1.1 How does your state implement UNSCRs on sanctions through your domestic legal framework?

Rationale and References

Article 25 of the UN Charter obliges member states to comply with the decisions of the UN Security Council. The success of measures taken by the UN Security Council under Article 41 largely depends on whether they are implemented effectively at the national level and give effect to resolutions through legislative, regulatory, and administrative action. Furthermore, 'rigorous design, monitoring and compliance with the agreed terms of such embargoes can contribute significantly to the promotion of international peace and security, and to the respect of a wide range of human rights and fundamental freedoms as required in international law' (Wood, 2006b, para. 1, p. 1).

Examples

Some states' constitutions stipulate that legal obligations resulting from international treaties (including UNSCRs) to which the state is a party are in themselves an integral part of the legal system. Others have adopted legislation specifically designed to transpose UNSCRs (including on sanctions) into the domestic legal framework (often referred to as a 'UN enabling act' or a 'UN act').

Some states transpose UN Security Council sanctions resolutions into the domestic legal order on a case-by-case basis through legal instruments such as cabinet orders, ministerial ordinances, presidential decrees, or executive orders. The choice of these legal instruments often depends on the legal nature of the resolution, the domestic legal structures, and the relevant domestic laws and regulations.

1.2 What domestic provisions are in place to prevent the transfer, brokering, transit/trans-shipment, and use of flagged vessels/registered aircraft for the delivery of prohibited items (such as conventional arms) to embargoed entities or those acting on their behalf?

Rationale and References

For states to be fully compliant with UNSCRs that impose arms embargoes, laws, regulations, and administrative procedures must be in place to provide competent authorities with the appropriate powers to deny the following rights: to conduct or facilitate transactions involving arms or any other embargoed items; to dispose of assets or conduct financial transactions; or to travel across the international borders of the state (CCSI, 2020, pp. 53–57).

Examples

Some states, for example, restrict the transit and trans-shipment of sanctioned goods and services by requiring a specific licence to be issued by a competent national authority for this express purpose.

2.1 Does your state have competent national authorities that are designated/mandated to implement UN arms embargoes? If so, what are they?

Rationale and References

As noted in the Implementation Handbook for UN Sanctions on North Korea by Compliance and Capacity Skills International, it is important for states to adopt comprehensive mandates for all relevant government entities that are required to participate in the implementation and enforcement of UN sanctions (CCSI, 2019, p. 54).

Examples

Government agencies and authorities that should be represented in and have mandates for implementation and enforcement activities of the state include, among others, those dealing with:

• trade control and related licensing, as well as border inspections of cargo;
• immigration, visa-issuing procedures, and border control;
• oversight of financial and transportation industries, including their intermediaries;
• judiciary and law enforcement, as well as internal security;
• external relations and security;
• oversight of the domestic defence equipment manufacturing sector;
• the trade of arms and military goods, including stockpile management and regulations related to brokers and brokering; and
• licensing and oversight of civilian maritime and aviation traffic, including vessels, crewing, and insurance.

The examples listed above are drawn from the Implementation Handbook for UN Sanctions on North Korea (CCSI, 2019, p. 54).

2.2 Does your state have an inter-agency coordination mechanism for sanctions implementation?

Rationale and References

The adoption of a comprehensive mandate that allows for the creation of a national coordination mechanism for all sanctions related activities is crucial to the successful implementation and enforcement of sanctions; the mandate should also enable the coordinator to convene all relevant government entities that are required to participate in the implementation and enforcement of UN sanctions. The exact composition of such a mechanism may vary depending on the nature of the sanction, reflecting the fact that sanctions implementation is often a multisectoral affair that involves different government agencies, ministries, and departments (CCSI, 2019, p. 54).

Examples

In the case of the Netherlands, inter-agency cooperation between the customs officials and relevant departments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is facilitated by an automated system for the issuance and management of permits This system allows customs officials to send all relevant documents pertaining to a case to the competent national authority dealing with either dual-use or military goods. The system is comprised of the customs agency—that is, the Precursors, Origin, Strategic Goods and Sanctions Legislation Team (Precursoren, Oorsprong, Strategische Goederen, Sanctiewetgeving - POSS) and the Central Import and Export Office (Centrale Dienst voor In- en Uitvoer - CDIU) —and the Department of Security Policy (Directie Veiligheidsbeleid) as well as the Department of International Trade Policy and Economic Governance (Directie internationale Marktordening en Handelspolitiek) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It facilitates communication between the relevant departments and has decreased the time required to deal with requests for export permits.

Regular meetings, held every 6 to 8 weeks, on both operational and policy-related topics take place between representatives of the various ministries and other relevant agencies, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, POSS and CDIU, the Public Prosecution Service, and various investigative agencies. A committee on the sale of military materiel comprised of representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence, and the Ministry of Finance meets about three times a year. The Dutch Central Bank (De Nederlandsche Bank - DNB), the Authority for Financial Markets (Autoriteit Financiële Markten - AFM), and the Human Environment and Transport Inspectorate ( Inspectie Leefomgeving en Transport - ILT) are also involved in ensuring that sanctions regimes are respected.

