet, and other smaller committees deliberated intently on draft documents, made

substantial amendments, and finally endorsed them. This aspect of the process is important because it is the basis for the continued development and implementation of the directions.

The other important aspect is that, for an undertaking as complex as the transformation of a guerrilla army into a professional one, many interrelated activities must be carried out and coordinated. This cannot be done using normal army structures. Participants in the March workshop agreed that there was a need for a transformation secretariat that reports directly to the SPLA Command Council, a consultative body chaired by the commander-in-chief that deliberates on all strategic issues (SSLA, 2009, p. 17). The March workshop represents the moment in the transformation of the SPLA at which the generation of policy frameworks was essentially complete and implementation could begin.

Lastly, I would like to highlight the importance of implementing the agreed policies and directions practically. In the course of implementing the agreed policy directions, some issues will require revision and updating. The security policy and SPLA White Paper on Defence are products of separate processes. As such, they may eventually require revision and harmonizing. This could be done as part of the review process.

# Abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| **CPA** | Comprehensive Peace Agreement |
| **DDR** | Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration |
| **DfID** | UK Department for International Development |
| **GoSS** | Government of Southern Sudan |
| **JIU** | Joint Integrated Unit |
| **NCP** | National Congress Party |
| **OAG** | Other Armed Group |
| **SAF** | Sudanese Armed Forces |
| **SPLA** | Sudan People's Liberation Army |
| **SPLM** | Sudanese People's Liberation Movement |
| **SSDF** | Southern Sudan Defence Forces |
| **SSDDT** | Southern Sudan Defence Development and Transformation |
| **SSR** | Security sector reform |

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