The following example illustrates how this inter-agency system has worked in practice in the Netherlands in relation to a suspected DPRK sanctions violation. After a tip-off that a ship officially destined for China might be in violation of the DPRK sanctions regime, Dutch customs officials seized the ship while it was docking at Rotterdam. The ship had previously stopped in Hamburg and had been automatically flagged for inspection by the customs agency's computer system (Winterman, 2019). On board the ship, the container in question was located underneath an aircraft fuselage, making it hard for customs at Rotterdam to extract it. Due to the complexity of the case, customs officials contacted the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The then Minister of Foreign Trade, Sigrid Kaag, decided that the container should be unloaded in Rotterdam, despite the potential economic consequences for the shipping company, which would have to deal with delays, and despite the risk of damaging the aircraft fuselage. A large quantity of vodka believed to be destined for North Korea was discovered in the container, which would constitute a violation of the sanctions on the DPRK. In this particular case, the close cooperation and communication between the various departments (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, customs, intelligence agencies, and others) was key to a successful intervention.

3.1 Are competent national authorities designated/mandated to enforce UN arms embargoes?

Rationale and References

Under the UN Charter, member states are obliged to give effect to Security Council decisions. States are therefore required to enforce UN sanctions adopted under Article 41 of the UN Charter, irrespective of the extent to which the relevant UNSCRs have been integrated into the domestic legal system. States are also obliged to provide all necessary actors within their government with the necessary legal competences, tools, and resources to achieve their tasks in relation to the enforcement of arms embargoes. An inter-agency coordination mechanism can contribute to the effectiveness of the institution and help to coordinate and harmonize policies, practices, and procedures.

Examples

In the Netherlands, for example, the legal mandate for such a mechanism stems from its Sanctions Law (1977), which provides the framework for the implementation of international sanctions. More in-depth information on the mechanism's workflows, inter-agency cooperation, and various relevant processes and procedures are contained in the Policy Evaluation on Non-proliferation, Arms Control, and Export Controls of Strategic Good from 2018.

In the Netherlands, inter-agency cooperation between the customs officials and relevant departments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is facilitated by the automated system for the issuance and management of permits. The system allows customs officials to send all relevant documents pertaining to a case to the competent national authority dealing with either dual-use or military goods. The system is comprised of the customs agency—that is, the Precursoren, Oorsprong, Strategische Goederen, Sanctiewetgeving (Precursors, Origin, Strategic Goods and Sanctions Legislation Team, POSS) and the Centrale Dienst voor In- en Uitvoer (Central Import and Export Office, CDIU)—and the Directie Veiligheidsbeleid (Department of Security Policy) as well as the Directie internationale Marktordening en Handelspolitiek (Department of International Trade Policy and Economic Governance) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It facilitates communication between the relevant departments and has decreased the time required to deal with requests for export permits.

Regular meetings, held every 6 to 8 weeks, on both operational and policy-related topics take place between representatives of the various ministries and other relevant agencies, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, POSS, CDIU, the Public Prosecution Service, and various investigative agencies. A committee on the sale of military materiel comprised of representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence, and the Ministry of Finance meets about three times a year. The DNB, AFM, and ILT are also involved in ensuring that sanctions regimes are respected.

South Africa is another interesting example as it has integrated penal provisions for the violation of sanctions into its domestic legal framework. The Government of South Africa has implemented a sliding-scale approach to penalizing violations of its National Conventional Arms Control Act, by explicitly extending the scope of application of the act to include the UN Security Council's sanctions regime (South Africa, 2002, sec. 15(f)). South African courts are thus empowered to impose either a fine or a term of imprisonment ranging from 10 to 25 years, or both, depending on the nature of the violation, when sentencing persons or entities (or those acting on their behalf) for violations of the National Conventional Arms Control Act (sec. 24).

3.2 What measures does your state take to ensure compliance with UN arms embargoes?

Rationale and References

'UN arms embargo resolutions stipulate that member states must:

• prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale, or transfer of arms to a state, territory or entity such as a designated terrorist organization;
• prevent transport of arms from or through the implementing state's territories;
• prevent transport of arms by the implementing state's nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft‘ (CCSI, 2019, p. 38).

The effective enforcement of sanctions requires member states to investigate and prosecute violations and impose penalties in order to deter further circumventions (Wallensteen et al., 2003, para. 170, p. 69).

The implementation of sanctions requires regular training of staff and institutional development. Key beneficiaries for training on implementation and enforcement of sanctions include, among others, custom authorities; police; border guards; coast guards; airport, railroad, seaport, and road transportation authorities; and financial regulators (Wallensteen et al., 2003, para. 153, p. 63).

Government outreach to relevant industry and commercial operators is an important part of ensuring compliance and enforcing sanctions. This can include making available regularly updated and sector-specific information and guidance, as well as actively disseminating this information to commercial actors in the field of arms manufacturing and exporting companies, trading companies, transportation companies, shipping agents, financiers, insurers, private security, and military companies. Member states are required to ensure that individuals, businesses, and organizations within their jurisdiction comply with the provisions of UN sanctions (CCSI, 2019, p. 55; see also Wallensteen et al., 2003, para. 143, p. 61).

Examples

UN Security Council arms embargo resolutions prescribe how states are to fulfil the obligations. States choose their own methods for undertaking and ensuring national compliance with these requirements. Namibia's Prevention and Combating of Terrorist and Proliferation Activities Act of 2014, for example, has an entire section on measures aimed at implementing UNSCRs (Namibia, 2014). These regulations relate to various tasks, such as:

• publishing lists of sanctioned persons or organizations designated by the Security Council;
• issuing orders to freeze the funds and assets of persons or organizations designated by the Security Council;
• requesting the delisting of persons or organizations designated by the Security Council;
• informing sanctions committees of actions taken in relation to designated or delisted persons or organizations, or of cases of non-compliance;
• prohibiting the procurement, supply, provision, import, or export of certain weapons, arms, and related materials;
• circulating the domestic ‘sanctions list', comprising persons, groups, undertakings, entities, or countries subject to United Nations sanctions; and
• defining offences and penalties in relation to sanctions.

4.1 How does your state cooperate with the UN on the implementation and enforcement of UN arms embargoes?

Rationale and References

Most sanction regimes require states to report to the relevant sanctions committee on structural measures adopted by the state, such as legal or regulatory measures undertaken to effectively implement sanctions domestically.

These reports play an important role in helping the sanctions committee and its panel of experts assist member states to fully implement the relevant resolutions.

In addition, UNSCRs imposing sanctions on particular countries regularly request and sometimes require UN member states to cooperate with the relevant sanctions committee and associated panel of experts, including reporting on concrete steps (such as inspections of cargo) taken to address actual or suspected sanctions violations and their outcomes, and ensuring unhindered access to persons, documents, and sites within its jurisdiction to enable the panel of experts to execute its mandate.

Standardized and institutionalized processes allow states not only to fulfil obligations for periodical reporting, but also to respond promptly and thoroughly to requests for information from the panel of experts. For an overview of the sanctions committee and the panel of experts, see the section on background to the UN Security Council arms embargoes.

Examples

The UN panel of experts' reports, along with the general reports of sanctions committee activities, document examples of how states have reported to the committee and often contain detailed accounts of exchanges between states and the panels of experts. To access the panel of experts' reports from different sanction regimes, visit the UN Security Council's website.

For details of UNSCRs that require states to report on their implementation of UN sanctions, see, for instance, the respective paragraphs for the sanctions regimes concerning the Central African Republic (UNSCR 2127, para. 58) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (UNSCR 1533, para. 9). The UN sanctions committee reports regularly contain information on cooperation with states, for instance with regards to exemption notifications to the committee or requests for information and follow-up with the respective panel of experts (see, for example, the most recent Report by the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1970 concerning Libya (UNSC 1970 Sanctions Committee, 2020) or annex 3 of the Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen (Yemen, 2021a).

4.2 How does your state cooperate with other states and regional organizations on the implementation and enforcement of UN sanctions?

Rationale and References

Cooperation on sanctions implementation and enforcement among states, bilaterally or through regional organizations, as well as between states and specialized institutions, contributes to a more efficient sanctions regime overall.

The implementation of UN sanctions can be improved through regional and bilateral cooperation, such as capacity-building efforts, enhanced information sharing, joint enforcement operations, or provisions for mutual legal assistance or tracing.

Examples

The Fourth Maritime Security Conference on Comprehensive Implementation of Maritime Provisions of DPRK UNSCRs included one working group session, held on 10 February 2021, dedicated to the question of flag registries (see 'flag state' in glossary). Although the session focused on this question in relation to DPRK sanctions evasion tactics, it also highlighted the following good practices that may apply more generally:

• establish a common standard between registries for due diligence, registration, and compliance, such as a protocol or a code of conduct to establish a baseline for credible registries;
• develop a best-practice guide for registries, which serves not only as a useful tool for compliance but also potentially as a metric of risk for financial institutions and insurers;
• join or establish an information-sharing mechanism, such as the Registry Information Sharing Compact, which could also be used as a 'collective bargaining' tool to access information platforms beyond the resources of a single registry (such as satellite imagery);
• conduct a full audit of vessels in a registry and investigate vessels of potential concern (international assistance can be requested to support such a process); and
• require vessels to request permission from their registry before conducting a ship-to-ship transfer.

4.3 Does your state currently work, or has it worked in the past, with partners (such as other states, the UN or its specialized agencies, other multilateral and regional organizations, and civil society organizations) to increase capacity to implement sanctions?

Rationale and References

Member states require considerable skills and administrative capacities to implement and enforce sanctions. Capacity building through bilateral relationships, within regional organizations or multilateral institutions, can facilitate knowledge exchange and the identification of best practices, foster regional networks, and—more generally—enhance government capacity.

Examples

The Partner-to-Partner Export Control Programme of the European Union (EU) is set up to transfer information on best practices to third countries in order to assist them in fulfilling their international obligations, most notably under UNSCR 1540 on the non-proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery. As part of the programme, experts from the EU Military Staff offer their expertise to third countries, with the aim of enhancing the effectiveness of dual-use export controls worldwide.

The Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) Program of the US Department of State 'seeks to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and destabilizing accumulations and irresponsible transfers of conventional weapons by building effective national strategic trade control systems in countries that possess, produce, or supply strategic items, as well as in countries through which such items are most likely to transit […]. The program works with partner governments to identify regulatory and institutional gaps and to develop resource requirements. The program provides a wide range of technical assistance, from executive exchanges to training workshops to the provision of detection equipment and specialized training for border control and enforcement agencies.'

1.1 Before importing conventional arms or contracting for related services (for example, via brokers), does your state take measures to ensure that arms-related imports do not involve designated North Korean entities (or entities acting on their behalf), personnel, or prohibited items? If so, please elaborate on these measures and/or provide an explanation of your state’s needs.

Rationale and References

With specific reference to imports, UNSCRs require that states ‘shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale, or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories’, of all arms and related materiel, including small arms and light weapons and related materiel (UNSCR 1718, para. 8(a); UNSCR 2270, paras. 6 and 9).

As a part of ‘due diligence’ in considering potential imports, states are advised to consult UN and other designation lists, along with UN panel of experts’ reports, to check potential contractors against lists of designated and suspect entities, including their contact information (that is, listed physical addresses, phone numbers, email addresses, etc.). The list of individuals, entities, and other groups—established and maintained by the UN pursuant to UNSCR 1718—can be found online. This list, dated 2018, was updated on 11 May 2020, but this version is currently unavailable. It consists of individuals and entities whose names were submitted to the sanctions committee at the request of states.

Examples

As part of an embargo evasion technique employed by North Korea, North Korean arms brokers establish offices overseas in order to source, broker, or trans-ship arms-related goods as a means to disguise their origin or conceal North Korean involvement (Griffiths, 2020, pp. 28–29). For example, as documented in the March 2019 report by the UN DPRK panel of experts, the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation used Future Electronic Company, based in Beijing, to supply Sudan with prohibited products and services. A member state provided information to the panel regarding this set-up, and Sudan took steps to inform the panel and to prevent the broker concerned from re-entering Sudan (UNSC, 2019, paras. 84–85, annexes 26–27).

The UN panel of experts report of 2017 (UNSC, 2017, pp. 28–30) describes the case of the Cambodian-flagged vessel Jie Shun. This vessel was stopped en route to the Suez Canal in August 2016 by Egyptian authorities. On board, the authorities discovered not only UNSCR-prohibited North Korean iron ore but also, beneath the iron ore, one of the largest consignments of conventional munitions ever discovered aboard a North Korea-linked vessel. The Jie Shun was also found to be partly crewed and captained by North Korean nationals. An article by the Royal United Services Institute’s Project Sandstone further documents this case (Byrne and Plant, 2019).

2.1 Does your state have measures in place to ensure that prohibited items are not conveyed in transit through your state? If so, please elaborate on these measures and/or provide an explanation of your state's needs.

Rationale and References

UN Security Council DPRK sanctions resolutions outline a range of obligations regarding transit/trans-shipment:

• UNSCR 1718, para. 8(a);
• UNSCR 1874, para. 9;
• UNSCR 2270, paras. 7 and 8;
• UNSCR 2094, paras. 10, 11, and 22; and
• UNSCR 2321, paras. 13 and 20.

Examples

Mauritius reported in its 2016 national implementation report (NIR) that it had, since 2013, instructed ground handlers at the main port and airport to inspect all cargo emanating from North Korea, and the National Coast Guard to conduct maritime checks in the exclusive economic zone (Mauritius, 2016a, p. 4).

In its 2010 report, the DPRK panel of experts noted the following two cases involving the seizure of DPRK vessels:

'In August 2009, the United Arab Emirates reported to the Committee that it had seized on 22 July 2009 military shipment aboard ANL Australia. The Committee requested further information from relevant Member States and the Panel of Experts began its own inquiries. ANL Australia is owned by ANL Container Line Pty Ltd, an Australian-registered company. The ship was registered on the Commonwealth of the Bahamas Ship Registry. The shipper of the cargo was the Pyongyang representative office of OTIM SPA, an Italian shipping company. The cargo was falsely described on the shipping documents as oil boring machine (spare parts). The cargo was custom sealed and loaded on a Democratic People's Republic of Korea ship in the port of Nampo, DPRK, and trans-shipped multiple times on its way to the declared destination, Bandar Abbass, Islamic Republic of Iran' (UNSC, 2010, para. 61).

'In February 2010, the Panel of Experts was apprised of the discovery and seizure of a shipment of spare parts destined to refurbish T-54/T-55 military tanks and other military goods located in the Republic of Congo. The shipment was interdicted by the South African Government in the Port of Durban on route to Pointe Noire, Republic of Congo. The cargo had its origin in the DPRK and was forwarded to Dalian, China, where it was loaded aboard the United Kingdom-flagged vessel CGM Musca, owned by the French company CMA CGM, on 20 October 2009. A large quantity of rice grains packed in sacks lined the containers. The shipper was subsequently identified as Machinery Exp. and Imp. Corp. in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. After leaving Dalian, China, the cargo was offloaded in Port Klang, Malaysia, and transferred to the Westerhever, a ship flying the Liberia flag chartered by Delmas Shipping, a subsidiary of CMA CGM. The shipping documents listed the contents of the containers only as "spare parts of bulldozer"' (UNSC, 2010, para. 63).

2.2 What measures regarding the transit/trans-shipment of arms and materiel from or to the DPRK are taken by your state to regulate activities by your own nationals, persons subject to your national jurisdiction, and entities incorporated in your territory or subject to your national jurisdiction in relation to the DPRK?

Rationale and References

UN member states are obliged to fully implement UN sanctions under international law. States are therefore also responsible for ensuring that persons subject to national jurisdiction and entities subject to national jurisdiction comply with the obligations imposed by UN sanctions. This is reinforced in the language of UNSCR 1196, in which the council '[r]eiterates the obligation of all Member States to carry out decisions of the Council on arms embargoes' (para. 1) and '[e]ncourages each Member State, as appropriate, to consider as a means of implementing the obligations referred to in paragraph 1 above the adoption of legislation or other legal measures making the violation of arms embargoes established by the Council as a criminal offence' (para. 2).

Examples

In 2016, the UN Security Council decided that member states are required to 'de-register any vessel that is owned, controlled, or operated by the DPRK [and] that Member States shall not register any such vessel that has been de-registered by another Member State pursuant to this paragraph' (UNSC 2321, para. 24). During a recent symposium on flag state responsibilities and other issues at the International Maritime Organization Headquarters, Malta reported the deflagging of vessels due to suspected breaches of UN sanctions. In this regard, Malta also noted that the Maltese Merchant Shipping Act provided a robust mechanism that facilitates this process, and that the Malta Ship Registrar General is a member of the national Sanctions Monitoring Board. The intervention further demonstrated the importance of information sharing between registering states with the principal aim of preventing ship registries from reflagging problematic ships involved in sanctions violations (Malta MFEA, 2020). Similarly, the Maritime Authority of one of the largest shipping nations worldwide, Panama, announced the introduction of measures against Panamanian-flagged vessels 'that deliberately deactivate, tamper or alter the operation of Long Range Identification and Tracking System or the Automatic Identification System' (Moreno, 2020; see also Parraga et al., 2019).

2.3 What measures are taken if designated North Korean entities (or those acting on their behalf), personnel, or equipment are implicated in a potential transit/trans-shipment? Please elaborate on these measures and/or provide an explanation of your state's needs.

Rationale and References

As per relevant UNSCRs, states are authorized to seize and dispose of (for example, through destroying, rendering inoperable or unusable, storing, or transferring to a state other than the originating or destination states for disposal) items whose supply, sale, transfer, or export is prohibited by the resolutions. In addition, all member states shall seize, inspect, and freeze (impound) any vessel in their ports—and may seize, inspect, and freeze (impound) any vessel subject to its jurisdiction in its territorial waters—if the member state has reasonable grounds to believe that the vessel was involved in activities, or the transport of items, prohibited by relevant resolutions (UNSC 1718 Sanctions Committee, 2018b, secs. XVII (inspection and transportation) and XVIII (seizure and disposal)).

Examples

UN Security Council 1718 Committee Implementation Assistance Notice No. 5 on the 'M/V Chong Chon Gang Incident' documents an example of where a member state identified, prevented the transfer of, and seized a shipment of illicit conventional arms and related materiel. The member state then notified the panel of experts, which conducted its own on-site investigation and confirmed the suspected violation. The 1718 Committee concluded, inter alia, the following: 'The concealment […] demonstrates intent to evade UN sanctions, and is consistent with previous attempts by the DPRK to transfer arms and related materiel through similar tactics in contravention of Security Council prohibitions. The Committee encourages States to be aware of these patterns of concealment and, in accordance with the relevant UNSC resolutions, take action with respect to shipments under similar circumstances if there is credible information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains prohibited items' (IAN No. 5, p. 2).

3.1 Does your state have measures in place to ensure that prohibited arms-related items are not exported to the DPRK? If so, please elaborate on these measures and/or provide an explanation of your state's needs.

Rationale and References

The UNSCRs require the DPRK to cease the export of all arms and related materiel (UNSCR 1718, para. 8(a); UNSCR 1874, para. 9; see also UNSC 1718 Sanctions Committee, 2018b).

The general criteria laid out in the EU Council Common Position of 8 December 2008 Defining Common Rules Governing Control of Exports of Military Technology and Equipment may be helpful for undertaking 'risk assessments' related to possible exports to the DPRK (CoEU, 2008). Criteria 6 and 7 are particularly relevant in this context:

• Criterion 6: 'Behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, as regards in particular its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and respect for international law.'
• Criterion 7: 'Existence of a risk that the military technology or equipment will be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions.'

Example

In an NIR on DPRK sanctions, Greece reported that, since at least 2006, it has prohibited the transfer of arms unless a specific licence is issued by the Ministry of Economy and Finance; a similar licence is required for transit and trans-shipment (UNSC, 2007a). An alternative approach taken by certain states is to adapt pre-existing licensing legislation to fulfil the obligations imposed by the sanctions resolutions. New Zealand reported that the export of sanctioned goods listed in UNSCR 1718 already requires a permit, and that this legislation would be adapted to prohibit the export of these items to the DPRK (UNSC, 2006a).

3.2 What measures are taken if designated North Korean entities (or those acting on their behalf), personnel, or equipment are implicated in a potential export? Please elaborate on these measures and/or provide an explanation of your state's needs.

Rationale and References

A range of actions can be taken by UN member states where actors are found to be in violation of UN sanctions on exports (see also UNSC 1718 Sanctions Committee, 2018b). These include:

• inspecting cargo being transported (directly or indirectly) to the DPRK, or shipments brokered by the DPRK, and subsequently notifying the sanctions committee and panel of experts, even if no illicit items were found;
• seizing and detaining goods and vessels if they are found to be in the territorial waters of the member states;
• freezing funds, other financial assets, and economic resources if they are identified on member state territories that are owned or controlled directly or indirectly by individuals or entities designated by the committee or by the UNSC sanctions;
• informing the panel of experts, the 1718 Sanctions Committee, and other relevant parties (including private shipping companies, banks, insurance companies, and relevant authorities in other states);
• sharing information such as aliases, front companies, names of sanctioned individuals, and other relevant details of sanction-evading shipments in a timely manner with other member states and the panel of experts; and
• levying penalties on actors found to be in violation of UN sanctions on exports (penalties for such offences are often laid out in civil, administrative, or criminal codes, and in general terms where states have non-proliferation acts).

Example

Namibia's Prevention and Combating of Terrorist and Proliferation Activities Act of 2014, for example, has an entire section on regulations relating to the implementation of Security Council decisions (Namibia, 2014). These regulations relate to various tasks, such as:

• publishing lists of sanctioned persons or organizations designated by the Security Council; issuing orders to freeze the funds and assets of persons or organizations designated by the Security Council;
• requesting the delisting of persons or organizations subject to sanctions by the Security Council;
• informing sanctions committees of actions taken in relation to listed or delisted persons or organizations subject to sanctions, or of cases of non-compliance;
• prohibiting the procurement, supply, provision, import, or export of certain weapons, arms, and related materials; circulating the domestic proscription list; and
• defining offences and penalties.

4.1 Does your state have measures in place to prevent the procurement of prohibited security assistance? If so, please elaborate on these measures and/or provide an explanation of your state's needs.

Rationale and References

Paragraph 9 of UNSCR 1874 prohibits the supply of 'all arms and related materiel as well as technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of such arms or materiel' by North Korea. Paragraph 9 of UNSCR 2270 'prohibits States from engaging in the hosting of trainers, advisors, or other officials for the purpose of military, paramilitary, or police-related training'.

Examples

In its 2016 NIR, Uganda, in reporting on implementation of UNSCR 2270, noted that it had not renewed an existing agreement with the DPRK for the provision of military training in martial arts and acrobatics; the report also stated that Uganda would not be renewing an agreement that provided for the instruction and training of the Ugandan police force in the areas of martial arts, marine rescue, and security and technical matters, nor an agreement 'for the provision of training to pilots and technicians of the Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces' (UNSC, 2016b). Mozambique announced that it had 'formally suspended its cooperation with the authorities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the field of defence and security in September 2016' and that it had 'no relationship with public or private entities in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that are dedicated to the arms trade or trafficking, such as the Haegeumgang Trading Corporation' (UNSC 2020, p. 3).

5.1 Are DPRK diplomatic personnel and facilities located in your state's territory? If so, what measures does your state take to ensure that diplomatic channels are not used by North Korea to evade arms-related prohibitions laid out in UNSCRs?

Rationale and References

In its regular reports, the UN DPRK panel of experts has often reported instances of diplomatic channels being used, in various ways, by North Korea to supply prohibited goods and services, including the sale and promotion of conventional weapons, military training, and technical cooperation and other services.

Implementation Assistance Notice No. 2 asks: 'Have concrete measures, procedures, legislation, regulations or policies been adopted in order to […] prevent (restrict) entry or transit of designated individuals together with their family members; of any individual acting on behalf or at the direction of a designated individual or entity or violating the sanctions or assisting in their evasion; of members of the Government of the DPRK, officials of that government, and members of the DPRK armed forces if the State determines that such members or officials are associated with the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other activities prohibited by resolutions?' (UNSC 1718 Sanctions Committee, 2018a, art. 5).

Examples

Drawing on panel of experts' reports, the Small Arms Survey's Supporting Effective Implementation of United Nations Sanctions on North Korea provides many examples of DPRK use of diplomatic channels to evade sanctions (pp. 75–86), including the following: 'In 2016, the Embassy of North Korea military attaché's office offered the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) prohibited military services including "presidential guard and special forces training, tank crew training, tank repair, military strategic infrastructure construction" via the Embassy of South Sudan in Uganda. The above services were provided to Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and Uganda between 2011 and 2018 and were facilitated by North Korean diplomats purportedly accredited in these or neighbouring Member States' (Griffiths, 2020, p. 80, citing UNSC, 2017, annex 12-8).

Examples of measures that states can take include the following:

• cooperating with the UN panel of experts investigating accredited North Korean diplomats and those travelling to or transiting through member states using diplomatic or service passports;
• using inter-agency working groups comprised of domestic security services; intelligence services; customs, border control, immigration agencies; and ministries of foreign affairs, justice, and defence to monitor accredited North Korean diplomats, visiting and transiting diplomatic and service passport holders, and related suspect activities on your territory;
• sharing information with other member states on North Korean diplomats expelled or suspected of sanctions violations and evasion practices (Griffiths, 2020, p. 88);
• investigating North Korean diplomatic banking activities carried out within or from the national territory;
• informing accredited North Korean diplomats of the various measures and obligations contained within UN Security Council DPRK sanctions resolutions and warning them of the consequences of violations or evasion practices, particularly Paragraph 13 of UNSCR 2270; and
• expelling North Korean diplomatic and service passport holders if there are reasonable grounds to suspect them of sanctions violations, related evasion practices, or other behaviour incompatible with the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations (UN, 1961; 1963; UNSCR 2094, para. 10; see also Griffiths, 2020, p. 89).

6.1 Does your state conduct outreach, awareness-raising, and training activities on the DPRK arms embargo with relevant government ministries and agencies? If so, please elaborate on these measures and/or provide an explanation of your state's needs.

Rationale and References

Many government departments, ministries, and other bodies will normally be involved in national arms-related transactions in various ways, including procurement decisions, licensing processes, and border or customs control. Relevant agencies in this context include:

• customs and trade control authorities;
• airport and seaport authorities;
• intelligence services and law enforcement agencies;
• the trade control licensing authority;
• immigration and border control authorities; and
• diplomatic accreditation authorities (CCSI, 2019, pp. 57–58).

It is essential that such bodies are effectively informed of DPRK sanctions regime prohibitions and obligations and have the capacity to act.

Example

In its 2016 NIR, South Africa noted that the South African Revenue Service had amended 'customs risk engine rules [to] identify and effect compulsory stops on all goods originating from, being exported to or destined for' the DPRK and had provided 'basic instructions to guide customs officers to ensure the prohibition of any goods found in contravention' of UNSCR 2270 (UNSC, 2016c).

Descriptions of sanctions information outreach to relevant internal agencies, as well as private sector actors (such as banking systems, associations of commercial ship owners, and insurers) can also be found in many DPRK NIRs submitted by states. For example, the following states, inter alia, have reported that they have taken measures to notify relevant domestic authorities of the contents of the sanctions resolutions on the DPRK: Albania (UNSC, 2006c); Israel (UNSC, 2007c); Mexico (UNSC, 2006e); Portugal (UNSC, 2006b); South Africa (UNSC, 2006d; UNSC, 2016c); Turkey (UNSC, 2007d); and Vietnam (UNSC, 2007b).

Certain states also stipulate the necessity to inform other relevant actors of the contents of the sanctions resolutions. In 2006, Portugal reported that it had taken steps to inform—in addition to all relevant state institutions—the national banking system, the national civil aviation authority, national airlines, the sea traffic authority, and the association of commercial ship owners of the contents of UNSCR 1718 (UNSC, 2006b, para. 1; see Question 6.2 on private sector outreach).

6.2 Does your state conduct outreach, awareness-raising, and training activities on the DPRK arms embargo for its domestic and foreign arms-related contracting community and commercial operators in your state?

Rationale and References

Private sector entities (such as exporters and importers of goods and services, shipping agents and companies, insurance companies, and banks) are key actors in shaping the success or failure of the DPRK sanctions regime in preventing or limiting DPRK sanctions evasion strategies and tactics. Because of the complexity of the DPRK sanctions requirements, private sector actors can become unwittingly involved in DPRK sanctions evasion. Taking steps to inform and strengthen the capacity of these entities in relation to DPRK sanctions compliance is an important component of national policy.

The US Department of State, the US Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), and the US Coast Guard have issued the following guidance to assist both governments and private sector entities: Guidance to Address Illicit Shipping and Sanctions Evasion Practices (US DoS et al., 2020). The UK has also issued similar instructions: Maritime Guidance: Financial Sanctions Guidance for Entities and Individuals Operating within the Maritime Shipping Sector (UK OFSI, 2020).

Example

The Fourth Maritime Security Conference on Comprehensive Implementation of Maritime Provisions of DPRK UNSCRs included a working group session, held on 4 March 2021, dedicated to examining the challenges and best practices for the maritime private sector in implementing and enforcing the maritime provisions of UNSCRs related to the DPRK. The participants concluded that states can inform and strengthen the capacity of these actors by:

• issuing regular and tailored guidance;
• holding regular 'outreach days' for private sector entities;
• conducting online and/or in-person training;
• maintaining a website that is regularly updated and provides relevant, centralized, and user-friendly information (including databases for screening); and
• undertaking regular consultations with private sector entities, such as maintaining a 'hot line' that such entities can use when confronting an ambiguous or difficult situation requiring expert advice.

The session also identified how states can improve outreach with the private sector, including by:

• translating relevant information into local languages and making it easily accessible;
• hosting outreach events with the private sector and other actors through roundtables and other face-to-face meetings;
• creating regularized channels of communication with representatives of the private sector, such as shipping sector associations;
• making lists of 'risky' vessels publicly available, and listing vessels mentioned in panel of expert reports; and
• disseminating relevant updates and new information through newsletters, social media, or other online channels.

Japan's current practice in the maritime domain helps to illustrate the scope of measures that can be taken. The Government of Japan aims to prevent Japanese companies and individuals from becoming unwittingly involved in sanctions violations by:

• providing the relevant industries with timely sanction-related information (such as a 'watch list' of vessels designated by the 1718 Sanctions Committee, panel of experts' reports, or US and South Korean notices, as well as online information from the Ministry of Finance on entities and individuals on the sanctions list);
• reaching out to relevant actors to notify them of 'risky' vessels that might be expected to try to enter Japan's ports; and
• conducting outreach activities with individual companies and industry groups through regular roundtable meetings between competent authorities and major industry groups in the financial sector, and awareness-raising seminars for the maritime industry (Japan, 2021).

7.1 Does your state have procedures/processes for responding to/cooperating with the UN DPRK panel of experts in case of requests? If so, please describe these procedures/processes?

Rationale and References

The DPRK panel of experts has a mandate to gather, examine, and analyse information from states, relevant UN bodies, and other interested parties regarding the implementation of measures' imposed by the sanctions-related UNSCRs (UNSC 1718 Sanctions Committee, 2017d, para. 13). The panel of experts also supports other 1718 Sanctions Committee efforts, including through outreach to member states on issues related to the implementation of sanctions, monitoring of sanctions implementation, and analysis of trends and 'best practices' regarding sanctions enforcement, as well as by holding special meetings (for example on challenges affecting the capacity of member states to meet the obligations imposed on them by the resolutions) (paras. 12–14). States are encouraged to cooperate and respond promptly and thoroughly to requests for information regarding actual and potential violations, as well as 'to invite the [panel of experts] to visit and inspect any items that may have been seized by national authorities. Prior to disposal, States are also encouraged to provide the [panel of experts] with documentary evidence, other materials and information that could further its investigations into incidents of non-compliance' (para. 15). The committee and the panel of experts seek to support and assist states in carrying out obligations imposed by the resolutions.

Examples

The regular reports of the DPRK panel of experts provide multiple examples of the ways in which states have engaged with the 1718 Committee and the panel of experts (see Annex 88 of the 2021 DPRK panel of experts report for a recent example (UNSC, 2021b, p. 374)).

In its NIR of 2020, Mozambique noted that '[i]n the spirit of transparency in the effective implementation of sanctions regime imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Government of Mozambique, in 2018 and 2019, repeatedly addressed an invitation to the panel of experts for monitoring the implementation of sanctions, which was established pursuant to Resolution 1874 (UNSCR 1874), to visit the country in order to witness the compliance of the measures taken by the country' (UNSC, 2020).

7.2 Has your state submitted national implementation reports (NIRs) to the 1718 Sanctions Committee?

Rationale and References

In 2017, the UN Security Council required 'all States to report to the Security Council within 90 days of the adoption of the resolution, and thereafter upon request by the Committee, on concrete measures they have taken in order to implement effectively provisions of the resolutions' (UNSCR 2397, para. 17). Based on this resolution, the 1718 Sanctions Committee Implementation Assistance Notice 2 clearly outlines the spectrum of areas that the UN encourages member states to report on in their NIRs (UNSC 1718 Sanctions Committee, 2018a). Overall, the DPRK UNSCRs contain ten separate reporting requirements that all UN member states are obligated to fulfil.

The UN Security Council's webpage for IANs includes IAN No. 2 and IAN No. 6, along with other IANs, and a 'Fact Sheet' on measures imposed by relevant UNSCRs (UNSC 1718 Sanctions Committee, 2017e; 2018a; 2018b). The 1718 Sanctions Committee and its panel of experts are available to respond to enquiries from states about how to interpret sanctions obligations.

A record of the NIRs submitted by UN member states can be found on the committee's webpage, which also demonstrates the range of ways in which states have reported via the NIR process.

Example

In February 2020, the Small Arms Survey conducted an inter-agency workshop, in collaboration with the Department of Development Cooperation and International Organisations of the Zambian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to assist Zambia in preparing its first NIR. The workshop succeeded in attracting 15 representatives from the following agencies: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Ministry of Defence; the Ministry of Home Affairs; Zambia Police; the Ministry of Finance; the Office of the President; the Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry; the Ministry of Justice; the Drug Enforcement Commission; the Immigration Department; the Financial Intelligence Centre; and the National Anti-Terrorism Centre. The workshop provided general information on DPRK arms-related sanctions violations, making use of the Survey's 'How-to Guides' (Griffiths, 2020) and took participants through the UN Security Council optional template for NIRs (UNSC 1718 Sanctions Committee, 2018a). By the end of the workshop, participants were able to define the extent to which measures contained in the UN Security Council optional template were covered by Zambia's Anti-Terrorism and Non-Proliferation Act (Zambia, 2018) and remaining gaps. The activities and content of the workshop provided participants with the tools necessary for Zambia to prepare and submit, for the first time, an NIR to the Security Council to cover eight UNSCRs related to North Korean sanctions. As of April 2022, however, Zambia has not yet submitted its first NIR.